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'IRAQ.

REPORT

ON

'IRAQ ADMINISTRATION.

OCTOBER, 1920—MARCH, 1922.

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Report on Iraq Administration.
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**Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner on the
Finances, Administration and Condition of
the 'Iraq, for the period from October
1st, 1920 to March 31st, 1922.**

I.—SURVEY OF THE PERIOD.

1.—POLITICAL AND GENERAL.

The Political Landscape.

In the long history of the 'Iraq there is perhaps no more pregnant period than the 18 months under review in this report. It opened on strife and uncertainty and the partial breakdown of the administration instituted during the years of military occupation; it closes on the picture of a National Government under an Arab Constitutional King, chosen by referendum to the people, its relations to the British Government to be defined by a treaty which will receive national confirmation at the elective congress which will shortly meet at Baghdad. To that congress will fall the duty of enacting an Organic Law which will give shape, on a constitutional basis, to the institutions of the infant State.

Yet though the change in the political landscape has been rapid it has been effected by orderly development. Dissonant elements are being gradually harmonized, inchoate instincts are merging towards sense of common interest in the stability of the new order and a growing appreciation of common nationality. It is on these features that I would lay special stress. Both from economic and from social aspects the population of the 'Iraq exhibits widely divergent stages of evolution; it comprises different races and creeds, and for the last 400 years its culture has been alien. Its future prosperity depends on the ability of its leading men to encourage fusion and the capacity of its peoples to see advantage in the abandonment of ancient separatist prejudices, that there may arise out of the strong existing sense of local patriotism and local piety, a wider loyalty and a more discerning reverence which will be prepared to subordinate the welfare of the group to the interests of the community as a whole. The growth of national intelligence, deliberately hindered by rulers who saw therein a menace to their own authority, may call for a prolonged exercise of high qualities of sympathy and mutual forbearance, but such foundations alone can assure the permanence of the 'Iraq kingdom of which the beginnings are here recorded.

Termination of Military Government and pacification of the Country.

Military Government, which had been in existence in the 'Iraq since the Occupation, terminated with my arrival at Basrah in the early days of October, 1920, but in extensive areas military operations,

in connection with the disturbances which had broken out during the summer, were still in progress and martial law prevailed. It will be convenient here to give a brief outline of the stages which led to the restoration of order.

(a) *The Middle Euphrates*.—In the main area of disturbance, the valley of the Middle Euphrates, Karbala submitted unconditionally on October 13; Kufah, where the garrison had held out gallantly for three months, was relieved on October 17, and the submission of Najaf followed automatically. Samawah was relieved on October 12 and Rumaithah, which had witnessed in the beginning of July the first hostilities, was re-occupied a day or two later. By the end of November all the tribes of the Shamiyah had made surrender, on terms which included the handing over of arms and ammunition, and their leaders had either given themselves up or had fled across the desert to Syria or the Hijaz. Diwaniyah was occupied in December by a column which encountered no resistance. Until the middle of February, when they were withdrawn from the whole area, troops were engaged in enforcing the terms of surrender. The tribes were heavily armed; to have left the Arab Government in its initial stages to deal with the problem they presented would have been to prejudice its success in the maintenance of administration. The fines were in the nature of a guarantee for the future. The total surrenders up to July 26th, 1921, were as follows: Rifles 65,435, of which over 21,100 are modern; S.A.A. 3,185,000 rounds.

(b) *Muntafiq*.—The collapse of the movement in the Middle Euphrates reacted favourably on the Muntafiq, where, though the equilibrium had been preserved, largely by the co-operation of two influential shaikhs, sporadic disorders had resulted from endeavours on the part of emissaries from Najaf to raise the country. The return of the additional troops which had been sent from India in the autumn was an urgent measure of economy; military operations in this Division were therefore confined to a peaceful demonstration along the Gharraf in January. Under the circumstances it was impracticable to impose a general levy of rifle fines and the subsequent tranquillity of this area suffered in consequence.

(c) *The Upper Euphrates*.—On the Upper Euphrates, thanks to the unswerving support given by 'Ali Suliaman, Shaikh of the Dulaim, to the preservation of social order, Fallujah and Ramadi had not suffered and Hit was reoccupied on October 8. Higher up the river it had been impossible to maintain control, and when in September 'Anah was evacuated by the tribal force provided by the Dulaim, as well as by the British authorities, it was attacked and

looted by the inhabitants of the neighbouring town of Rawah, in league with sections of the 'Aqaidat from regions, at that time lawless, across the 'Iraq frontier. Rawah submitted in the middle of January, but civil administration was not re-established until, in April, the organization of a desert force under the standard of the Dulaim made it possible to overcome the difficulties presented by the long desert route up the river.

- (d) *Diyala*.—On the Diyala, where the rising had worn its most savage aspect, there was no shaikh of sufficient importance to control the petty tribes of the Division; even after they had been subdued by the operations of a British column, their private dissensions led to constant breaches of local peace. It may fairly be said that the brutal license which had been aroused in August, 1920, was not laid to rest until a comprehensive inter-tribal agreement was concluded in Baghdad, under the auspices of the 'Iraq Government, in the last days of 1921.
- (e) *Kirkuk*.—Kirkuk Division, though for a short time sympathetically affected by the troubles in Diyala, had yielded only in part to the contagion of lawlessness. When the column which had been sent to Kifri after the murder of Captain Salmon was withdrawn, the influence of Shaikh Habib, the widely-respected head of the Talabani clan (he died in the spring of 1921), stabilized the situation, and if the Dilo chief and other marauders remained at large for a considerable period, the fear of further trouble of a serious nature was at an end.
- (f) *Mosul and Arbil*.—Mosul Division, under the skilful handling of the Political Officer, Mr. L. Nalder, C.B.E., had remained generally tranquil, but here, as at Arbil, the main cause for anxiety lay in incitement from beyond the border. Intrigues at Jazirat ibn 'Umar kept the Arab tribes of the North-West frontier restless and culminated, on October 24, in a daring raid on the Mosul-Sharqah road, carried out by the Albu Hamad, who had fled from the 'Iraq to take refuge with the Turks. This incident produced a profound impression, for travelling with the convoy which was attacked was the distinguished Arab Nationalist, Sharif al Faruqi, who, with several other persons, was killed by the raiders. Until the Shammar chiefs made submission to the Amir Faisal after his arrival in the 'Iraq, security on this line of communications was not assured. Throughout the period under review Kamalist propaganda has never been absent, though in the Mosul Division it has produced no more tangible results than the robbing of kalaks on the Tigris, tribal attacks on Faish Khabur and similar small annoyances. But in Arbil Division, where one of the Surchi chiefs who had been a party with Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan

in the murder of Mr. Bill and Captain Scott, in December, 1919, was still at large, conditions were more favourable to hostile influences.

Policy of His Majesty's Government.

But even if the complete pacification of the country was a process of several months, the salient feature of the period after my arrival was the rapid progress in that direction in the Middle Euphrates area. While the programme of the extremists was discredited by failure, men who held moderate views were encouraged by the benevolent intentions of the British Government, which it was my mission to make known, namely, that His Majesty's Government had charged me with the duty of assisting the leaders of the people to create in the 'Iraq, with the guidance of Great Britain, an Arab National Government, the constitution of which would be drawn up under the auspices of an elective assembly; but I pointed out that as long as sections of the tribes and communities were in active rebellion, it was obviously impossible to hold a general election, and in a proclamation, issued on October 17, I expressed myself at a loss to understand the object of the tribes in continuing hostilities and desired them to put themselves into communication with my Political Officers with the object of clearing up any misunderstanding that might still exist. (Appendix I.)

The Shi'ah religious leaders.

An attempt was made by some of the tribal leaders to refer negotiations to the foremost Shi'ah divine at Najaf, the Shaikh al Shari'ah, who had been induced to take an important part in promoting disturbances, and he himself proposed to send representatives to Baghdad. These suggestions were discountenanced and the death of the Shaikh al Shari'ah in December, together with the absence of any individual who commanded the reverence which had been accorded to him, left the Shi'ah Religious head-quarters without a recognized head. It had not gained in popular estimation by the active participation of some of its members in the events of the summer and when the failure of the resort to arms had been placed beyond doubt, men called to mind and openly expressed the maxim that doctors of divinity should properly be precluded from taking part in the politics of this world by their preoccupation with matters appertaining to the next.

2.—THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Formation of the Cabinet.

While it was clear that some time must elapse before conditions would permit of full development along the lines determined by His Majesty's Government, I found myself confronted with questions of policy, affecting the future of the 'Iraq, with which I did not feel myself justified in dealing without consultation with representatives of the people of the country. As an immediate expedient I judged it necessary to institute a Provisional Government which, under my guidance and control, should be responsible for administration until further progress could be made in the direction of national institutions.

The high religious and social position of the Naqib, coupled with the universal respect which he inspired, pointed to him as the most suitable person to form and preside over a provisional Council of State. Age and ill-health might well have excused him from emerging from the studious seclusion of a Darwish in which he had spent the latter years of his life, but when, on October 23, I asked him to undertake the formation of a Cabinet in the interests of his country he courageously responded to the call, though with some hesitation, and consented to my request.

The post of Minister of Interior was accepted with alacrity by Saiyid Talib Pasha, eldest son of the Naqib of Basrah. He had been in Baghdad since the previous July, when, in company with all other ex-deputies of the Turkish Chamber, he had been invited by my predecessor to form part of a Committee charged with the revision of the Turkish electoral law. Possessed of a remarkable force of character, he had been chosen to preside over this Committee, and it was clear that a man of his prominence could not be excluded from high place in the Provisional Government. Nevertheless, his appointment gave rise to difficulties. His ambition was regarded with grave apprehension by men of integrity, and their reluctance to serve with him could only be overcome by assurances that it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government to force him or any one else as a ruler upon the 'Iraq.

The Council was ultimately composed as follows :—

President of Council	...	H.H. the Naqib of Baghdad.
Minister of Interior	...	Saiyid Talib Pasha.
„ Finance	...	Sasun Effendi Haskail.
„ Justice	...	Mustafa Effendi Alusi.
„ Defence	...	Ja'far Pasha al 'Askari.
„ Public Works...	...	'Izzat Pasha.
„ Education and Health	...	Saiyid Muhammad Mahdi Tabatabai.
„ Commerce	...	'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil.
„ Auqaf	Muhammad 'Ali Effendi Fadhil.

Sasun Effendi, a leading representative of the Jewish community of Baghdad, commands universal respect and confidence. He had been a member of the Turkish Chamber since the Constitution of 1908 and had also occupied the post of President of the Finance Committee. Mustafa Effendi Alusi belongs to a family of well-known 'ulama and had himself filled responsible positions as Qadhi. Ja'far Pasha had made a name as a soldier during the war and had served as Governor of Aleppo under the Amir Faisal. 'Izzat Pasha is an ex-Turkish General of Kirkuk origin; Saiyid Muhammad Mahdi, a Shi'ah of Karbala; 'Abdul Latif Pasha is one of the best-known citizens of Basrah; Muhammad 'Ali Effendi an ex-deputy and a citizen of Mosul. Nine Ministers without portfolios were also given seats on the Council, including the Mayor of Baghdad, 'Abdul Majid Beg Shawi, two paramount shaikhs of large Shi'ah tribal confederations, Christians from

Mosul and Baghdad and Moslem notables of Baghdad and Basrah, one of whom was a Shi'ah. At a later period two more Shi'ahs, one a tribal shaikh, the other a citizen of 'Amarah, were added, together with a member of the Sunni family of the Sa'dun. Thus composed the Council represented very comprehensively the various interests and communities of the people.

A British Adviser was attached to each Ministry; the following officers have served in this capacity :—

Interior.—Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, C.I.E.; handed over to Mr. J. S. Thomson, I.C.S., who acted until the appointment of Mr. K. Cornwallis, C.B.E., D.S.O.

Finance.—Lt.-Colonel S. H. Slater, C.I.E.

Justice.—Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, K.C.M.G. On his retirement, in April, Mr. E. M. Drower acted until Mr. N. G. Davidson took up his duties in October.

Defence.—Major J. I. Eadie, D.S.O., acted until the appointment of Lt.-Col. P. C. Joyce, C.B.E., D.S.O., in April.

Public Works.—Major General E. V. de V. Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E. Left in April to take up an appointment in India, since when Major H. H. Wheatley, O.B.E., M.C., has acted.

Education and Health.—Mr. E. L. Norton, I.C.S. Left for England on leave in May when Mr. A. L. Smith, M.V.O., and Lt.-Col. J. D. Graham, C.I.E., I.M.S., acted for their respective departments. In August, this Ministry was divided. Mr. A. L. Smith became Adviser to Education until he went on leave in November when Mr. W. J. Farrell, M.C., acted for him. Mr. Farrell went on leave in March, 1922, and Mr. J. Glen is at present acting Adviser. Colonel Graham became Adviser to the new Ministry of Public Health.

Commerce.—Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater, C.I.E. (acting).

Auqaf.—Mr. R. H. Cooke.

I met the assembled Council on November 10th when the draft instructions, as finally approved by myself and the Naqib, were accepted. The formation and functions of the Council of State were formally announced by proclamation on November 11th. (Appendix 2.)

Work accomplished by the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Council continued to exercise its functions until the coronation of the Amir Faisal in August, 1921. I wish to express my lively appreciation of its services to the 'Iraq State. Under the wise and dignified presidency of H.E. the Naqib it performed important constructive work, and during the whole period of its existence I relied on its loyal co-operation in seeking a solution for the problems which confronted us.

The principal questions towards which it directed immediate attention were :—

- (a) The return of persons interned at Henjam on account of their participation in the disturbances of the previous summer.
- (b) The repatriation of Arab officers who had served in Syria.
- (c) The organization of Civil Government under Arab officials throughout the 'Iraq.
- (d) Consideration of the electoral law.
- (e) Formation of the 'Iraq Army.

(a) *The Return of Political Deportees.*—The return of political deportees was broached by the Council at the preliminary meeting on November 10. After a careful scrutiny of dossiers the Council recommended and I acceded to the immediate release of 15 out of the 45 persons at Henjam, on suitable guarantees. The remainder returned under the general amnesty proclaimed in May, 1921.

(b) *Repatriation of Arab Officers in Syria.*—Such of the Arab officers and officials remaining in Syria as were in a position to pay their own expenses obtained individually permission to return on application to myself. Arrangements were completed in February for the return by sea at the charge of the 'Iraq Government of officers with their families to the number of 396 persons. The case of those who were unable to avail themselves of the opportunity thus provided was finally regulated by a resolution passed by the Council in December, 1921, by which Government assistance was extended to all ex-officers and their families remaining in Syria who were not in a position to pay their own expenses. It was also decided that 'Iraqis in other countries whose services were required by the Government might similarly be repatriated. It may be noted with satisfaction that, apart from those who have availed themselves of Government assistance, there has been an uninterrupted flow from Constantinople and other parts of Turkey of 'Iraqis whose return is of advantage to the State. Men of experience and education who held civil or military appointments under the Turks, as well as private individuals, have come back to take office in the 'Iraq Government, to practise their professions, or to devote themselves to the management of their estates.

(c) *Organization of Civil Government under Arab Officials.*—As order was restored in the areas of disturbance, temporary arrangements had been made for administration, but the appointment of Arab officials to replace British Political Officers was one of the most urgent duties incumbent on the Council. A scheme for the division of the 'Iraq into 10 Liwas, 35 Qadhas and 85 Nahiyahs, closely following the lines of the former Turkish organization, was passed on December 12th, and received my approval, with certain reservations regarding the Kurdish districts, which the Council, unmindful of restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres, had treated on the same basis as the rest of 'Iraq. Meantime it had been possible to proceed at once to appointments in Baghdad and its vicinity, while towards the end of December, Ja'far Pasha al 'Askari visited the Euphrates area to study the problem of civil reorganization. On January 10th a number of appointments were submitted to the Council by the Ministry of Interior. They were

on the whole very reasonable. In the Karbala, Hillah and Muntafiq Liwas administrative posts were not filled until after the withdrawal of troops, but in the case of Hillah the individual selected, a notable of Kirkuk, having refused to serve, the position of Mutasarrif was left vacant until after the coronation of the Amir Faisal. As regards Mosul there was a delay occasioned by the brutal murder, under circumstances which have never been elucidated, of the first nominee two days after his arrival at his post. A not unnatural reluctance withheld others from accepting an office so ill-omened, nor did an Arab Mutasarrif take up his duties until after the triumphal reception accorded to King Faisal in October, 1921.

As the Arab administrative officials took over, the Political Officer became the Adviser to the Mutasarrif with one, or in the larger Liwas, two British Assistant Divisional Advisers. On the whole this system has worked smoothly, but, as was only to be expected in so new a venture, not all the native appointments have proved successful, and the Council of State, learning from experience, passed in September, 1921, a resolution that in future administrative officials should be appointed on probation for a definite period before receiving confirmation in their office.

Some changes in the administrative divisions have also been made, the most important of which was the creation of an additional Liwa with headquarters at Kut in January, 1922. The table given in Appendix 3* shows the principal administrative appointments up-to-date.

(d) *Revision of the Electoral Law.*—The electoral law was the subject of debate during December. The Council had before it the revision of the Turkish law which had been prepared by the Committee of ex-deputies. Apart from certain modifications necessitated by changed conditions, such as the obligation of all candidates to possess a knowledge of Turkish, special provisions had been introduced to ensure the representation of the tribes. The Council demurred to this article until I pointed out that, as the Congress would be called upon to pronounce decisions vital to the future of the 'Iraq, it was essential that it should be truly representative of all communities, including the tribes, which under the Ottoman law had virtually been excluded from taking part in the elections. Special representation was therefore accorded to the tribes, as well as to the Jewish and Christian communities, and the law was referred to the Ministry of Interior. But my British Legal Adviser has assured me that the form in which in the spring it was ultimately printed by that Ministry was so full of omissions and incongruities that it could not have been applied as it stood. Neither did it contain any recognition of the safeguards to which under the Treaty of Sévres the Kurdish communities of the 'Iraq were entitled. It was this latter point which was under discussion with the Council when I left for the Cairo Conference in February. Pending a decision it was, however, open to the Provisional Government to proceed with the preliminaries essential to the holding of general elections, notably the creation of elective municipalities, on which falls the task of carrying

* Not reproduced.

out in the townships the provisions of the electoral law. Such action could have been initiated by the Ministry of Interior; it was not taken because the Minister, Saiyid Talib Pasha, was not disposed to hasten the general elections until he had instituted an extensive propaganda in his own interests throughout the country. He repeatedly gave private expression to the opinion that a general election should be delayed, and the law lay dormant in the files of the Ministry of Interior. The circumstances which led to recourse to a referendum for the purpose of choosing a ruler will be dealt with in their place. After the coronation of the Amir Faisal the electoral law, in common with all other laws, required his consent. Owing to its inherent defects, a considerable amount of revision was necessary, but in the meantime the Ministry of Interior took those steps which had previously been neglected and municipal elections were completed throughout the country by the end of March.

(e) *Creation of National Army.*—Shortly after the Council had entered on its duties I called the attention of the Ministers to the urgent need for the creation of a National Army, and by January, 1921, the nucleus of an 'Iraq General Staff was engaged in working out a scheme. One of the difficulties with which the Ministry of Defence was confronted was the number of 'Iraqi ex-officers of the Turkish army who sought employment. Pending their absorption in the 'Iraq army, the most liberal allowances compatible with the financial position of the country were barely sufficient to afford them a livelihood, and until they could be given occupation on full pay they formed a hungry and therefore discontented section of the community, which was a heavy pre-occupation to the Ministry of Defence.

Status of the Levies.

Their existence played a decisive part in determining the position of that Ministry with regard to the Levies, a locally recruited force under the ultimate command of British officers. Ja'far Pasha contended that if the Levies, at that time about 2,000 strong, were put under his charge he must find place for a proportion of those Arab officers who were waiting for employment. On the other hand it was feared that the introduction of this new element might dislocate the existing formation at a time when it was the sole resource for the preservation of order and the protection of the railway after British troops had been withdrawn from the Middle Euphrates. As this withdrawal was imminent, settlement of the question could not be postponed and the Council resolved early in February to place the Levies under the Ministry of Interior. Though the decision presented certain grave objections, inasmuch as it involved division of control over the armed forces of the country and reduplication of staff, I accepted it as the best means available to meet the urgent practical needs of the moment.

A programme for the progressive reduction of the British garrison in the 'Iraq and its replacement by native forces was one of the main questions which occupied the attention of the Cairo Conference. It was agreed that in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Imperial troops from Kirkuk and other frontier districts the Levies should be expanded by

the addition of Kurdish and Assyrian recruits to a maximum of 5,000 men, but that no recruiting for Levies was to be carried out among the townsmen and settled villagers of Arab Iraq. It was further laid down that the Levies should be withdrawn from the Ministry of Interior and placed under my control, with the proviso that in time of war all local forces should come under the command of the G.O.C. so as to avoid dual control. As the Levies would be run and commanded by British officers it was considered that the National Government could not be called on to maintain them, and their budget was therefore transferred to the Imperial exchequer.

The Cairo Conference.

The decision of His Majesty's Government to create a separate department in the Colonial Office in order to co-ordinate our interests and responsibilities in the Near East called for a comprehensive revision of the situation, with a view to diminishing at the earliest possible moment the burden incurred by the British taxpayer, as well as to decide on broad issues of policy. The Secretary of State determined to summon a conference at Cairo and I left the Iraq in February, 1922, in company with the Commander-in-Chief, taking with me Sasun Effendi, Minister of Finance, and Ja'far Pasha, Minister of Defence. I was accompanied by the following members of the British Staff: Major-General E. H. de V. Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to Ministry of Works; Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Slater, C.I.E., Financial Adviser; Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary. The Judicial Adviser, Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, K.C.M.G., acted for me during my absence.

It was incumbent upon the Secretary of State to place before the Cabinet the conclusions reached at the conference, but on April 11th, a few days after my return to Baghdad, I was able to gratify public expectation by publishing a communication of a general nature (see Appendix 4) which was followed on May 30th by the proclamation of an amnesty to political offenders (see Appendix 5).

The question of a ruler; ambitions of Saiyid Talib Pasha.

During the six weeks of my absence the internal situation had undergone some change. Saiyid Talib Pasha had toured the country south of Baghdad, carrying on a strong campaign of propaganda, ostensibly in favour of the candidature of the Naqib as future ruler of the country, but really with an eye to his own reversionary interest. In private conversation he had been perfectly frank as to his ultimate intention of becoming Amir and in many quarters his ambitions had roused alarm. I was greeted at Basrah by the Shaikh of Muhammarah, who pressed his own desire to come forward as a candidate, as well as by leading members of the Basrah community, who begged that the province might be placed under direct British control, thereby avoiding the disturbances and jealousies which in their opinion must inevitably accompany the setting up of an Arab State, and enabling Basrah to stand apart from the controversies of the coming election. On the other hand the number of those whose hopes centred in the Sharifian family had been increased by the return of well-known Iraqis who had

served under the Amir Faisal in Syria. In the course of the next weeks they despatched telegrams to H.M. King Husain begging him to send one of his sons as a candidate for the throne of the Iraq. The main anxiety of the Naqib, who showed himself, as ever, devoid of personal ambition, was that no ruler should be imposed upon the country contrary to the wish of the people. I was able to satisfy him that such was not the intention of His Majesty's Government, but Saiyid Talib Pasha, no doubt realizing that if a son of the Sharifian house were acknowledged to be a suitable aspirant to the position he coveted, his chance of success would be dangerously jeopardized, continued to spread abroad rumours of an unjustifiable character to the effect that undue influence was being exerted against himself or, as he chose to word it, the Naqib. Finally, on April 14th, at a dinner party in his own house given to the correspondent of a leading London journal, at which the French and Persian Consuls were present, together with the Manager of the Mesopotamian Persian Corporation, the Amir Rabi'ah, Shaikh Salim al Khaiyun and other guests, Saiyid Talib Pasha in an after-dinner speech, looking towards the two tribal chiefs above mentioned, threatened the armed resistance of their 20,000 tribesmen if the declared policy of His Majesty's Government were not carried out, with the obvious implication that it was not being adhered to. On receiving a well-substantiated report of this speech on April 16, I considered it necessary to take immediate action and asked the G.O.C.-in-Chief to arrange for Saiyid Talib's instant removal. He was arrested on the afternoon of the same day in a public thoroughfare and conveyed by river to Basrah, whence he was deported to Ceylon. The circumstances were made known to the public in a communication issued on April 18th (see Appendix 6) and throughout the country satisfaction was undisguised. The messages of congratulation and thanks which I received revealed the singular mistrust and fear which Saiyid Talib was regarded with and I have no hesitation in saying that his departure relieved a grave popular anxiety.

Saiyid Talib Pasha remained in Ceylon, where his family was permitted to join him, till February, 1922, when he was allowed to proceed to an Italian spa for the benefit of his health.

The Kurdish Districts.

In accordance with the policy agreed upon at the Cairo Conference, shortly after my return I proceeded to ascertain the wishes of the Kurdish districts which lay within the area of the British mandate, with regard to inclusion in the Iraq State, and on May 6th a communication on the subject was circulated by the Advisers in the Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimani Divisions (see Appendix 7). I pointed out that from such information as had reached me it would appear that opinion in the Kurdish districts was divided between fear lest their interests should suffer by subordination to the National Government at Baghdad and a desire to maintain with the Iraq economic and industrial ties which it would be inconvenient to sever. In these circumstances, I suggested a solution which would avoid either evil and by providing adequate safeguards admit of political union.

In the Liwa of Kirkuk where the population is mixed Turcoman, Kurdish and Arab, a Mutasarrif had been exercising his functions since February, but Arbil with a population mainly Turcoman and Kurdish had objected strongly to the decision of the Council of State to combine that Division with Kirkuk, according to Turkish precedent, placing the headquarters at Kirkuk. The proposal that Arbil should be formed as a sub-Division of Kirkuk Division, under a sub-Mutasarrif and Qaim-maqams, appointed directly by the High Commissioner, was favourably received and was thereupon adopted. The sub-Mutasarrif exercises the full powers of a Mutasarrif except in respect of matters connected with finance and revenue, the Army and Levies, external politics and relations with tribes in other Liwas, on all of which he must consult the Mutasarrif of Kirkuk.

The Kurdish districts of Mosul Division likewise agreed to the proposals, but as, for reasons above mentioned, a Mutasarrif had not yet resumed control, the existing administrative system was continued until after the coronation of the Amir Faisal and the creation of a sub-Liwa proved then to be unnecessary.

Sulaimani Division rejected, almost unanimously, any form of inclusion under the 'Iraq Government. It has remained at its express wish under direct British control, exercised through a British political officer. Every effort has been made to develop native administration along normal lines. Except for the presence of six British political officers, whose position is largely advisory, all administrative and revenue officials are local Kurds. In November, 1921, a Council of 12 members, 8 of whom were elected, while the political officer and three Kurdish officials occupy the remaining four seats, met under the presidency of the Political Officer, there being no local President agreeable to all. It has exhibited a lively and wholesome determination to take its part in the political life of the province.

3.—ELECTION ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AMIR FAISAL.

Arrival of the Amir Faisal.

Owing to the pre-occupation of His Majesty's Government in matters of grave importance at home, the announcement by the Secretary of State of the conclusions reached in Cairo was delayed till June. Meantime the vernacular press in 'Iraq had been eagerly debating the question of the future ruler, with a marked inclination towards the selection of the Amir Faisal, and on June 13th the news was published, with favourable comments, on the strength of private telegrams received by 'Iraqis from King Husain, that his son Faisal had left the Hijaz for the 'Iraq.

At a meeting of the Council of State on June 16th, the Naqib proposed that the National Government should make proper provision for his reception and a committee was appointed for the purpose. The report of the Secretary of State's speech in the House of Commons touching the policy of His Majesty's Government in the 'Iraq was received on June 16th and published in Baghdad on the following day. Friendly telegrams passed between His Majesty King Husain and His

Highness the Naqib, and on June 22nd the Amir Faisal sent a wireless message to the Naqib announcing his expected arrival at Basrah on the 24th and received from the latter a cordial reply.

The imminent arrival of H.H. the Amir made a decision imperative, but the moment for decision was undoubtedly a difficult one. The country was staggering under the disillusionings engendered by the movement of the previous year and suffering alike from the depredations of the tribes and the measures which had inevitably attended the restoration of law and order. There was a general desire for a period of recuperation, preferably under the strong arm of British administration, rather than for a call to embark on a fresh Nationalist adventure. These sentiments found expression in a petition bearing some 4,500 signatures presented three days before the Amir's arrival in the 'Iraq by an influential deputation from Basrah. The petitioners, while ready to recognise the sovereignty of the ruler who should be chosen by the people of the 'Iraq, requested that the district of Basrah, from which they expressly excluded all turbulent tribal areas, should be granted a separate political existence with full local powers in dealing with finance (subject to a contribution towards the maintenance of the ruler), local police and military services.

The Secretary of State's announcement gave to the bulk of the population that for which they were asking, namely, guidance from that Government whose obligation it was to proffer advice. The express exclusion of a republican form of government was recognised to accord with Islamic principles, as well as with the political conditions of the 'Iraq, while the assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard the Amir Faisal as a suitable ruler, should he be selected, cleared away apprehensions born of previous misunderstandings. But the Amir himself was his own best advocate. In a series of very remarkable speeches delivered on his arrival at Basrah and at receptions given in his honour at Baghdad, he gave eloquent expression to views as wise as they were liberal, and made a deep impression upon all sections of the community, represented by deputations which had gathered from various parts of the 'Iraq, including Mosul, to greet him at Baghdad. Never failing to dwell on the need of British assistance, he claimed that the 'Iraq could honourably accept the help of Great Britain, as a friend from a friend and a free people from the free. He handled with great discrimination the outbursts of his more impetuous adherents, reminding them that he had not come to impose himself on the 'Iraq nation but awaited its unfettered choice, either of himself or another, and he publicly rebuked a speaker who delivered himself of sentiments which might be interpreted as hostile to the French Government in Syria. This last point is of sufficient importance to justify me in reverting to an accusation raised by a French journal in Paris which stated that the Amir had declared to the editors of local vernacular papers that he hoped to reconquer Syria from Mesopotamia. He himself categorically denied the imputation, and its publication by Reuter's telegrams was followed by strongly worded *dementi* on the part of all the Arab press. I was at pains to trace the statement to its source and am satisfied that it was without foundation.

The referendum.

The salient feature during the fortnight which followed the Amir's arrival in the 'Iraq was the growing conviction that the question of his election to the throne must be settled without delay. From insistence on the necessity for the immediate summons of the National Congress, public opinion, reflected in the vernacular press, turned towards resort to some speedier expedient. The Mosul deputation, a weighty and moderate body of men, as well as members of the Provisional Government, in private conversation expressed themselves in favour of a referendum, and by the end of the first week in July the local papers were advocating this course. It was as the result of the popular tributes that the Amir had received that H.H. the Naqib, without entering into consultation with me, proposed to the Council on July 11th a resolution, which was unanimously accepted, that the Amir Faisal should be declared King, and I acted in accordance with the expressed wish of the nation in replying that before concurring in or confirming the resolution of the Council of State, I felt it incumbent upon me to fortify myself by a direct indication of the choice of the people by means of a referendum.

The task of carrying out the referendum was entrusted to a committee formed by the Ministry of Interior. This committee issued to all Mutasarrifs the following orders :—

Resolution of the Council of State, dated July 11th, 1921.

On the proposal of the President, the Council of Ministers, at their meeting of the 11th July, 1921, passed a unanimous resolution declaring His Highness Amir Faisal King of 'Iraq provided that His Highness's Government should be a constitutional, representative and democratic Government, limited by law.

Before confirming the above Resolution, His Excellency the High Commissioner has considered it necessary to fortify himself with a direct indication of the assent of the people, and has accordingly requested the Council of Ministers to instruct the Ministry of Interior to take the necessary steps to that end. The Ministry of the Interior, accordingly requires that representative committees of the inhabitants of all Nahiyahs and Mahallahs should record their opinion on the above Resolution in the following form. The duty of presenting the madhbatahs to the Committee, and of forwarding them to Baghdad on completion, is entrusted to the Mutasarrifs of Liwas.

Form of Madhbatah.

We, the undersigned residents of Nahiyah/Mahallah in Qadha/
Town of _____, in the Liwa of _____ have heard, under-
stood and fully considered the above Resolution of the Council of
State, and it results that _____ express themselves in agreement
therewith, and profess their allegiance to Amir Faisal while
have signified their dissent.

Signatures.

The Sulaimani Liwa decided not to take part in the election of a King for the 'Iraq; with this exception, the referendum was carried out through the country. In Baghdad city a rider was added to the voting papers, laying down the conditions that the 'Iraq should be independent of any foreign sovereignty and that a National Congress should be convened in three months, but when news of this addition was received in other Liwas most of the townships or districts in which the vote had not yet been taken replied by laying down a condition that the continuance of the British mandate should be assured. The results of the referendum showed 96 per cent. of the votes to be in favour of the election of the Amir, the dissentient 4 per cent. coming mainly from the Turkish and Kurdish population of Kirkuk. In this Liwa, while the candidature of the Amir was rejected, there was no consensus of opinion as to an alternative. The Kurdish section asked for a Kurdish Government, but were averse from inclusion in the Sulaimani Liwa, while a few of the Turcomans favoured the idea of Turkish ruler. Ultimately a petition was presented to me asking that the Division might be given a year's grace before coming to a decision.

Accession of the Amir Faisal as King of the 'Iraq.

On August 18th, the Ministry of Interior informed H. H. the Naqib and the Council that an overwhelming majority had supported their resolution and the Council appointed a committee to make the necessary arrangements for the accession, which was fixed for August 23rd. In the presence of representatives of all local communities and of deputations from every Liwa of the 'Iraq, except Sulaimani and Kirkuk, I proclaimed H.H. the Amir Faisal to have been duly elected King of the 'Iraq and announced his recognition as King by His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Saiyid Mahmud Effendi, representing his father, H.H. the Naqib, delivered a prayer of thanksgiving and in a brief and moving oration, His Majesty the King laid down the principles by which his government would be guided, insisting on the need of strong and close co-operation between himself and his people, without distinction of class or creed, together with the maintenance of the alliance between the 'Iraq and Great Britain, to be embodied in a treaty which would be confirmed by the National Congress.

Immediately after the ceremony I delivered to His Majesty King Faisal the following telegram from His Majesty King George V:—

"I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the War, will, I am confident, enable me to

fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

Signed, GEORGE, R. I.

H.M. King Faisal replied as follows :—

"I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

"On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded shortly between us will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battlefields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundations.

"Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory."

Signed, FAISAL.

Resignation of the Provisional Government.

In conformity with constitutional practice, on the accession of the Sovereign H.H. the Naqib and the Provisional Government tendered their resignation to the King who, while thanking them for their past services, asked them to continue in office till a new cabinet should be formed. It was my grateful duty to intimate to H.H. the Naqib that His Majesty King George had been pleased to confer upon him, in recognition of his services to his country, the high distinction of Grand Commander of the Order of the British Empire.

Insertion of King Faisal's name in the Khutbah.

At the instigation of the Ministry of Auqaf, after consultation with H.H. the Naqib, His Majesty issued orders confirming in their posts Imams, Mu'idhdhins and other servants of the mosques. From the first Friday after the King's accession, the name Faisal, King of the 'Iraq, son of Husain King of the Hijaz, was inserted in the Khutbah.

Formation of King Faisal's first Cabinet.

The formation of the new Cabinet was not long delayed. On September 10th, His Majesty entrusted His Highness the Naqib with the office of President of the Council, which he had previously held, and the latter submitted to His Majesty the following proposals which were accepted.

Minister of Interior	Haji Ramzi Beg.
„ Finance	Sasun Effendi Haskail.
„ Justice...	Naji Beg al Suwaidi.
„ Defence	Ja'far Pasha al 'Askari.
„ Communications and Works	'Izzat Pasha.
„ Commerce	'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil.
„ Education	'Abdul Karim Effendi al Jazairi.
„ Public Health	Dr. Hanna Khaiyat.
„ Auqaf	Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali al Fadhil.

'Abdul Karim Effendi al Jazairi was unable to serve and a well-known Shi'ah man of letters, Saiyid Hibat al Din al Shahrستاني, assumed the office of Minister of Education.

No change in the Cabinet took place until the end of March, when after the raid of the Akhwan on the Muntafiq tribes, subsequently to be recorded, His Majesty, considering that certain Ministers showed by their ineffective attitude in Council that they had not realised to the full the gravity of the situation or the necessity of taking immediate steps to meet it, sent for three of them and called upon them to resign. The Ministers of Justice, Education, Commerce and Public Works accordingly sent in their resignations, while the Minister of the Interior, who had previously tendered his resignation, availed himself of its acceptance. These resignations were unfortunately followed by that of Sasun Effendi, Minister of Finance, who resigned in sympathy, being of the opinion that the action of the King in asking for the resignations and the Naqib in not resigning himself was unconstitutional. The Cabinet is now being reconstructed. Taufiq Bey, Governor of Baghdad, has been appointed to the Ministry of Interior, and Sabih Beg ibn Nishat, an officer of considerable reputation who has recently returned from Constantinople, to Public Works. It is hoped that Sasun Effendi will be persuaded to withdraw his resignation.

King Faisal's position.

During the seven months which have elapsed since his accession, King Faisal has steadily consolidated his position in the confidence and affection of his people. When the rigours of an exceptionally hot summer were over, he paid a state visit to Mosul where he was met with spontaneous demonstrations of loyalty which bore witness to the vanity of Kamalist propaganda. A subsequent visit to the Hillah and Karbala Liwas was the occasion for a welcome no less enthusiastic, and when in November he honoured the Muntafiq with his presence, tribesmen and townsmen assembled from all parts of the Liwa to greet him. His great reputation as a patriot and a leader is to Arab Nationalists a guarantee of the fulfilment of their aspirations, while his tact and wisdom, combined with his steady reliance on the help and friendship of His Majesty's Government, are an assurance to all that the fortunes of their country are being laid on sound foundations. His

presence in Baghdad has from the first stimulated a sense of unity in the 'Iraq. The deputations which gathered from all parts of the country to greet him and to witness his coronation served a double rôle. Not only did they give opportunity for acquaintance and understanding between himself and the leaders of opinion in 'Iraq, but they also enabled 'Iraqis, who were imperfectly or wholly unknown to each other, to meet in pursuance of a common national purpose and to take cognizance of each other's local circumstances and prejudices. His Majesty's application to his political duties, his eager participation in the efforts of his subjects to solve local difficulties and his constant readiness to give personal attention to all who seek his aid, have combined to make his audience chamber a centre of national consciousness.

II. INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

I.—SURVEY OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

Smooth working of the new system.

I can record with deep satisfaction that the gradual substitution of Arab for British officials has proceeded without causing any dislocation in the administration of the country. The fact reflects equal credit on all affected, and while expressing my appreciation of the willingness shown by responsible Arab officials to profit by the experience of their British colleagues, I must offer the latter most cordial recognition of the zeal and sympathy which they have shown, in accepting and adapting themselves to their new duties. Such special difficulties as have confronted the Arab Government have been due to no lack of confidence between the two constituent parts of the administration, but to circumstances inevitable to the institution of a new regime, or to difficult problems of long standing which became more clearly apparent when the military force which supported the Government of Occupation was diminished or withdrawn.

Administration difficulties in the Muntafiq Division.

The Muntafiq Division has provided an instructive example on both counts. For reasons already indicated it was not possible there to proceed to rigorous measures of pacification. Not only did the tribes remain in possession of their arms, but they devoted themselves to the acquisition of additional weapons, with the result that the Division is perhaps to-day more heavily armed than any other part of the 'Iraq. They were thus in a position to defy the Government, an attitude for which they had been noted in Turkish days, and they were persuaded that the Arab Government was one which could be defied with impunity. During the period of military occupation it had been the policy of the Civil Administration to reduce to order the chaos inherited from the Turks by restoring authority to the tribal shaikhs and using them, thus vested with the might of British prestige, to carry out the behests of the supreme authority. The outbreak of 1920 destroyed the edifice thus successfully constructed and the tribes relapsed into a traditional state of anarchy. The powerlessness of the tribal chief to stand without the support of Government was illustrated

in the Suq district by a series of brutal murders, culminating in February in the assassination in his own guest house of the Shaikh of the Albu Khalifah who had invited his tribesmen to confer on the means of collecting outstanding revenue. The fact that at that period punitive measures could not at once be taken confirmed the general belief that the Arab Government could not exact obedience; an orgy of crime, inter-tribal disputes and murders followed, and though the Albu Khalifah were successfully dealt with in July, the Suq and Hammar areas have been the scene of almost continuous petty outbreaks. The support afforded by the R.A.F. to police and gunboats has been invaluable in dealing with the situation, and there is a growing conviction among the tribesmen that official orders must be treated with respect.

Further north, on the Gharraf Canal, several notable instances of lawlessness met with speedy retribution, with the result that this area is now fairly well under control. For several months past inter-tribal fighting has ceased, public security has improved, the tribesmen no longer carry arms and Government dues are coming in regularly. It is also gratifying that in the case of two serious disputes over land claimed by the Shaikh of Chabaish, the threat of tribal warfare was successfully checked by official investigation.

The Samawah district shares the characteristics of the Muntafiq proper and has been the scene of similar difficulties, while near the mouth of the old Euphrates channel, sections of the Madinah tribes, after prolonged disregard of Government orders, have required coercion.

Towards the close of the financial year something over 9 lakhs of revenue were still outstanding in the Muntafiq, about 4 lakhs being in respect of the demands of 1920-21. Though the 'Iraq treasury can ill afford to forego its dues, a reduction of 25 per cent. on the saifi demands for 1921-22 has been agreed to.

The tribal question.

It may fairly be said that in no part of the 'Iraq is the question of tribal disintegration and the problem of finding a substitute for shaikhly authority more acute than on the lower Euphrates, but it must not be forgotten that the primitive structure of Mesopotamian society and the contrasts between urban and rural conditions must for many years to come tax the patience and wisdom of the Central Government. The country is in a state of transition. In some cases the Shaikh is a leader only in name and Government deals directly with the sectional chiefs, in others the Shaikh is paramount over a tribe or a confederation and the sectional leaders come rarely into contact with the executive authority. But as a rule even the paramount Shaikh depends on the backing of the central Government, without which he is powerless. When he attempts to enforce orders, for the execution of which he is nominally responsible, his tribal influence dwindles and vanishes, while, if he sets himself to gain or preserve local prestige, he is apt to become a menace to the State. On the whole he is anxious to fulfil the services required of him, and if he be actuated mainly by a desire to maintain his own position, under present circumstances care should be taken not to alienate his allegiance.

It is nevertheless imperative to encourage all revenue payers to deal direct with the local executive, so as to prepare for the moment when the tribal system will drop into final decay. The progress of this social development will be in direct ratio to the general advance of civilization throughout the country. The outlying provinces which are in close contact with the desert and desert institutions, the more inaccessible regions of the 'Iraq, such as the marshes of the southern delta and the unirrigated steppes of the Jazirah, may for some considerable time hold to the ways of their forefathers, but the opening up of the country, the diffusion of education and, more especially, the recognition that there are modes of life more profitable than that of raider and robber will strike at the root of tribal organization.

Development in Dulaim Division.

As an encouraging example I would instance a Division no less tribal in organization than the Muntafiq, that of the Dulaim. The development of the Saqlawiyah Canal between the Euphrates and the Tigris, largely due to the energy and initiative of Shaikhs 'Ali al Sulaiman and Mushhin al Hardan, has provided for the settlement of 2,000 tribesmen. These have been drawn from the somewhat unprofitable semi-nomadic elements of the Dulaim confederation and will greatly add to the wealth and resources of the country. Already projects are in hand for the building of a town in the centre of this new agricultural district which has lain waste since the days of the Khalifs, though the presence of burnt brick and other traces of habitation in every mound show how thickly it must have been populated in 'Abbasid times. A little farther to the south the re-digging of the Yusufiyah canal, the ancient Nahr Malkah, is restoring to settled life a region where the remains of famous Babylonian cities bear testimony to former prosperity.

It rests with the 'Iraq Government to encourage the wandering shepherd to take to permanent settlement as a cultivator by giving him satisfactory terms of tenure and securing to him his due share of the fruits of his labours by means of honest and enlightened administration. The creation of an intelligent and capable civil service is not the work of a day, but creditable efforts in this direction are being made by the appointment to positions of responsibility of men of education who, though they may be somewhat lacking in experience, bring an increasing measure of intellectual training to bear upon their task.

The Zubair Nahiyah.

As a step towards the unification of administration the transference of Zubair from shaikhly government to the status of a Nahiyah may be noticed. From the period of the Occupation the town and district, which lie some 8 miles west of Basrah on the edges of the desert, had been administered by Shaikh Ibrahim, who had rendered valuable services during the war. But his autocratic rule had become an anachronism and was resented by the inhabitants. It was brought to an end in June, when a normal municipality was established and a mudir appointed.

'Amarah Division.

The division of 'Amarah has been substantially untroubled. At the beginning of the period under review a successful redistribution of Muqata'ahs (estates leased from Government) was carried out, with the object of providing for certain shaikhs who had been persistent in hostility during the war and on making submission had not been restored to their former position.

Certain difficulties were experienced with the sections of the Bani Lam who followed Ghadhban ibn Bunaiyah. Ghadhban is a man of marked personality, but his rule was oppressive and he was deposed at the request of his tribesmen in favour of his son 'Abdul Karim in 1919. Part of the Khasraj tribe, who occupy the border between 'Iraq and Persia, had been under his control, while the large proportion of his Bani Lam sections live permanently in Persia. 'Abdul Karim proved incapable of asserting his authority either over the Bani Lam or the Khasraj. Matters came to a head in March 1921; the Khasraj refused to acknowledge 'Abdul Karim and the opportunity was taken to hand over to the Persian authorities the control of all tribes residing within the Persian border. 'Abdul Karim, who had himself lived continuously in Persia, attempted to take up a truculent attitude and was outlawed from 'Iraq. He has since subsided into obscurity.

Tribal difficulties in Diyala, Kirkuk and Baghdad.

Diyala and Kirkuk Liwas, together with the Samarra Qadha of Baghdad, have suffered from inter-tribal enmities leading to petty raids and other breaches of public peace. As yet the terms of the agreement arranged in Baghdad in December have not been fully complied with. These troubles, together with such as have occurred among the Kurdish elements in the Divisions in question, were largely an aftermath of the disturbances of 1920, coupled with a conviction that the Arab Government was not in a position to maintain order. The efforts of the police are gradually dispelling this impression.

Mosul Division.

Progress in the Mosul Division has been well maintained. A promising step in the direction of agricultural development was taken in May, 1921, by the enterprise known as "Mosul Farms Limited," the Managing Director of which is Mr. J. M. Birch, who was formerly Agricultural Circle Officer in Mosul. The capital has been subscribed almost entirely by local people. The aim of the Company is to farm on a large scale with the aid of the most modern forms of agricultural machinery. The Company have obtained a thirty years' lease of the Sanniyah lands of Jurf and Dhibaniyah, between Nimrud, the ancient Kalah, and the mouth of the Zab, for which they are to pay, including both land tax and rent, the equivalent of one-tenth of the value of their crop, assessed every five years. The terms are easy, but not unduly so, considering the value of the object-lesson in modern agricultural methods which the Company's working should provide. Apart from their cultivation of wheat and barley by "dry farming" methods, it

is their intention to grow cotton by irrigation and also to experiment with arboriculture. Pending the arrival of their big machinery, which only reached Basrah at the end of the year, the Company have been cultivating their lands with two Fordson tractors.

Pacification of the northern area of Dulaim Division.

I have already made allusion to the disturbances in the northern parts of the long and straggling Division of Dulaim. The ancient hostility between the towns of Rawah and 'Anah was embittered by the disaster under which 'Anah suffered at the hands of the Rawiyin and the 'Aqaidat in 1920. In the autumn of 1921 a party of Rawah notables, who were on their way to Baghdad via Tikrit, were attacked in the desert, a few hours east of Rawah, by Dulaim raiders who inflicted on them casualties. The party had been warned that the route was not safe and assured of protection, under the guarantee of Shaikh 'Ali Sulaiman, if they would travel by the Euphrates. Representatives of the two towns and of the Dulaim tribe were summoned to Baghdad by the Ministry of Interior for the purpose of settling up scores. 'Anah and the Dulaim readily obeyed; Rawah prevaricated and procrastinated and it was not till the end of March, 1922, that the representatives, together with several leading shaikhs from other parts of the country, chosen to adjudicate between the parties, met in Baghdad.

Consolidation of French authority beyond the frontier.

Meantime during the course of the autumn and winter of 1921, the French Government established its authority across the frontier. The suppression and pacification of the lawless 'Aqaidat, who are at feud with the tribes within the 'Iraq border, was regarded by the latter with unmixed gratification. The peace of the Euphrates road within 'Iraq territories had been disturbed by raids and forays on the part of tribesmen higher up the river, and the Euphrates townships had suffered from the complete interruption of communications and commerce. These are now re-established and the task of the 'Iraq Government in maintaining law and order is simplified by the gradual disappearance of a disturbing element from without. The road from Mosul to Aleppo via Dair al Zor has also been opened and for the past three months continuous motor traffic has been maintained between the two places.

My relations with the High Commissioner for Syria have been of the most cordial nature. I have addressed His Excellency General Gouraud on the subject of the protection of desert traffic from attack and extortionate demands on the part of the tribesmen and have found him courteously eager to co-operate in seeking to facilitate peaceful intercourse between Syria and the 'Iraq. British and Arab local officials in 'Iraq have likewise found their colleagues across the border to be imbued with the same helpful spirit. I have recently taken up with the High Commissioner for Syria, at the request of the 'Iraq Government, the question of a comprehensive settlement of trans-frontier claims arising out of the disorders of the last eighteen months

And I have every hope that we may reach a solution advantageous to both administrations. In these matters I have never failed to receive the hearty support of H.M. King Faisal.

2.—ELECTIVE BODIES.

Municipalities.

After the British occupation municipal elections ceased to be held in Iraq : Mayors were appointed by the local Political officers, together with a small Municipal Council to assist them in their work. This system worked well enough during the war, but with the introduction of a settled administration it was obviously desirable that elections, which had been customary under the Turkish regime, should be resumed. The desire for elections had been made clear from time to time and in Mosul Liwa elections actually were held in the spring of 1921, the Turkish Municipal law being altered in such manner as was considered necessary to fit the altered circumstances.

The decision to hold elections in all municipalities was taken by the Council of Ministers in the autumn of 1921, and the Turkish Municipal Law, translated into Arabic, was sent to all Liwas to be made use of as it stood, the only important change made in it being that universal manhood suffrage was introduced as a means of solving the difficulty which arose from the fact that the voters' qualifications, according to the law, was based on the wergo tax, the collection of which has been in abeyance since the British occupation. This change, while in strict conformity with the democratic professions of the new Government, would appear to have been somewhat premature, but on the whole the results have been fairly satisfactory.

The Turkish Municipal Law is not, however, a good instrument. It is burdened with much unnecessary detail while much that is important is omitted. The experience gained during the recent elections should be of value in the task of remodelling it in the future.

The policy of Government with regard to municipalities is to free them as far as possible from official interference and control and imbue them with a sense of responsibility. To this end proposals are now on foot for delegating to the elected Municipal Councils wide financial powers and authority to improve local by-laws, as long as only local interests are affected thereby.

The principal resources of municipal revenues are tolls on such bridges and ferries as are maintained at the expense of municipalities, house tax levied, as a rule, at the rate of 10 per cent. of the rental of each house situated within municipal boundaries, slaughter-house fees, brokerage fees, rents of municipal properties, building tax, landing stage tax and profits from municipal trading concerns. With the exception of the house tax and the landing stage tax, these taxes were levied by municipalities in their present form under the Turks. The present house tax is merely a modification of the old Turkish wergo which was intensely unpopular and by no means easy to assess, but the landing stage tax has been introduced since the British occupation. It is justified by the considerable expense to which municipalities are put in maintaining landing stages and river walls and the difficulty in

many cases of raising sufficient funds for the purpose. The new imposition was intended to supply the necessary funds by imposing a small tax on all goods landed in each municipality, and it can be claimed that it has fulfilled its purpose and been met with little or no objection.

A feature of municipal progress during the past year is the expansion of municipal enterprise in the institution of services of public utility. Consequent on the reduction of the British troops in this country many stations hitherto containing garrisons have now been evacuated. For the benefit of the troops there had been installed in the towns electric light plants and water supplies and many municipalities have seized the opportunity afforded of taking over, at a comparatively low price, the services declared surplus by the army.

Satisfactory progress is noticeable in the larger towns. The Municipality of Basrah has maintained its former high standard of civil enterprise; special thanks are due to Rajab Effendi al Na'mah, who held the post of Mayor from March, 1921, till January, 1922, for the attention and ability he has shown in carrying out his duties, and to the Assistant Divisional Adviser for the Municipality, Captain R. E. Alderman, C.I.E., O.B.E. To the cleanliness of the town may be attributed the absence of any serious epidemics. Metalled roads have been extended, graded to ensure good surface drainage, and widened, the building of the Maude Memorial Hospital, of which about half the cost had been subscribed locally, put in hand, new houses and markets erected and repairs carried out under the auspices of the Municipal Engineer's Department.

In Baghdad the Ministry of Auqaf has steadily improved its property by the rebuilding of houses and bazaars, while a number of buildings along the new thoroughfares have been erected by private persons, but municipal enterprise has been somewhat lacking. Useful projects, for the metalling of roads, the provision of a sufficient water supply, as well as for a tramway line, are now under consideration.

A scheme for supplying Mosul with water, at an estimated expenditure of about 7 lakhs, was approved in the beginning of 1921 and is now well on the way towards completion. The Municipality has taken over the new bridge built by the military authorities and completed the grading and levelling of Ninewah Street, the main thoroughfare, which bids fair to be the finest street in Iraq.

Divisional Councils.

During the British occupation, Divisional Councils were appointed in all Liwas. They met at regular intervals under the presidency of the Political Officer and proved themselves of genuine value. All of these, however, with the exception of that at 'Amarah, ceased to sit after the outbreak of disturbances in 1920, and even the 'Amarah Council has now ceased to function.

In Mosul, the Political Officer instituted Liwa and Qadha Councils in May, 1921, appointed *ad hoc*.

In the autumn of 1921, the Council of Ministers issued orders for the reintroduction of elective Majlis Idarah in all Liwas and Qadhas on the lines of the old Turkish Councils. These Councils have not yet

come into being in Baghdad, Basrah, 'Amarah and Dulaim, and the Turkish administrative law needs extensive alterations. A Committee has been appointed to prepare a revised draft of the law for submission to the Council of Ministers.

3.—GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS.

There remain now no Government publications in English. The English daily papers in Basrah and in Baghdad have both been sold to private companies, as also have the Arabic daily papers of Basrah and Baghdad.

The Arabic newspaper *Al Mosul* is still published as a Government paper in Mosul together with a Turkish paper, *Najmah*, in Kirkuk and a Kurdish paper in Sulaimani.

Certain members of the Government are anxious to have an official daily gazette, published in Arabic only, which shall contain the official notifications of all Government departments. There are, however, difficulties in the way of this proposal and much doubt is entertained as to whether it will be possible to issue it in the near future. The matter is still under discussion.

4.—LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS.

The most important institutions of this nature are :—

(i) *Jama'iyat al Khairiyah al Islamiyah*. This is a charitable institution founded in Baghdad in November, 1921, its declared objects being to rescue from the streets the blind and the infirm, widows and orphans, and to institute a home where such persons can be attended to and where orphans can be brought up as useful citizens. Its resources are obtained from monthly contributions and from bequests. Its books are to be open to inspection at any time and statements of the accounts are to be published periodically in the press.

(ii) The *Ma'had al 'Ilmi*, a scientific and literary club, was opened in Baghdad in January, 1922, the opening ceremony being performed by the King himself. Its objects are to spread education, provide lectures and a reading room where local and foreign publications can be seen, and to translate and publish works in foreign languages. The first of these to be taken in hand is Sir W. Willcocks's report on irrigation.

(iii) The *Nadi al 'Adabi of Mosul*.

(iv) The *Nadi al 'Adabi of Hillah*.

These two clubs are copies of the *Ma'had al 'Ilmi* of Baghdad.

(v) The *Saff al 'Adabi* is a Jewish club, the object of which is to arrange lectures and evening classes for its members.

5.—POLICE.

Formation of Regular Police.—The year 1921 has seen the formation of regular police throughout Iraq under the central control of the Inspector-General of Police, with headquarters at Baghdad. An Inspectors' Training School has also been organized, and during the

year Inspectors were trained and passed out for the whole country. In October, 1921, the Mosul District Gendarmerie were taken over. The work of reorganization into regular police is still proceeding.

Nuri Pasha Sa'id was appointed Director-General of Police with effect from January 1, 1922, and during the coming year it is proposed to appoint Arab Commandants and Assistant Commandants of Police in every Liwa and Qadha and to transform the present British staff into an Inspectorate. British Gazetted officers have been reduced from 32 to 25 and Non-Gazetted officers from 52 to 32. The end of the financial year finds 22 'Iraqi Gazetted officers employed; during the course of the year 1922, it is hoped to increase this number to 56. Arabic numbers and cap badges have been introduced and Arabic words of command are used.

Arms.—The Police are at present armed with the 1914 .303 British rifle, with Martinis and Sniders for town patrol work; but it is hoped very shortly to arm the entire force with the short Lee-Enfield.

C.I.D.—A Central Finger Print Bureau was formed at Baghdad in May, 1921.

The Baghdad Passport Office was transferred in March, 1921, to the Commandant of Police, and at the end of July a Passport Examining Post was organized at Quzil Robot with a view to establishing surveillance over movements to and from Persia. Since December it has been in charge of an Arab officer.

Railway Police.—Much progress has been made in the Railway Police during the year. Armed police posts are being established at all the bigger stations and pilfering from goods trains has almost ceased.

Strength.—No difficulty has been experienced in recruiting for the Police and the cadres given in Appendix 9* are almost all up to strength.

Duties.—The Police have been frequently engaged in combination with aeroplanes or Levies, or both together, in operations of a military nature against the tribes. Inter-tribal disturbance in the Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk Divisions called for action on a comparatively large scale in November, 1921, in which the Police acquitted themselves with success. Work of this kind has been specially heavy in the Nasiriyah Division, where also the Police have been occupied with preventing the importation of arms. In the Arbil Sub-Division the Police Force has co-operated with the Levies and R.A.F. in measures against the insurgent tribes and the Turks. When the small post at Batas was surprised by the Turks in July, Inspector Kamal was brutally murdered after he had been forced to surrender. In the rear-guard action which followed on the ambush at Babachichik in December the Police held up the enemy and did much to stabilize the situation. On this occasion the Commandant, Captain Littledale, received the special thanks of the Inspector-General, Levies, on the steady behaviour of his men under fire.

* Not reproduced,

Camel Corps.—In March, 1921, Captain Williams, Commandant of Police at Nasiriyah, was charged with the organization of a camel corps, under the standard of the Dulaim, to patrol the desert frontier and preserve peace on the Euphrates road. It consists of 250 men, 150 riding camels, 20 baggage camels and 90 horses (included in Appendix 9*, in the mounted strength of Dulaim Division), and is under the British District Commandant. The Dulaim Camel Corps proved so conspicuous a success that in the early part of 1922 the formation of two others, each 200 men strong, was ordered. One of these, on the southern desert border, was placed under the command of Yusuf Beg al Sa'dun, with Captain Corry as adviser, but it had scarcely come into existence before in March it met with disaster at the hands of an overwhelming force of Akhwan. It is intended to reach the same strength as the Dulaim corps. The other, under 'Ajil Beg al Yawar of the Shammar, for the purpose of preserving order in the Jaziarh desert on the frontier west of Mosul, is based on Tall 'Afar. It is at present in course of formation. The force is entirely under the command of Shaikh 'Ajil, who receives a monthly allowance to cover all expenses. It is understood that the corps will be of the same strength as the others. The men are not regarded as Police personnel, although under the supervision of the Director-General of Police, who is responsible to the King.

6.—PRISONS.

No prison is on a separate system; all are in association wards.

A convict warder is in supervision in each ward.

Each prison contains six wards, including a hospital ward, and four cells usually occupied by lunatics.

Taking the average number of prisoners in gaol, 350 cubic feet of space are allowed for each prisoner during the hours of sleep, together with a superficial area of 35 square feet.

Prisoners are classified as follows:—

Habituals.

Casuals.

Rigorous imprisonment.

Simple imprisonment.

Civil debtors.

Under trial.

There is no penal labour. Other kinds of labour in use are road repairing, brickmaking and coolie labour. A small number of prisoners are engaged in trades, such as tailors, carpenters, smiths, bakers, cooks, etc.

The majority of prisoners are employed beyond the walls of the gaols on road repairs, brickmaking, or coolie labour on British military dumps, and are supervised by a British warder guard with a British warder in charge.

* Not reproduced,

Escapes of prisoners so employed have been as follows :—

1919...	8
1920...	40
1921...	17

The profits of prison labour are paid to superintendents of goals, who pay the sums into the Treasury.

The cost of prisons during the year 1920 was Rs. 6,35,978, while prisoners' earnings amounted to Rs. 92,445.

Ten hours are allotted for sleep. Wards are lighted with electric light where it is available. There is no patrolling.

In 1921, 1,554 prisoners were punished for offences against gaol discipline, with an average daily population of 1181.29.

If any European happens to be in gaol, arrangements are made for the attendance of a chaplain. Prisoners are allowed their religious books.

As regards remissions of imprisonment, three days monthly are awarded for good work and good conduct.

All who have died in prison have been attended by the medical officer, who gave the necessary death certificate. The sanitary state of the gaols is on the whole good. Prevailing diseases are fevers, dysentery, abscesses, ulcers, venereal ailments, etc.

Three meals are given per diem, morning, noon and evening. The scale of diet is as below :—

Europeans.	Ordinary.	No. 1 Diet.	Penal Diet.
Oatmeal ... 2 ozs.	Atta ... 12 ozs.	Same as ordinary	Atta.
Bread ... 1½ lb.	Rice ... 8 "	with the following	Bread, 1 lb.
Meat and bone 12 ozs.	Dhall ... 2½ ozs.	daily additions.	Water.
Vegetables ... 12 "	Ghee ... 1½ oz.	Tea ... ¼ oz.	Ad lib.
Ghee ... 1 oz.	Salt ... ½ oz.	Sugar ... 1 "	
Tea ... ¼ "	Dates ... 2 ozs.	Meat ... 8 "	
Sugar ... 1½ ozs.	Tamarind ... ¼ oz.		
Salt ... ½ oz.	Vegetables ... 8 ozs.	HOSPITAL DIET.	
	Meat (twice 8 "	As ordered by the	
	weekly)	Medical Officer.	
MEALS.	MEALS.		
BREAKFAST.	BREAKFAST.		
Porridge ... 1 pint.	Dates ... ½ lb.		
Bread ... 2 ozs.	Bread ... ½ "		
MIDDAY MEAL.	MIDDAY MEAL.		
Bread ... 8 ozs.	Boiled Dhall 2½ ozs.		
Meat with bone 8 "	Bread ... ½ lb.		
Vegetables ... 12 "			
Ghee ... 1 "			
EVENING MEAL.	EVENING MEAL.		
Tea ... 1 pint.	Vegetables ... 8 ozs.		
Bread ... 8 ozs.	Rice ... 8 "		
Meat ... 4 "			

Note.—Europeans. Two ozs. of dhall on Tuesdays and Saturdays in lieu of 4 ozs. of vegetables, 4 ozs. of rice may be issued twice weekly in lieu of 4 ozs. Vegetables. Salt, ½ oz. daily.

Porridge. To every pint, 2 ozs. of coarse Scotch oatmeal and salt.

There is at present no lunatic asylum in 'Iraq. During the war lunatics from this country were sent to India for detention, but this practice has now ceased, and as a temporary measure lunatics are detained in the gaol. Plans are, however, being made for the construction in the near future of a lunatic asylum for men. The number of lunatics who reach an asylum is, however, very small, as the Arab still prefers to take his lunatics to one or more of the tombs where cures are said to be both sudden and painless.

7.—AGRICULTURE.

The Arab rising in the middle of 1920 disorganized for a time the work of the Department owing to the fact that the Experimental Testing stations had to be abandoned. By October, however, it was possible to resume work in three districts where considerable progress was made, considering that much initial work had to be begun afresh. Agricultural Officers were posted to Mosul, Kut and Ba'quba, and Testing Stations established in the latter areas.

In Mosul the Agricultural Officer devoted a great part of his time to the study of the local breeds of sheep. This officer had special training in the Australian wool industry and the administration were particularly fortunate in securing his services after demobilization. Owing to financial stringency, however, it was found in the spring of 1921 that a whole-time officer could no longer be spared for Mosul. This was particularly unfortunate as the area in question comprises the large dry farming tracts north of the Jabal Hamrin range of hills where most important problems demand the services of a whole-time officer.

The most pressing of these problems are :—

- (i) The organization of the cultivators to combat annual ravages of locusts (*Locustotaurus Moroccanus*).
- (ii) The demonstration of harvesting and threshing machinery.
- (iii) Investigation of the "Sun" pest of wheat.
- (iv) Improvement in the preparation and marketing of wool for export.

The Ba'quba area is the important fruit-growing centre in 'Iraq. It also held out promise of considerable development with regard to cotton cultivation. Ba'quba was also selected as being the most convenient locality for attempting a revival of the silk industry. An 'Iraqi of known capability was delegated to Kashmir to undergo a course of instruction in sericulture, and, on his return to 'Iraq in the spring of 1921, he embarked on district propaganda work and initiated a small training and demonstration centre in Ba'quba town. His efforts have been successful so far, and if he is allowed to continue the very useful work which he is now conducting, there is eventually a promising future for the silk industry, not only in Ba'quba but in the Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaimani, Baghdad and Basrah areas. It will be some time however, before the present methods of rearing silk worms will be superseded by new and improved ones. The effort merits continued support and should receive every encouragement.

Owing to insistent demands for an Agricultural Officer at Kut, the headquarters of the Agricultural Officer at 'Amarah were transferred from 'Amarah to Kut early in 1920.

A testing Station was established primarily with a view to duplicating experiments carried out on the Cotton Farm at Karradah. The only site available has since proved unsatisfactory, and the Testing Station will be closed down in the autumn of 1922.

No officer was appointed to the Baghdad area until May, 1921. Prior to this date its needs were attended to by the Deputy Director of Agriculture. Of the multifarious duties imposed upon this charge, foremost was the initial work connected with the commencement of the Government Experimental and Demonstration Farm at Rustam on the Diyala. Adverse conditions and the difficulties inseparable from the organization of such a large undertaking, especially with constant changes in staff, rendered preliminary spade work particularly trying. It will be a considerable time before the institution can fully perform its intended functions. One of the first essentials is the appointment of an experienced European Manager capable of dealing with and demonstrating modern implements and machinery. For this class of work the type of Indian subordinates employed at present is not satisfactory. This is no reflection on the said subordinates, who have many estimable qualities; they simply lack experience.

District work in the Baghdad area was concentrated mostly on the Saqlawiyah and Yusufiyah canals where it was anticipated there would be a good chance of cotton propaganda succeeding. Owing to adverse circumstances the crop on both canals was a distinct failure. Not only on the two mentioned canals, but elsewhere, the yields of cotton were very disappointing. This was due in part to exceptionally hot winds and consequent shortage of water, but the main difficulty lies as yet in the ignorance of the cultivators.

Late in the season a revised estimate of 350 bales was anticipated, but the total yield only amounted to about 60 bales. Thus the whole country produced less than was grown on 80 acres the previous year. It is unpleasant to have to admit defeat in the cotton season of 1921, but it must be remembered that this was the first year in which active propaganda had been undertaken although much had been written about cotton previously. 'Iraq undoubtedly holds out immense possibilities for the cultivation of cotton, but it is essential to bear in mind that progress will of necessity be slow. No useful purpose would be served by undue optimism, a fact which is likely to be again illustrated in 1922. The Yusufiyah area will probably yield promising quantities of cotton, but elsewhere reports are less favourable. Propaganda should be continued on areas like the Yusufiyah where cultivators are at last responding to instructions, and it is interesting to observe how in this area particular attention is paid to ridging the land before sowing. Wherever cotton has been cultivated on ridges, the results have been good, whereas there have been nothing but failures reported wherever cotton has been grown on the flat.

Regarding importation and trial of implements and machinery, the work has not been systematized, and until this is done it is question-

able if progress will be effected. This work demands the services of a trained Agricultural Engineer, but so far no one has been appointed. There is no demand for small implements. It is considered, however, that there is likely to be a demand for tractors in time, but not until conditions allow of development schemes being undertaken either by Government or by the granting of land concessions to private enterprise.

Flax growing is beginning to attract the attention of the more enterprising cultivators. They are looking for a crop to replace wheat and barley now that the prices of these cereals have fallen. The Department of Agriculture introduced five varieties of flax and have grown them. The yield of straw was good, but the quality of the fibre poor. This was due to there being no one in the department having any experience of flax retting. This year, however, experiments are being carried out to discover the length of time required to rett flax in Tigris water at various times of the year. A machine has also been imported to do the scutching, and with its aid it is hoped to be able to turn out samples of fibre which will receive better valuations.

The Entomological Section of the Department of Agriculture has conducted investigations which should have a far-reaching effect on the date industry of the country. The two worst enemies of the date in Iraq are the diseases known as Toz and Mann. Effective control measures have been worked out, and it is hoped that considerable progress will be made in combating these diseases in the near future.

The department has been without a Botanist for the last two years, consequently plant breeding has been confined mostly to making selections of cotton, noting and recording their habits of growth, flowering and bolling.

About seventy indigenous varieties of wheat were isolated by Dr. Graham when he was Director of Agriculture. These have since been grown in observation lines and their characteristics noted. Strength of straw, rust resistance and yielding capabilities are looked for, and in another year it is hoped that sufficient seed will be available to enable varietal tests to be conducted. The same has been done with many exotic varieties of known reputation in other countries.

8.—ARMS TRAFFIC.

The disturbances of 1920 and the subsequent exaction of rifle fines from the tribes produced a strong demand for rifles and ammunition with the result that the importation of arms into Iraq, though legally prohibited, became a lucrative business which continued to be carried on in secret in spite of all efforts to prevent it. This was especially true in the case of the Euphrates districts. Arms were imported from two sources, viz., Syria and Central Arabia, the former being the more important of the two. Reports dating from May, 1920, indicated that hostile organizations well supplied with funds existed for the purpose of collecting and forwarding arms and ammunition to Iraq. A report dated February 4th, 1921, stated that the Arabs of Iraq had been provided through these organizations with as many rifles as they required and that more would be despatched. How far

the importation of arms into 'Iraq has been prompted by these outside influences, as distinct from the general law of supply and demand, it has not been possible to determine with any certainty.

(i)—*Arms traffic from Syria.*

In October and November, 1920, the capture by the Shammar and by the 'Anizah respectively of two caravans from Damascus carrying 300 rifles (Mauser) apiece brought the question of the importation of arms into 'Iraq from Syria into prominence, and it was requested that representations should be made to the French authorities with a view to checking at the fountain head a trade which might subsequently become a source of embarrassment as much to Syria as to 'Iraq. In reply to notes addressed to the French Government on this subject in January and February, 1921, it was suggested that our information was inaccurate and that in fact there was practically no trade in arms between Syria and 'Iraq; every facility would, however, be given to the British Liaison Officer and to the British Consul at Damascus by the French authorities to enquire into the matter. Since that date His Majesty's Consul at Damascus has energetically prosecuted his enquiries and obtained information regarding the arms traffic which he has frequently brought to the notice of the French authorities.

In September, 1921, he persuaded the French to search a caravan, in which 40 rifles were discovered in bales. The pass for the rifles had been signed by Muhammad al 'Asaimi, who had been entrusted by the French with the control of the export of rifles from Damascus, and who thus used his privileged position to organize for his own profit the traffic which he was paid to prevent. This incident is likely to have a deterrent effect on traders in arms. As a further result of His Majesty's Consul's representations, the French authorities have drawn up more stringent regulations with regard to the carrying of arms by caravans; they have also formed a camel corps based on Tadmor which controls the Dair al Zor road, and more recently they have established posts on the direct route across the desert to Kubaisah, which is the route generally followed by arms-carrying caravans. It is hoped that these measures will have the effect of reducing the arms traffic for the future.

For many reasons the interception of arms-carrying caravans on their arrival on the confines of 'Iraq is a matter of considerable difficulty. The traffic is carried on with great secrecy and it appears that there is no definite distributing centre for rifles arriving from Syria, but that the caravans break up in the desert and distribute the rifles in small quantities, and there is evidence that rifles are frequently buried until they can be distributed without fear of detection. Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal of the 'Anizah has been encouraged to intercept arms-carrying caravans where possible and to relieve them of their rifles. One such caravan was raided by Mahrut ibn Hadhdhal in November, 1920, and another gun-running caravan from Damascus was similarly raided by Hamud al Suwait of the Dhafir in July, 1921. These two instances, however, revealed a further difficulty. In both cases the merchants from whom the rifles were seized claimed that the rifles were being taken to Najd and appealed to Ibn Sa'ud, who strongly

supported their claims. To obviate this difficulty it has been proposed to Ibn Sa'ud that caravans carrying rifles from Syria to Najd should avoid entering 'Iraq or, if this is not possible, that due warning should be given in advance of their coming.

In addition to the above captures, three cases of arms smuggling were detected by the Police in the neighbourhood of Kubaisah in September, 1921, and the smugglers were arrested and punished.

In the meantime the Euphrates tribes have succeeded in re-arming themselves to a considerable extent and the consequent fall in the price of rifles has decreased the incentive to gun-running. It is hoped that the measures recently adopted by the French authorities in Syria at the instance of His Majesty's Consul, coupled with a judicious use of the desert police force and of the assistance of friendly tribal chiefs, will reduce the arms traffic from Syria to a minimum for the future.

(ii)—*Arms traffic from Central Arabia.*

The present abundance of arms in the Muntafiq is explained firstly by the comparative immunity which this confederation enjoyed from penalties after the 1920 disturbances and, secondly, by the importation of arms from Najd. While the arms traffic from this direction has been much less considerable than that from Syria, it has been even more difficult to control. Rifles are carried in small quantities and distributed over many caravans and lack of definite information makes their detection a matter of great difficulty. In June, 1920, however, a brilliant capture of an arms-carrying caravan was effected by the Police about 9 miles south of Samawah. 263 rifles, including 109 Short Lee Enfield, and 25,000 rounds of ammunition, Mauser and British .303, were captured. This incident, no doubt, had the effect of considerably reducing the volume of arms traffic from this direction. It has recently been rumoured that the fall of Hail has produced a recrudescence of this traffic and that rifles captured by the Akhwan from the Shammar are being imported into the lower Euphrates districts both direct and via Kuwait. It appears, however, that these rumours are greatly exaggerated. The Shaikh of Kuwait is taking steps to prevent such traffic and at the beginning of February he seized 40 rifles which had been brought to Kuwait from Hail.

iii.—*Arms traffic from Persia.*

There has always been a certain infiltration of arms from Persia into the Tigris districts, though the volume of this traffic is inconsiderable. It was reported in July, 1921, that a certain amount of gun-running was being carried on in the vicinity of Mandali, and that rifles were imported concealed in sacks of grain. There is evidence also of arms traffic between Persian and 'Iraqi Kurdistan and there has been a distinct increase in the number of rifles in Keui Sanjaq since the withdrawal of the British Assistant Political Officer. At present, however, it is probable that there is as great a demand for rifles on the Persian side of the border, and in any case it is impossible to prevent the infiltration of rifles into the mountainous districts of 'Iraqi Kurdistan, the greater part of which is not under Government control.

iv.—*Arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.*

At the instance of the India Office a Conference composed of representatives of the High Commissioner, Iraq, Government of India, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and Governor-General, Baluchistan, was held at Karachi on August 1-5, 1921, to concert measures to prevent a threatened recrudescence of arms traffic in the Persian Gulf. The Conference considered that the most important route by which arms were conveyed was via Hail to Kuwait and thence to the Persian coast from the Shatt al 'Arab to Lingah. As large supplies of arms were known to exist in Central Arabia, and in view of reports that arms might be landed on the Red Sea coast, the Conference recommended certain precautions, as follows:—

1. The maintenance of the existing Naval Force in the Persian Gulf, supplemented by permission to establish immediately a motor-boat patrol in the event of an increase of the traffic taking place.
2. A wireless installation at Kuwait for direct communication with His Majesty's ships working in the Gulf.
3. Pressure on Shaikhs and, in the case of Kuwait, an effort to persuade the Shaikh to establish registration of arms.

The Government of India, however, expressed a doubt as to whether the further expense which these measures would involve would be justifiable and the question as to how far action is to be taken on the recommendations of the Conference is still under consideration. It may be added that, as mentioned above, the Shaikh of Kuwait has shown himself ready to co-operate in the control of arms traffic so far as he is concerned.

III.—FINANCE.

1.—OCTOBER, 1920, TO APRIL, 1921.

General Remarks.

It is difficult to form a correct appreciation of the financial position during the period under review. The situation was obscured by the arrangement whereby the Civil Administration had been responsible since 1917 for obtaining funds from India for the use of the military authorities, which in the absence of prompt and accurate accounts of internal expenditure and receipts made it difficult to ascertain at any moment how far the balance in the Civil Treasuries represented local revenue collections or ways and means advances held at the disposal of the military authorities.

In the light of later events it would no doubt have been an advantage (at all events from the point of view of elucidating the local financial position) if, at any rate the, major resource operations (*i.e.*, the drawings on India) had been conducted by the military authorities on their own account. The minor resource operations, by which civil balances in out-stations were utilized for military expenditure when required (on the basis of recoveries in Baghdad), though no doubt adding somewhat to the responsibilities of the Civil Administration, would not have proved a substantial difficulty had it not been for the further troublesome complication that, owing to the failure of the authorities to arrive at a

clear decision on the incidence of expenditure between military and civil, it was necessary to keep a number of suspense accounts, which added much to the confusion. A complete elucidation of the 1920-21 position cannot be expected until the precise terms of the settlement between His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government, as at April 1st, 1921 (to which reference is made elsewhere in this note), have been decided. Until this is done, it is also impossible to give a satisfactory account of the position during the financial year 1921-22.

Effect of change of methods and of withdrawal of troops.

From the administrative point of view, the great changes in the policy and method of Government introduced in October, 1920, profoundly affected financial administration.

The previous administration had contemplated a more extensive employment of British and Indian officials (both superior and subordinate classes) than was compatible with the policy subsequently adopted. It had incurred a good deal of expenditure in providing equipment, such as stores and transport, and in constructing buildings, both offices and residential quarters, with the object of improving efficiency. Some of this expenditure, though not strictly debitable to capital, was calculated to meet the needs of the immediately succeeding years, and it appeared, therefore, not improper that it should be defrayed from the accumulated surplus of previous years, which at that stage was regarded as at the disposal of the Civil Administration.

The different requirements, however, of the new Government made much of this expenditure a fruitless burden upon the revenue of the year.

The earlier Administration, again, had assumed a more gradual withdrawal of the Army of Occupation than was subsequently decided upon, and its liability for the cost of defence and order had been limited to the maintenance of Police, Gendarmerie and Levies, the aggregate expenditure on which, in the year 1920-21, was 88.5 lakhs, while in the following year it was approximately 240 lakhs, of which about 100 lakhs, representing the cost of the Arab and Kurdish Levies, was borne by His Majesty's Government.

Deficit arising from disturbances of 1920.

The disturbances of 1920, moreover, greatly modified the financial outlook. As shown in the table below, the estimates of expenditure in 1920-21 amounted to 1,092 lakhs, the receipts being estimated at 1,059 lakhs. The deficit of 33 lakhs, which represented initial outlay on equipment calculated to meet requirements for the next two or three years, was, as explained above, to be met from the previous accumulated surplus, which, as far as could be ascertained at the time, was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 200 lakhs at the beginning of the financial year 1920-21.

TABLE I.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURE.		
		Rs.			Rs.
Land Revenue		1,58,13,250	Revenue		29,02,060
Date Tax		18,89,250	Political and General ...		68,65,710
Kodah		21,34,100	Gaols		7,51,900
Miscellaneous Taxes ...		12,00,295	Police		73,64,384
Ottoman Public Debt ...		23,59,350	Levies		48,03,243
Gaols		2,71,500	Miscellaneous		1,00,800
Political and General ...		3,23,080	Customs		42,87,680
Police		3,94,914	Tapu		4,40,880
Levies		—	Irrigation		69,34,912
Interest		14,470	Land Settlement and Ac-		
Miscellaneous Receipts ...		1,32,740	quisition		1,07,380
Customs		2,56,82,000	Education... ..		17,32,809
Tapu		5,72,500	Posts		37,38,000
Education		31,000	Telegraphs		38,90,000
Posts		41,93,700	Veterinary and Remounts		10,82,040
Telegraphs		43,81,000	Stationery		3,26,000
Veterinary and Remounts		65,000	Health Services		50,47,200
Health Services		7,90,300	Stores Department ...		8,00,000
Stores		6,00,000	Railways		2,98,20,000
Railways		2,98,38,000	Transport		60,31,641
Transport		17,50,000	Agriculture		6,87,150
Agriculture		65,000	Surveys		6,09,415
Survey		94,400	Judicial		12,66,860
Judicial		7,91,000	Port Directorate		52,90,567
Port Directorate		54,59,500	Government Presses ...		8,48,000
Government Presses ...		6,60,300	Mily. and P.W.D. Civil		
Finance		25,000	Estimates		98,43,500
Government Publications		1,72,049	Finance		11,47,400
Revenue Grain transferred			Quasi-Waqf		75,000
to Military in 1918-19		62,00,000	Government Publications		1,58,893
			Sub-allowances and non-		
			effective charges		22,54,800
Total		10,59,03,698	Total		10,92,08,224

The actual result of the year's working was, however, as the next table (No. II) shows, a deficit of 183 lakhs.

This figure, it will be noted, includes capital expenditure on Railways and the Port of 39·5 and 14 lakhs respectively, and for the purpose of a true comparison with the Budget estimates the actual deficit should be shown as 183—(39·5 plus 14) equal to 129·5 lakhs.

TABLE II (A).
1920-21 ACTUALS.
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE BY MAIN HEADS.
(Accounts under audit of D.A.G. (Civil).)

RECEIPTS.				EXPENDITURE.			
Rs.				Rs.			
Land Revenue	...	1,09,02,475	13 11	H.Q. Revenue	...	1,53,584	5 5
Date Tax	...	8,03,823	6 7	Divisional	...	18,38,081	6 0
Kodah	...	20,50,059	11 0	Ottoman Debt Re-			
Revenue Misc.	...	11,30,376	10 11	venues	...	10,650	13 0
Ottoman Debt Re-				Pol. and General Adm.	...	41,76,157	2 11
venues	...	24,09,558	8 6	District Police	...	12,86,052	7 3
Pol. and General Adm.	...	3,96,006	6 5	District Lock-ups	...	47,194	15 0
District Police	...	10,319	14 2	Gendarmerie	...	11,32,862	1 8
District Lock-ups	...	1,221	11 0	Hillah Forests	...	2,813	12 0
Gendarmerie	...	9,494	8 1	Hillah Land Settlement	...	14,818	8 0
Interest	...	18,915	10 11	Levies	...	26,18,300	1 0
Levies	...	9,673	8 3	Levies (Arbil)	...	4,34,708	0 0
Levies (Arbil)	...	563	15 8	Gaols...	...	6,87,168	14 6
Gaols	...	70,335	7 10	Central Adm.	...	45,66,481	1 4
Central Adm.	...	215	8 0	Police	...	38,49,867	10 4
Police	...	1,61,672	10 7	Customs	...	60,09,620	14 10
Customs	...	2,76,65,412	9 8	Tapu	...	3,57,404	15 11
Tapu	...	11,13,444	2 7	Education	...	12,46,853	7 3
Education	...	31,348	12 10	Survey	...	3,81,488	0 10
Survey	...	11,155	3 1	Veterinary and Re-			
Veterinary and Re-				mounts	...	9,06,276	12 2
mounts	...	31,356	11 11	Stationery	...	4,84,325	0 10
Stationery	...	32,872	9 4	Finance	...	13,60,694	1 9
Finance	...	888	3 8	Agriculture	...	6,74,607	7 4
Agriculture	...	10,847	13 5	Judicial	...	10,69,430	8 1
Judicial	...	7,38,500	4 9	Govt. Press, Baghdad	...	3,02,300	13 0
Govt. Press, Baghdad	...	3,29,825	6 4	Govt. Press, Basrah	...	2,44,618	7 1
Govt. Press, Basrah	...	2,45,982	10 8	Transport	...	99,35,059	7 4
Transport	...	1,82,000	6 7	Civil Stores	...	6,53,101	0 1
Publications	...	2,54,288	11 3	Publications	...	1,93,556	12 11
Miscellaneous*	...	22,02,992	12 1	Land Acquisition	...	30,269	3 2
Medical	...	7,06,818	5 0	Non-effective charges	...	15,78,205	1 1
Civil Stores	...	2,38,953	14 0	Alwiyah Cantt.	...	56,896	13 11
				Miscellaneous*	...	40,46,625	15 7
				Medical	...	33,42,695	15 11
Total	...	5,17,71,402	1 0	Ministry of Communi-			
				cation and Works	...	38,097	9 1
				Total	...	5,37,30,869	11 6

* This includes 7 lakhs on account of lapsed claims by Military, i.e., receipts properly creditable to Civil are 517-7=510 lakhs. This gives a surplus of 5 lakhs (receipts over expenditure) for the year.

* This includes 15½ lakhs repatriation of refugees.

11½ lakhs on a/c Military rents.

5½ „ „ Bar Dredging.

32½ lakhs.

The effect is that expenditure properly chargeable to Civil is 537-32=505 lakhs.

TABLE II (B).
*Receipts and Expenditure by Main Heads of Departments other than those
 under D.A.G. (Civil's) Audit.*

1920-1921.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURE.		
	Rs.			Rs.	
Public Works	...	94,157 1 10	Public Works	...	59,75,014 10 1
Irrigation	...	38,791 6 8	Irrigation	...	46,67,295 9 3
Posts	...	43,69,879 3 8	Posts	...	53,42,940 8 4
Telegraphs	...	58,16,266 14 11	Telegraphs	...	39,19,465 14 4
Railways	...	2,88,61,578 4 4	Railways	...	3,43,47,261 2 6
Port Directorate	...	72,43,090 7 8	Capital	...	39,50,843 2 8
			Port Directorate	...	55,74,402 14 0
			Capital	...	14,14,364 5 10
Total	...	4,64,22,763 7 1			*6,51,91,588 3 0

* These figures show an excess of expenditure over revenue of 188 lakhs.

The accounts under the audit of the D.A.G. (Civil), however, show a surplus of 5 lakhs. The net deficit, therefore, is 183 lakhs.

This unhappy state of things was due almost entirely to the disturbances. The destruction of crops and other property, and the weakening of administrative control in some areas, produced a deficiency of 61 lakhs in revenue from agricultural sources. Further, the great damage done to the Railway and the almost complete stoppage of commercial traffic led to a loss on Railway Revenue Account of almost 55 lakhs. These two items, which total 116 lakhs, contribute nearly the whole of the deficit on revenue account. The situation, therefore, at the outset of the new Government, with these serious losses, and with the new burden of increased military expenditure impending, made it necessary for them at once to retrench in every possible direction until they were able to discover fresh sources of revenue.

The position was difficult and might have become critical; the reforming enthusiasm of the new regime tended in directions which, but for the judicious application of a little cold water by the Finance Ministry, might have proved very embarrassing. It was fortunate that the person selected for this important Ministry possessed qualities which more than any others were needed at this juncture for the restraint of exuberant politicians. His Excellency Sasun Effendi is, by common consent, the best Finance Minister the country can produce; he has the respect and confidence of all; he is experienced and highly educated; his knowledge of the financial systems of different countries is extensive; and he unites with it an intimate practical acquaintance with the highly polished system of the Turkish Empire. His grasp of financial principles is complete; but perhaps it is his unswerving adherence to them that makes him so invaluable in the constant ebb and flow of political parties.

Scope of the Ministry.

It was not immediately, of course, that these qualities came into play. The early days of office were no doubt somewhat tedious. The Department was busy trying to disentangle the transactions of the provisional civil administration from those of the temporary military regime. On these mysteries the Minister did not intrude. A more important fact was that financial administration was at this time incomplete in its scope. The Department dealt with budgets, resource operations and accounts, and intervened in questions of expenditure. But the administration of revenue had, during the previous regime, been controlled by the Revenue Secretary to the Civil Commissioner in respect of land revenue and excise, and by the Commerce Secretary in regard to Customs. The latter, on the abolition of the Commerce Secretaryship at the end of August, 1920, passed under the control of the Finance Secretary; but it was not until the following year, viz., March, 1921, that Excise was taken over by the Finance Ministry from the Interior (which had succeeded to the functions of the Revenue Secretary in matters of revenue), while land revenue and its concomitants were not transferred to the Finance Ministry until October, 1921.

Economies Effected.

The Financial stringency with which the new Government was faced demanded immediate measures of economy.

The previous administration had frequently had charges of extravagance levelled at it, and a laudable zeal was evinced in discovering and terminating superfluous expenditure. It is not certain that the results obtained were commensurate with the zeal displayed. Great hopes were entertained that the costly foreign establishment could be replaced at once by a local staff with modest emoluments. In point of fact the actual expenditure under the heads (according to the former classification) "Revenue" and "Political and General Administration" was 107 lakhs in 1920-21 as compared with estimates of 97 lakhs, and an actual expenditure in the preceding year of about 85 lakhs. It would perhaps be fairer to take the result of the following year, 1921-22, as an indication of the extent to which the general administration has been cheapened by the fuller employment of local personnel. But here the comparison is rendered difficult by the changed budget classification introduced last year, and is vitiated by the introduction of central institutions on a more elaborate scale than those of the provisional civil administration. Taking, however, the figures of expenditure on revenue and political administration outside Baghdad, we find that the estimate for 1921-22 was 55 lakhs, while the expenditure of the previous year was 60 lakhs. Some economy appears, therefore, to have been achieved.

A more substantial, if less interesting, saving was made under the head "Transport." This, as has already been indicated, was in 1920-21 conceived on a somewhat grand scale, to enhance the efficiency of executive administration. When the change in policy came, it was at once recognized that very rigorous steps must be taken to reduce this item in expenditure, and new regulations were introduced by which

the Government defined within narrower limits its liability under this head. The change was not popular, but was imperative ; and whereas the expenditure in 1920-21 on transport was 99 lakhs, in 1921-22 it did not amount to more than about 30 lakhs.

Provision for National Defence.

It has already been indicated that the new factor in expenditure with which the Government was confronted, and on account of which it was necessary to make retrenchment elsewhere, was in connection with defence. The national Government must have a national army. The existing forces of law and order were the Levies, the Gendarmerie, the regular Police, and the district Police under the control of Political Officers. These forces in 1920-21 cost respectively 26, 11, 38·5 and 13 lakhs—a total of 88·5 lakhs. It seemed to some that the obvious course to take in the formation of a new national army was to make the existing Levy organization the nucleus on which to build. There were, however, political and other objections to this course, and after considerable divergence of opinion had been displayed, the Levies were put under the Ministry of Interior as an adjunct to the other forces for the maintenance of internal order, and the new Ministry of Defence proceeded to lay the foundation of a new army. Very meagre funds were available during the remainder of the financial year, and the activities of the Ministry were limited to the formation of a headquarters and recruiting staff. The prospect, however, of having to finance two military organizations, the new Army and the Levies, during the coming year caused much anxiety to the Finance Minister, and the provisional allotment of 55 lakhs which he made for the Ministry of Defence was determined rather by the limitation on available resources than by a considered programme of defence.

Cairo Conference.

The various urgent political, financial and administrative questions to which some reference has been made above, called for a comprehensive policy, and a Conference was summoned by the Secretary of State at Cairo in March, 1921. The absence of the Minister of Finance and the Adviser at the Conference made it out of the question to present the budget estimates before the beginning of the financial year, and there was no alternative but to carry on with the provisional allotments proposed by the Finance Ministry.

This concludes the survey of the period October, 1920, to April, 1921 ; and the Cairo Conference is a suitable landmark for the introduction of the new period 1921-22.

2.—APRIL, 1921, TO END OF MARCH, 1922.

Decisions reached at Cairo.

The mission returned from Cairo with the following main decision directly affecting Iraq finances. Firstly, all Military claims against the Civil Administration and vice versa were to be dropped, the total receipts (whether from Army Votes or Civil revenue) to the end of March, 1921, being pooled and applied indiscriminately to Civil and

Military expenditure, the deficit, if any, being made good by a supplementary vote to be obtained from Parliament.

Secondly, 'Iraq finances were thus to start with a clean sheet on 1st April, 1921, with nothing for or against.

Thirdly, the 'Iraq Budget was to provide not less than 55 lakhs for the National Army, and ordinarily her contribution to defence was not to fall below 15 per cent. of her revenues. The budget was also expected to show a small surplus.

Fourthly, the Levies were to be financed by His Majesty's Government and administered by the High Commissioner on their behalf.

Work accordingly went forward on these lines. But the first resolution was not so simple as it looks. It was adopted with the object of terminating the labours of the Military and Civil accounts departments as early as possible. Expectations were perhaps a little sanguine and have not been altogether justified by results. In point of fact, the scrutiny of local claims continued, because the Military authorities had no instructions to the contrary. Eventually this scrutiny was limited to claims arising in 1920-21, and the disputes were settled by a compromise. To this extent the first resolution above referred to was modified in practice. It was, in fact, impossible to dispense with the task of bringing all expenditure and receipts to account; and the decision not to press claims between the Civil and Military sides could at best have saved only the actual presentation and acceptance of claims and the transfer of credits. It has been seen that claims were in fact mutually examined for part of the period in question, while the transfer of credits was made *en bloc* instead of piecemeal. Opinions probably differ as to the propriety of merging Civil and Military finances during the period of the Occupation. Until the Cairo Conference it had apparently been generally considered that a distinction should be made: many attempts had been made by the Government of India to define the limits of each, and the view had recently been put forward in a White Paper published in 1920 (and therefore presumably accepted by the authorities) that revenue collections in excess of expenditure regarded as properly debitable to civil estimates were really held in trust for the use of the future civil Government. The decisions taken at Cairo were not in accord with this doctrine, and were no doubt much influenced by considerations of practical convenience; but the final settlement of assets and liabilities has not yet been made, and it is premature at this stage to discuss this matter further.

The budget estimates for 1921-22 (of which a summary is given in table III below) show how effect was given to the other resolutions affecting 'Iraq finances.

TABLE III.

1921-22.

EXPENDITURE.		RECEIPTS.	
	Rs.		Rs.
Public Debt	22,68,800	Taxes on natural produce	1,90,33,623
Civil List	7,50,000	Stamps, Fees and Registration... ..	31,37,145
Representative Assembly	1,00,000	Customs and Excise	2,94,43,365
Council of Ministers	3,70,550	Commercial Departments	1,39,36,008
Ministry of Finance	62,44,187	Government Institutions	10,47,517
Customs and Excise	51,09,882	Proceeds of other Government properties	6,55,000
Ministry of Interior	81,37,582	Interests and Commission	16,080
'Iraq Police	59,71,500	Miscellaneous receipts	26,23,840
Gendarmerie	12,13,060		
Veterinary and Remounts	5,50,380		
Dept. of Agriculture	8,58,770		
Ministry of Defence	55,24,895		
Ministry of Justice	17,86,930		
Dept. of Tapu	7,64,720		
Ministry of Education and Public Health	20,70,460		
Dept. of Health Services	37,54,170		
Ministry of Communications and Works	1,18,12,330		
Postal and Tel. Dept.	72,87,182		
Ministry of Commerce	53,17,180		
Total	6,98,92,578	Total	6,98,92,578

A small surplus of 8.75 lakhs is shown as a reserve in the budget of the Finance Ministry. Unfortunately, the estimates of revenue have not been realized. Under Chapter I, indeed (Taxes on natural produce), the first revised estimates (based on 5 months actuals) showed an improvement of 17 lakhs on the original estimates, owing to the fact that credit had not been taken in the latter for the 1920 arrears. Later revised estimates, however, indicate that the actual collection under this chapter will probably be some 37 lakhs less than the first revised estimates. This is explained partly by a somewhat liberal policy of granting remissions on quasi-political grounds which was pursued in the early part of the financial year, and partly by the general fall in prices below the fixed conversion rates, which has led to difficulties in collection and to an inevitable postponement of a part of the demand.

Another disappointment has been the heavy falling off in Customs receipts from 294 lakhs to 264 lakhs (including 47 lakhs transferred from the "transit suspense account"). This is due to two main causes—the stagnation of trade owing to the political situation in Persia and the large local sales by the Disposals Board, and to the drop in prices. The sooner Customs and land revenue (which represent together some 80 per cent. of the total revenues) can be removed from a basis which at present is almost entirely *ad valorem*, the better it will be for the stability of the 'Iraq budget estimates.

Budget of 1921-22.

The budget was not presented to the Council of State until September, *i.e.*, half-way through the financial year to which it relates. Numerous political and administrative changes made it impossible to complete it before that date, but the majority of Departments had definite (though provisional) allotments on which to proceed. The actuals of receipts and expenditure which are complete up to the end of December, 1921 (except in the case of the Irrigation Department and Port Directorate, the completed accounts of which have been brought to the end of November only), show a practical equilibrium, except for Railways, as to which see below. But the balance between revenue and expenditure can be maintained to the end of the year only if the full revised estimate of land revenue is realized, and it has already been pointed out that a deficit under this head is anticipated of some 37 lakhs. A slight increase in some of the other heads of revenue, and a saving of expenditure in some of the departments, appear likely to make good the remaining deficiency, *viz.*, in Customs revenue; and the calculations made in February indicate that the year will close with a deficit of about 33 lakhs.

It will be realized that, in the present fluid conditions, accurate estimation is impossible, and it is unnecessary to enlarge on this point. Continuous efforts are made to prevent all unnecessary expenditure, and the unsettled state of the administration has made the work of the Finance Ministry in this direction doubly hard.

Railway Expenditure.

The expenditure on Railways has been excluded from the above forecasts. Their accounts are, however, incorporated in those of the 'Iraq Government, owing to the accident that railway administration in 1920 was nominally taken over by the Civil authorities. In fact, as has already been stated, the Railways were used almost entirely for Military purposes, and the 'Iraq Government has protested against the decision that the loss on their working (which stood at 44·5 lakhs at the end of December, 1921) should be borne by 'Iraq Revenues. This matter is still under correspondence.

3.—MACHINERY OF THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

In this part it is proposed to give a brief description of the machinery of the Finance Department, including the Ministry and the Accounts and Audit Department, while the next and final part will contain a few notes on the administration of Land Revenue and Customs and Excise.

Composition and Work of Finance Ministry.

The Finance Ministry at first comprised a Minister, the Adviser, a Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries. One of the latter dealt mainly with the budget estimates, and the other with financial rules and regulations. Both, of course, had also a great variety of miscellaneous matters to attend to. Their work was co-ordinated by the Secretary, who also handled direct some of the larger questions. A good deal of the Adviser's time was taken up with questions which did not

directly concern the 'Iraq Government as then constituted, but he saw every case of importance arising in the Ministry. In the spring of 1921 an additional officer was brought into the Ministry to deal mainly with Customs and Excise matters. During the summer the absence of the Secretary on leave threw a very heavy burden of work on those who remained, and it is difficult to speak too highly of the assistance which they rendered to the Minister and the Adviser. Later in the year an additional Secretaryship was created to deal with questions relating to Customs and Excise revenue which required the orders of Government, and about the same time the administration of Land Revenue was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior, and two Secretaries, one British and one Arab, were appointed to deal with it. The scope of the Ministry was thus much enlarged since the early days of the new Government.

It is impossible to go in detail into the work of the Finance Ministry. Side by side with the close examination of the working and cost of each department, which was entailed by the preparation of the budget estimates, went a mass of detailed work in connection with foreign and local personnel, conditions of service, forms of contracts, general service regulations, grades, rates of pay, pension regulations and so forth. Much spade-work has been done, and the ground has now been prepared for a systematic and comprehensive body of regulations, which it is hoped will be ready for issue as soon as permanent service can be said to be in sight. It is proposed to form a Cadre Commission for the formulation of the regulations of such a service, based on the data already collected.

Provisional Pension Law.

As has been said already, it is impossible, and would be tedious, to go into the details of this laborious task; but one measure is perhaps of special interest, as illustrating the influence of temporary political considerations on financial regulations. The advent of the new Government encouraged the return of many officers of the late Sherifian Army. Several of them had not qualified for pension, but had cut themselves off from the Turkish Government under which their pensionable service had begun, and had thus some claim to special treatment from the 'Iraq Government.

To meet their case a provisional pension law was enacted early in 1921, which came into force with effect from 1st February, 1921.

It may be of interest to add, in connection with the subject of pensions, that the late Civil Administration and the present 'Iraq Government have alike honoured the obligations of the Turkish Government in the payment of pensions to ex-Turkish officials, though hitherto no contributions on this account have been credited to the local revenues.

Accounts and Audit Department.

As far as this Department is concerned, the above period falls naturally into three sections, marking three distinct stages in the evolution of the department.

First period, October, 1920, to January, 1921.—During this period the Department consisted of four distinct branches, viz., (i) Deputy

Accountant-General (Civil), who was the final accounting officer for all Civil Treasury Accounts and for all Departments whose accounts were maintained in the Civil Treasuries. At the same time, he was the Audit Officer for such expenditure.

(ii) Deputy Accountant-General (P & T.), who compiled the accounts of the Postal and Telegraph Departments, and audited them concurrently.

(iii) Audit Officer (Irrigation and Public Works), who audited the accounts of the two Departments mentioned, after they had been prepared in the offices of the respective Directors.

(iv) Audit Officer for Port Accounts, with functions similar to the Audit Officer (Irrigation and Public Works Department).

As far as Audit went, the organization met all essential requirements, although many matters of detail were continually being reviewed and improved.

From the accounting point of view, the organization left much to be desired. The various branches were, in effect, independent accounting offices and there was no co-ordinating and supervising machinery to ensure that all technical accounting operations were carried out satisfactorily, even within each branch (such as transactions under "advance," "suspense" and "deposit" heads). As regards transactions affecting two of the branches, which may be classed as "exchange account transactions," the position was even more unsatisfactory, owing to the absence of any systematic machinery for the exchanging of such accounts between the respective accounting officers and for their prompt adjustment.

The weaknesses of the organization had long been recognised, but it was not until 1921 that it was possible to form an Accountant-General's Office to co-ordinate all the accounting operations of Government.

February, 1921, to December, 1921.—The Accountant-General's office was formed in January, 1921, Fuad Effendi al Sanniyah being appointed Accountant-General with a British Secretary and an 'Iraqi Assistant Accountant-General.

His duties were defined as follows in the 'Iraq Government Gazette for February, 1921 :—

"An Accountant-General's Department has been formed to carry out the following functions :—

Accounting.

(a) Organization and co-ordination of all accounting operations of Government; issue of instructions on accounting procedure and the general form of accounts; organization of a system of exchange accounts between different 'Final Accounts Officers' in 'Iraq, and, if necessary, between 'Iraq and foreign Governments (India, United Kingdom, Egypt, etc.).

(b) Preparation of monthly consolidated statements of Receipts and Issues, and monthly statements of audited Revenue and Expenditure for administrative purposes.

Custody and movement of funds.

(c) Resource operations, *i.e.*, Shipment of Specie from India; sales of T.T's on India or United Kingdom; arrangements for the

supply of funds for military requirements ; movement of Government Funds as necessitated by Government requirements.

(d) Arrangements for the custody of Government Funds ; Currency Chests and Reserve Treasures.

Audit.

(e) Co-ordination of audit interpretations of Government's orders, Civil Service Regulations and financial legislations, and the formulation of general principles of audit.

(f) Recommendations as to the confirmation or otherwise of audit rulings of Audit Officers (Deputy Accountants-General, etc.), disputed by Departments, etc., for report to the Ministry of Finance, whose decision will be final.

(g) Presentation of audited appropriation accounts to the legislative body, with audit reports.

Until further notice Departments, etc., will correspond on audit and accounts questions as at present, but Deputy Accountants-General and Audit Officers will communicate on audit and accounts matters with the Accountant-General instead of the Ministry of Finance."

Steps were at once taken for the issue of instructions calculated to ensure the systematic adjustment of inter-departmental transactions through "Exchange Accounts" between the various accounting branches and for the systematic clearance of the "advance," "deposit" and "suspense" heads within each branch.

"Accounts current" were also organized between 'Iraq on the one hand and His Britannic Majesty's Government, the Governments of India and Kurdistan (Sulaimani) on the other hand, for the adjustment of transactions affecting those Governments.

At the same time arrangements were made to present to the Minister of Finance periodically a consolidated monthly statement of all Receipts and Issues of the Government of 'Iraq for administrative purposes.

Owing to the numerous and radical changes made in the general administrative organization of the Government of 'Iraq, such as the formation of Ministries, etc., it was not possible for the Minister of Finance to decide upon the general form which the Budget of 1921-22 should take until about August, 1921. As a result the consolidated monthly statements for the earlier months of 1921-22 were much delayed, but most of the arrears of 1921-22 had been overtaken by the end of March, 1922.

It was recognised, however, that an audited statement of accounts could not be prepared sufficiently promptly to meet all the requirements of the Ministry of Finance. To overcome this difficulty steps were taken to provide for a monthly approximate statement of Receipts and Issues in Civil Treasuries alone (as distinct from Departments), as this would indicate, sufficiently accurately for the purpose of financial administration on broad lines, and within a fortnight of the end of each month, how the receipts and issues in Treasuries compared with the figures of the sanctioned Budget.

The Hillah Treasury and Liwa Accounts were accordingly re-organised on lines calculated to enable an approximate classified

statement to be submitted to Baghdad by the 7th of the subsequent month. The experiment was successful, and the procedure would have been extended in turn to all Liwas, but this extension was interrupted by the proposal, referred to below, to adopt a general accounting procedure based closely on the former Turkish model.

It was possible, however, to send the Minister of Finance every month a "Review of the ways and means operations" of the preceding month, indicating on very broad lines how the 'Iraq Government's receipts and expenditure compared with one another, and comparing the totals of 'Iraq's drawings on His Britannic Majesty's Government (through India) with her disbursements (to Military Levies, High Commissioners etc.) on account of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Throughout this period attention was given primarily to the accounting operations of the current financial year (1921-22). A very heavy volume of work had also to be undertaken in connection with the accounts of 1919-20 and 1920-21, which, as indicated above, were far from being complete. This work had not been completed satisfactorily by March, 1922, and a considerable amount of work still requires to be done.

This legacy is the inevitable result of the unfortunate inability of this Administration to obtain from India, or spare from her available personnel, an officer and staff for a central Accountant-General's office. Strenuous endeavours were made to do this early in 1919, but the Government of India could not spare the officers asked for, and there was no alternative but to postpone the formation of an Accountant-General's office until staff became available in January, 1921.

January, 1922, to March, 1922.—This period was characterized by the proposal to reorganize the accounts of the Government of 'Iraq on a model more suited to the employment of local personnel. After much discussion a general procedure was decided upon which follows fairly closely the former Turkish accounting organization, and the necessary Arabic forms and instructions are now being prepared.

Resource Operations.—During the course of the year 1921-22 it became evident that there was considerable misunderstanding in London as to the actual machinery by which funds were raised in 'Iraq to finance expenditure adjustable against the Budget of His Majesty's Government. At the same time it became obvious that the transition to accounting in Arabic and the employment of the 'Iraqi accounting staff would be extremely difficult and much delayed as long as the Major Resource Operations were conducted by the 'Iraq Government through its own treasuries.

Steps were therefore taken to transfer all the Major Resource Operations, and all the accounting for expenditure on the Budget of His Majesty's Government, to His Excellency the High Commissioner's office, thus relieving the 'Iraq Government of responsibility for this work from the 1st April, 1922.

This measure is of first-class importance. It will enable the Accountant-General's Office to concentrate on the requirements of the 'Iraq Government, and—a far more significant change—it will compel the 'Iraq Government to realize more closely the limitation on its

- own ways and means, and will thus probably act as an effective incentive to economy.

4.—LAND REVENUE, CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ADMINISTRATION.

Land Revenue.

The administration of Land Revenue was under the Ministry of the Interior until October, 1921. It was much influenced in the early part of the year by political considerations. The disturbances of 1920 had dislocated agricultural industry and caused some genuine hardship among many who had remained loyal to the cause of law and order. Their grievances could not in justice be overlooked, and from one cause and another a considerable amount of revenue was remitted in the course of the summer.

Certain privileges also were granted or extended during the period under review, notably the immunity from enhancement of the fixed assessments on Muqata'ahs in 'Amarah which was extended to November, 1922.

In the main the Turkish law was applied, as during the provisional administration. The unsettled administrative arrangements led to a resumption of the system of farming taxes from which efforts to escape had been made during the previous year or two. Considerable difficulty was caused by the remarkable fall in prices of grain, which in some areas was as much as 100 per cent. Some diminution had been expected, but the factor which chiefly contributed to the fall, namely, the rapid reduction in the size of the British garrison, had not been accurately gauged. Complaints on this score arose at first from the Hillah, Nasiriyah and Kirkuk Liwas. After careful consideration it was found necessary to make a large reduction in the rice conversion rates in three qadhas of the Hillah Liwa, and to revert to the "Kharas" mode of assessment in the Suq-al-Shuyukh qadha of the Muntafiq Liwa. The Kirkuk case was different, since there was no question about the suitability of the rates at the time they were settled, and it was only on account of the practical difficulty of realizing the tax (some political factors also perhaps influencing the case) that a partial postponement of collection was allowed. It is probable that this will lead to similar concessions elsewhere, and it is important to find some safeguard against the detrimental effects on revenue exercised by fluctuation in prices.

Proposal for creation of a State Domains Department.

Steps were taken towards the end of 1921 to form a State Domains Department under the Ministry of Finance. It was found desirable, however, to postpone the creation of a separate office until more complete information had been collected in the Ministry with regard to the extent and value of immovable property belonging to the State. This enquiry is in progress. Meanwhile, attention was given to the possibility of raising funds to finance capital expenditure on Irrigation, etc., and the question of selling Government land was considered as a means to this end. Important economic points have emerged in connection with this subject, such as the possibility and desirability of creating a peasant-proprietor class, and it has been found useful to have a kind of informal committee, composed of representatives of

various departments, for the consideration of these topics. This institution ought to prove of great value to the Ministry.

'Amarah Muqata'ahs.

In October, 1921, an officer was put on special duty to study the question of reassessing the 'Amarah Muqata'ahs. His report, which contains much of interest from political, economic and fiscal points of view, and in which the possibility of a considerable enhancement of revenue is forecasted, reached the Government just before the close of the financial year.

Customs and Excise.

During the period October, 1920, to April, 1921, the revenue from excise was administered by the Ministry of Interior, while the Customs Department, consisting of a Chief Collector and two Collectors, assisted by about a dozen other officers, was concerned only with Import and Export duties. In April, 1921, excise revenue was brought under the Customs Department, the organization of which thereafter comprised a Director of Customs and Excise, two Collectors of Customs, two Deputy Collectors of Excise (working, as a temporary measure during the early stages of excise administration, directly under the Director and independently of the Collectors), and a number of assistants called Deputy Collectors.

The commodities on which excise duties were levied were Liquor, Opium, Tobacco and Salt, and the revenue derived from these sources (including also the proceeds of country-craft registration, which was provisionally administered by the excise authorities) amounted in 1921-22 to 39.29 lakhs.

The following table (No. IV) gives the monthly value of the Import trade of Iraq (showing imports into Basrah and Baghdad separately) during the whole period under review :—

TABLE IV.

	Basrah.	Baghdad.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
October, 1920	94,69,450	62,35,357	1,57,04,807
November, 1920	1,13,76,450	84,25,803	1,98,02,253
December, 1920	1,08,14,846	1,12,78,127	2,20,92,973
January, 1921	96,44,510	92,00,884	1,88,45,494
February, 1921	63,89,114	1,07,65,277	1,71,54,341
March, 1921	74,37,851	1,13,62,784	1,88,00,635
Total	5,51,32,221	5,72,68,232	11,24,00,513
April, 1921	99,61,169	91,35,533	1,90,96,702
May, 1921	1,17,00,919	65,74,512	1,82,75,431
June, 1921	1,65,04,375	81,91,002	2,46,95,377
July, 1921	1,14,89,119	55,14,303	1,70,03,422
August, 1921	77,22,895	63,26,364	1,40,49,259
September, 1921	70,60,886	45,20,461	1,15,81,347
October, 1921	47,12,645	78,69,771	1,25,82,416
November, 1921	65,85,116	96,60,297	1,62,45,413
December, 1921... ..	93,86,225	79,23,143	1,73,09,368
January, 1922	56,65,691	1,03,98,108	1,60,63,799
February, 1922	45,23,336	79,00,000	1,24,23,336
Total	10,13,12,726	9,31,13,494	19,44,25,870

Specie imports during the above two periods amount to :—

For the half-year ending 31st March, 1921.

—	Gold.	Silver.	Total value.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Basrah (Value Rs.)	—	5,79,000	5,79,000

—	Persian Krans.	Turkish Liras.	Tomans.	Roubles.	Gold roubles.
Baghdad (Nos.)	12,71,950	84,983	1,184	32,24,463	1,830

For the financial year ending 31st March, 1922.

—	Gold.	Silver.	Total value.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Basrah (Value Rs.)	9,200	7,39,400	7,48,600

—	Persian Krans.	Turkish Liras.	Tomans.	Roubles.	Gold roubles.
Baghdad (Nos.)	1,25,45,555	2,61,635	1,956	1,43,97,770	15,000

Note.—The total rupee value of specie imports during the period was approximately 105 lakhs.

Table V gives the monthly value of exports during the same period.

TABLE V.

—	Basrah.	Baghdad.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
October, 1920	1,29,15,174	7,12,285	1,36,27,459
November, 1920	27,81,078	31,23,410	59,04,488
December, 1920	18,11,140	15,83,216	33,94,356
January, 1921	9,14,466	32,12,516	41,26,982
February, 1921	10,39,951	31,16,750	41,56,701
March, 1921	11,67,527	32,35,615	44,03,412
Total	2,06,29,336	1,49,83,792	3,56,13,398
April, 1921	15,10,785	54,42,201	69,52,986
May, 1921	14,83,347	79,02,667	93,86,014
June, 1921	10,02,184	91,43,493	1,01,45,677
July, 1921	19,20,801	87,04,792	1,06,25,593
August, 1921	13,86,003	75,00,088	88,86,091
September, 1921	27,59,929	39,80,024	67,39,953
October, 1921	74,42,482	60,12,161	1,34,54,643
November, 1921	52,76,840	50,88,734	1,03,65,574
December, 1921	25,66,415	65,38,911	91,05,326
January, 1922	17,14,910	56,33,642	73,48,552
February, 1922	11,85,067	60,00,000	71,85,067
March, 1922	10,40,648	65,00,000	75,40,648
Total	2,92,88,641	7,84,46,713	10,77,36,124

Specie exports—

For the half-year ending 31st March, 1921.

—	Gold.	Silver.	Total value.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Basrah (Value Rs.)	2,35,20,943	8,60,230	2,43,81,173

—	£ Turkish.	Krans.	Rupees.	£ Sterling.
Baghdad (Nos.)	14,45,333	7,57,400	1,22,000	21,485

—	Gold.	Silver.	Other metal coins.	G.C. Notes.	Total value Rs.
Basrah (Value Rs.)...	3,43,69,818	1,19,53,169	12,500	1,33,12,000	6,85,07,712

For the financial year ending 31st March, 1922.

—	Gold.	Silver.	Other metal coins.	G.C. Notes.	Total value Rs.
Basrah (Value Rs.)...	3,43,69,818	1,19,53,169	12,500	1,33,12,000	6,85,07,712

—	£ Turkish	Krans.	Rupees.	£ Sterling.	Roubles.	Gold Tomans.	Gold roubles.
Baghdad (Nos.)	3,07,820	8,048,000	28,000	42	1,000,000	27,178	24,455

Note.—The approximate value in rupees of exports of specie is 1,227 lakhs.

At the beginning of the year 1921-22 the ordinary *ad valorem* import duty was 11 per cent. In April of that year the rate was raised to 15 per cent. on all articles previously liable to the 11 per cent. duty, with the exception of specified foodstuffs, machinery, building and engineering materials and certain other articles (*vide* Customs Notification No. 3 of 1921).

Further increases in duties were introduced by a law passed in September, 1921. By this law the following articles were removed from the lower *ad valorem* rate of 11 per cent. to a rate of 15 per cent.,

viz., tea, coffee, sugar, almonds and nuts, fruit and vegetables, provisions and groceries. The duty on imported cigarettes was raised from Rs.2/8 per 1,000 to Rs.5/- per kilogramme, that on manufactured tobacco from 15 per cent. *ad valorem* to Rs.5/- per kilogramme, that on cigars and snuff from 15 to 50 per cent. *ad valorem*, while "tumbeki" (or pipe-tobacco imported mainly from Persia) was taxed at Rs.2/- per kilogramme instead of Rs.1/2. Importation of raw tobacco was prohibited. Further, a surtax on matches of Re.1/- per gross boxes of 60 matches, and on playing cards of Re.1/- per pack, was levied in addition to the existing duty of 15 per cent. *ad valorem*.

The gross Customs realization during the period under review are shown in the subjoined Table (No. VI).

Gross Customs realizations during the half-year ending 31st March, 1921, amounted to :—

	Basrah.	Baghdad.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
October, 1920	14,18,388	7,85,598	22,03,986
November, 1920	13,81,413	8,76,629	21,58,042
December, 1920... ..	12,51,559	11,42,276	23,93,835
January, 1921	10,96,588	9,81,714	20,78,302
February, 1921	8,23,570	12,02,664	20,26,234
March, 1921	9,62,490	11,55,338	21,17,828
Total	69,34,008	61,44,219	1,29,78,227

For the financial year ending 31st March, 1922, the following are the figures of gross realization under Customs :—

	Basrah.	Baghdad.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
April, 1921	11,13,952	5,89,888	17,03,840
May, 1921	9,50,527	5,64,706	15,15,233
June, 1921	13,39,891	5,67,512	19,07,403
July, 1921	10,39,718	4,32,884	14,72,602
August, 1921	7,29,509	4,10,796	11,40,305
September, 1921	8,05,802	3,60,326	11,66,128
October, 1921	6,80,212	6,13,514	12,93,726
November, 1921	8,49,534	7,76,136	16,25,670
December, 1921	8,93,662	5,48,151	14,41,813
January, 1922	6,76,579	6,28,363	13,04,942
February, 1922	5,87,593	6,28,819	12,16,412
March, 1922	8,78,075	4,50,000	13,28,075
Total	1,05,44,986	65,72,095	1,71,16,149

The figures for the two financial periods are not, however, compiled on precisely the same basis. In 1920-21, import duty on goods in transit was credited to realizations, and its subsequent repayment on export is included in disbursements under the head "Refunds." In

the following year, however, an account called the "transit suspense account" was opened, and payments of import duty on goods in transit were credited to a deposit head, and are, therefore, not included in gross realizations. The "transit suspense account" of 1921-22 amounted to 94 lakhs, of which 45.48 were refunded during the year. In the earlier period refunds on account of export of goods in transit are shown in the total expenditure of the Department, and are not explicitly distinguished from "refunds and drawbacks" proper, or from the working costs of the Department.

IV.—THE 'IRAQ ARMY.

1.—HISTORY AND GENERAL REMARKS.

Ja'far Pasha al 'Askari, C.M.G., late C-in-C. of the Hijaz Army, arrived in 'Iraq from Syria on 16th October, 1920, and was appointed Minister of Defence on 26th October, 1920.

No further development occurred till 6th January, 1921, when a skeleton Headquarters Staff of 10 'Iraqi officers was formed; their numbers being increased to 13 on 18th January and to 24 in April, 1921.

Many of these officers had fought on the side of the Allies during the Great War in the Sharifian Forces. Plans for raising and organising an 'Iraq Army were gone into, officers registered for service, etc., and on the recommendation of the Minister of Defence, the Council of Ministers decreed that the 'Iraq Army should be organised, trained, dressed, and equipped on British lines.

In February, Nuri Pasha al Sa'id, C.M.G., D.S.O., arrived from Syria and was appointed officiating C.G.S., and on 6th March 111 'Iraqi Officers of the Hijaz Army arrived in Baghdad from Suez and became available for service in the 'Iraq Army.

In February, the Minister of Defence accompanied me to the Middle Eastern Conference at Cairo, returning to Baghdad on 9th April, 1921.

A further period of conferences and references to superior authority took place and finally, on 12th June, financial sanction was received to proposed rates of pay for rank and file, and on 18th June Recruiting Officers were despatched to the various recruiting centres, the first recruit enlisting (at Baghdad) on 21st June. The 'Iraq Army, therefore, may be considered to date its birth from the end of June, 1921.

The terms of service offered to recruits were as follows:—

I.—Any 'Iraqi of the towns and settled villages of 'Iraq, between 18-40 years of age, may volunteer for Army service. The period of service will be two years in the dismounted units and three years in the mounted branches.

II.—Monthly rates of pay for N.C.O.'s and men will be as follows:—

Mounted Units.				Dismounted Units.			
Sergeant	Rs. 70	Sergeant	Rs. 60
Corporal	" 50	Corporal	" 45
Private	" 35	Private	" 30

Each soldier will also be entitled to rations and clothing.

III.—After having served from 3 to 6 months in the ranks, a private should have proved himself proficient in drill and musketry training. He will then receive Rs.5 per mensem extra. This allowance will be called "proficiency pay."

IV.—On completion of his period of service a soldier may be permitted to re-enlist for a second period. He will then receive an increase of pay of Rs.5 per mensem.

V.—No soldier will be sent on service outside the limits of 'Iraq.

VI.—A soldier who has completed his second period of service is eligible for promotion to the Commissioned ranks.

VII.—If a soldier who has completed 12 years' service leaves the Army he will be entitled to a post in the Civil Service (if, or when, there are vacancies) at a salary of 50 per cent. more than his Army pay.

VIII.—Troops will be quartered in barracks in towns, but will live in tents when on field service.

IX.—The soldier's daily ration will be as follows:—

	Grammes.
Flour	560
or Biscuits	560
or Bread	800
Meat	180
Rice	180
Ghee	30
Salt	20
Sugar	10
Tea	2
Fresh Vegetables	500
or Fresh Fruits	250
or Potatoes	
Lentils	
Dried Beans	
Onions	250
or Dried Vegetables	100
or Dry Fruits	200
Fuel	700
Soap	10

X.—Each soldier will receive the following articles of clothing —

Summer.	Winter.	General.
2 Drill Tunics.	1 Serge Tunic.	3 Pairs Socks.
2 Pairs Drill Trousers.	1 Pair Serge Trousers.	2 Pairs Puttees.
	1 Jersey.	2 Pairs Boots.
	2 Pairs Pants.	2 Shirts.
	1 Waterproof.	1 Greatcoat.
		1 Aqual.
		2 Kafiyahs.
		1 Sidarah.
		2 Blankets.
		1 Haversack.
		1 Water-bottle
		1 Spoon.
		1 Plate.
		1 Mug.

XI.—Every man wishing to enlist must produce a certificate of good character signed by the Mukhtar of his quarter.

XII.—Recruits will receive subsistence allowances from the date of recruitment by the District R.O. till date of arrival at Headquarters. They will also receive a free passage from their recruiting centres to

Baghdad. Before receiving subsistence allowances for their journey they must produce a guarantee that is acceptable to the District R.O.

XIII.—The following leave will be granted to soldiers of the 'Iraq Army :—

- (a) All unmarried soldiers living in a place where their families reside, 24 hours a week.
- (b) Married men living in a place where their families reside will get this same leave, plus one extra night.
- (c) All soldiers whose homes are not more than 24 hours' journey from their barracks, every 3 months, 10 days' leave.
- (d) All soldiers whose homes are more than 24 hours' journey, but not more than 3 days' journey, every 6 months, 20 days' leave.
- (e) All soldiers whose homes are distant more than 3 days' journey from their barracks, every 9 months, 30 days' leave.

N.B.—If the classes enumerated in (c) and (d) take no leave for one year they will be entitled to 30 days' leave. Leave in excess of 30 days cannot be accumulated.

These Regulations are subject to such alterations and amendments as the exigencies of the service may necessitate.

XIV.—The following are the chest and height measurements necessary. The figures in the Table represent the mean between the measurements of the chest when emptied of all air and when fully expanded. There should be a difference of at least two inches between the two latter measurements :—

Age.			5' 4" to 5' 7"	5' 7" to 5' 8"	5' 8" to 5' 9"	5' 9" to 5' 10"	5' 10" and over.
18-19	33"	33"	33½"	34"	34½"
19-22	33"	33½"	34"	34½"	35"
22-24	33½"	34"	34½"	35"	35½"
24-25	34"	34½"	35"	35½"	36"
25 and over	34½"	35"	35½"	36"	36"

Technical and menial establishments will be enlisted if able-bodied, irrespective of height and chest measurements.

On 1st January, 1922, the term of service for all arms was fixed at two years and the following revised rates of pay approved for the Rank and File :—

				Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.
				Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Artillery	60	50	40
Cavalry	60	50	40
Infantry	55	45	40
Transport	55	45	40
				Assistant		
				Ward Masters.	Ward Masters.	Orderlies.
Medical	55	45	40

The approved rates of pay for officers are :—

			Rs. per mensem.
Al 'Amid	General	2,000
Al Fariq al Awwal	Lt.-General	1,500
Al Fariq	Major-General	1,200
Al Zaim	Colonel	850
Al 'Aqid	Lt.-Colonel	650
Al Muqaddam	Major	550
Al Rais al Awwal	Senior Captain	450
Al Rais	Captain	400
Al Mulazim al Awwal	Lieutenant	300
Al Mulazim al Thani	2nd Lieutenant	250

The 1st 'Iraq Infantry was formed at Baghdad on 28th July, 1921, and transferred to Kadhmain on the 17th August. On 7th/9th October it was transferred to Hillah, relieving the British garrison there and at the Hindiyah Barrage, and was given the title of "Fauj Musa al Kadhim" ("The Musa al Kadhim Battalion") on leaving Kadhmain, by H.M. King Faisal.

The 1st 'Iraq Cavalry was formed at Baghdad on 27th August, 1921, the nucleus of its 1st Squadron (King's Bodyguard) having been formed on 18th July, 1921. In March, 1922, it was given the title of "Katibat al Hashimi" ("The Hashimi Regiment"), by H.M. King Faisal.

The 2nd 'Iraq Infantry was formed at Baghdad on the 10th August, 1921, and proceeded to Kadhmain on 7th November, 1921.

The 1st Pack Battery was formed at Baghdad on the 12th October, 1921, and proceeded to Kadhmain on 12th November, and one section of it will proceed to Mosul on April 10th, 1922.

The 1st Transport Company was formed at Baghdad on 24th July, 1921, and proceeded to Mosul on 5th March, 1922.

The 2nd Transport Company was formed at Baghdad on 1st December, 1921.

The 2nd Pack Battery was formed at Kadhmain on 1st January, 1922.

The nucleus of the 2nd 'Iraq Cavalry was formed at Baghdad on 1st January, 1922, and proceeded to Mosul on 6th January.

The nucleus of the 3rd 'Iraq Infantry was formed at Baghdad on 1st January, 1922, and proceeded to Mosul on 9th January, 1922.

The 'Iraq Medical Corps was formed at Baghdad in July, 1921, and has detachments at Mosul, Hillah and Kadhmain.

(The 3rd 'Iraq Cavalry will be formed at Mosul in April, 1922.)

2.—RECRUITING.

Recruiting began well, but there were many desertions to start with and a considerable number of undesirable characters entered the ranks. From the monthly returns below, it will be noticed that recruiting fell off in October, November and December, 1921, the higher rates of pay given by the 'Iraq Levies having a bad effect on recruiting for the 'Iraq Army. When in January, 1922, the rates of pay in the 'Iraq Army were equalized with those of the Levies, recruiting greatly improved.

A voluntary recruited Army, however, is an innovation in 'Iraq and it remains to be seen whether men will be obtained in sufficient numbers to form a force capable of garrisoning Iraq effectively. Many local authorities are doubtful of this and consider some modified form of ballot will be necessary.

Recruiting branches were opened towards the end of June, 1921, at Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Ramadi, Basrah, 'Anah, Kadhimain, Khanaqin, Ba'quba, Mandali, Samarra, 'Amarah, Karbala, Hillah, Kut, Najaf, Hindiyah, Nasiriyah and Kifri. The staff of these branches consisted of :—

28 Officers.
4 Officer Clerks.
30 N.C.O. Clerks.

Recruits from all these branches were sent to Baghdad for training till January, 1922, when recruits from the Mosul and Kirkuk Liwas were posted for training direct to Mosul, and those from the middle Euphrates area to Hillah. This has proved popular with recruits, as the 'Iraqi dislikes serving for long periods far away from his native district.

The monthly returns of men enlisted are as follows :—

							Men.
June, 1921	19
July, 1921	1,429
August, 1921	594
September, 1921	320
October, 1921	117
November, 1921	130
December, 1921	200
January, 1922	403
February, 1922	691
March, 1922	554

3.—MILITARY EDUCATION.

(a) 'Iraq Military College.

On 1st April, 1921, a small class of instruction for 20 'Iraqi Subalterns was begun in a room of the Sarai ; it was finally assimilated into the first class, who joined the 'Iraq Military College in July. On the return of the Mesopotamia Commission from the Middle Eastern Conference at Cairo in the beginning of April, a scheme for the formation of a Training College was submitted to the Ministry and approved in principle.

This scheme was designed to provide a training establishment for 250 'Iraqi officers of the old Turkish Army, the seniors to go through a 3 months' course and the juniors through a 6 months' course during the financial year. The establishment of the school was organised on the lines of a Company at the R.M.C., Sandhurst, modified to suit conditions in 'Iraq.

The only suitable building available was the North Gate Barracks, and it was not possible to get the necessary repairs and alterations finished till the 15th July.

The 'Iraq Military College was formally opened on the 19th July in the presence of H.H. the Amir Faisal, H.E. the High Commissioner, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in 'Iraq, and many Government officials and local notables. On this date 156 officers joined the College, their ranks being as follows :—

Muqaddam (Major)	7
Rais Awwal (Senior Captain)	26
Rais (Captain)	17
Mulazim Awwal (Lieutenant)	34
Mulazim Thani (2nd Lieutenant)	72

It was unfortunate that the College should have been opened at the hottest period of the year, as it involved considerable hardship on the students, many of whom were no longer in their first youth. The British instructional staff was not complete at the commencement of the course, consisting of 3 British Officers and 4 Non-Commissioned Officers, instead of the full complement of 7 and 10 respectively.

The authorized staff of the School consisted of the following personnel :—

British :

- 1 Director.
- 1 Assistant Director.
- 5 British Officer Instructors.
- 10 British Other Ranks Instructors.

'Iraq :

- 1 Commandant.
- 4 'Iraq Army Officer Instructors.

In August, 3 British Officers and 6 Non-Commissioned Officers joined the instructional staff, making it practically complete. The subjects taught at the College consisted of :—

Infantry Drill.

Cavalry Drill—Horse and Stable Management.

Physical Training.

Musketry.

Military Administration and Regimental Interior Economy.

Sanitation and Hygiene.

Elementary Lectures on General Military Subjects.

Elementary Military Law.

On 1st October, 27 of the Officer Students were urgently required for the Army.

At the end of September, an examination was held in all subjects taught at the College, the candidates at the top of the list being passed out as under :—

Muqaddam	3
Rais Awwal	3
Rais	4
Mulazim Awwal	9
Mulazim Thani	8
Total	27

On 13th October, the following Artillery Officers were passed out of the College :—

Rais Awwal	2
Rais	2
Mulazim Awwal	2
Mulazim Thani	3
Total ...							9

On 10th November, a class of 51 fresh Officer Students joined the 'Iraq into the Army :—

Muqaddam	3
Rais Awwal	9
Rais	8
Mulazim Awwal	13
Mulazim Thani	17
Total ...							50

In addition to these, 13 Officers failed to pass out of the College and returned to civil life.

On 10th November, a class of 51 fresh Officer Students joined the 'Iraq Military College, being of the following ranks :—

'Aqid (Lieutenant-Colonel)	2
Muqaddam	5
Rais Awwal	7
Rais	11
Mulazim Awwal	14
Mulazim Thani	12
Total ...							51

A class of 50 Non-Commissioned Officers also joined the College for a class of instruction on this date [see (ii) (d)].

On 17th November, the following officers of the July course were commissioned :—

Rais Awwal	1
Mulazim Awwal	2
Mulazim Thani	3
Total ...							6

Generally speaking, the College had now begun to function satisfactorily and better results in training were plainly evident.

On 1st January, 1922, the remainder of the July class passed out of the College to the Army. They were of the following ranks :—

Muqaddam	1
Rais Awwal	10
Rais	1
Mulazim Awwal	2
Mulazim Thani	32
Total ...							46

A new class joined on the 3rd January, 1922, of the following ranks :—

Muqaddam	3
Rais Awwal	10
Rais	5
Mulazim Awwal	11
Mulazim Thani	25
Total	54

The Students were now divided into four classes as under :—

1st Class : (In two divisions).—Senior officers who had joined in November, 1921, and January, 1922.

2nd Class :—Junior officers who had joined in November, 1921.

3rd Class :—Junior officers who had joined in January, 1922.

4th Class :—Non-Commissioned Officers who had joined in November, 1921.

Owing to these classes being at different stages of instructions, the system of training had to be modified to meet requirements and the staff were very fully employed. The difficulties which were formerly met with, however, were not experienced, as the administration and organisation of the College had now much improved and the whole establishment had settled into their places.

During February and March, a marked improvement generally as regards training was noticeable.

During February, Officers of ranks as under were commissioned and left the College :—

1st February	Muqaddam	1
	Rais	2
	Mulazim Thani	3
13th February	Muqaddam	1
20th February	Mulazim Awwal... ..	1
22nd February	Mulazim Awwal... ..	1
28th February	Muqaddam	2

All these were of the November, 1921, class.

Ninety-four Officer Students now remain in the School and will be ready for commissions by 31st March.

The senior division of the 1st class, and the 2nd class, are required for the Army on 1st April under present arrangements, and therefore the January class will complete a 6 months' course.

Physical training was discontinued from November, 1921, and Tactics instituted for No. 1 class.

Particular attention has been paid to Musketry, and in addition to frequent firing on the Miniature Range, a course of Musketry on the long range was begun on 4th March for the senior division of No. 1 class and classes Nos. 2 and 4.

The Translation Department of the 'Iraq Army was attached to the 'Iraq Military College and has been flooded with work, as in addition to carrying out the ground work of the bulk of the translation of Military Text Books required by the College and the Army at large, they were occupied with work required for the interior economy of the School, Lecture, etc.

(b) *Translations and Courses of Instruction.*

The undermentioned books have been translated into Arabic and in addition lectures on Tactics and Military Administration, Standing Orders, etc., have been translated and printed in Arabic.

Squad Drill.

Platoon Drill.

Company Drill.

Extended Order Drill.

Bayonet Fighting.

Parts of Cavalry Training.

„ Musketry Regulations.

„ Infantry Training.

„ Machine-Gun Training.

„ Handbook of .303 Vickers Machine-Gun.

Manual of Physical Training.

Part of Field Service Regulations, Vol II

Drill Book of 2.75 B.L. Gun.

Notes on Horse Management in the Field.

Notes on the Ford Car.

One of the first tasks with which the Ministry of Defence found itself confronted was the necessity of forming an Arabic Military vocabulary. Hitherto all Military Terms, Text Books, Words of Command, etc., have been written in Turkish, and the necessity of translating these into Arabic involves the selection, adaptation and classification for Military purposes of works which have hitherto carried no special Military significance.

The following courses of instructions have been held during the year :—

- (a) A three months' course of instruction in Motor Transport (Fiats and Ford). One Officer and 17 men passed this course with credit.
- (b) A 6 weeks' course for 14 officers in the 2.75 B.L. Gun.
- (c) A 2 months' course for 7 officers and 7 N.C.O.'s in the .303 Vickers Machine-Gun.
- (d) A 4 months' course at the 'Iraq Military College for 50 (afterwards reduced to 43) N.C.O.'s.
- (e) 14 artificers have undergone a course of instructions in the British Ordnance Workshops, Baghdad.
- (f) 16 men have been trained as Farriers at the Civil Veterinary Hospital.
- (g) 5 officers and 31 N.C.O.'s have undergone a Cavalry Course under the senior Liaison Officer, Cavalry.

4.—MEDICAL AND VETERINARY.

(a) *Medical.*

Recruiting for the 'Iraq Medical Corps began on 2nd July, 1921, and a small hospital of 20 beds was opened in the North Gate Barracks, on 25th August, 1921.

For establishment of the Medical Corps *see* (7).

There are at present three Military Hospitals :—

Baghdad	35 beds.
Mosul	50 „
Hillah	8 „

As these hospitals are not yet fully equipped very serious cases are usually sent to Civil Hospitals.

During the past 6 months 484 cases have been treated in Military Hospitals.

There have been 5 cases of death in Hospital.

There have been 2 cases of death out of Hospital (one of these due to an accident).

Prevailing Diseases.

Eye Diseases.

Malaria.

Venereal.

Only one case of infectious disease has been reported.

Field Ambulance.

A Field Ambulance of 2 sections is being prepared and is nearly complete.

Medical Examination of Recruits and Invaliding.

The rejection of recruits, or invaliding of soldiers out of the Army has been chiefly due to the following causes :—

Trachoma and its consequences.

Malarial Cachexia.

Profound Anæmia usually due to Malaria or Ancylostomiasis.

(b) Veterinary.

The Veterinary Service of the 'Iraq Army is naturally in its initial stage of development.

Administrative British and 'Iraq Personnel.

A Veterinary Adviser being necessary at Headquarters, the services of the existing Director of Civil Veterinary Department, for the sake of economy, are utilised.

The executive Veterinary Officers ('Iraqis) are four in number, one in charge of Remounts and the other three in charge of areas. Two of them have not completed a full Veterinary course and it is proposed to send them to India to fully qualify.

Further, the Veterinary Inspectors of the Civil Veterinary Department render all Veterinary aid in those areas where there is no Army Veterinary Officer stationed.

The subordinate personnel consists of two men from each unit being attached to the Veterinary Officers in charge of their formations and undergo a special course of instruction and work under their orders in the Unit's sick lines.

Veterinary Hospitals.

For the sake of economy there are no Veterinary Sections nor Hospitals. The existing Hospital of the Civil Veterinary Department being available, the Hospital cases are evacuated there.

Veterinary Equipment.

All Units are provided with Field Veterinary Equipment on an economical scale and are issued to and held on charge of the Veterinary Officers concerned.

Veterinary Stores.

All Veterinary Stores are supplied from the Civil Veterinary Stores, Baghdad, on indent and the Director of Civil Veterinary Department personally scrutinises the demands.

Returns.

A return of sick and lame animals is rendered weekly by each Veterinary Officer for the Units under his charge to the Veterinary Adviser direct.

Veterinary History sheets have been compiled for all animals and are kept with the Unit Commanders.

Health of Animals.

During the last two months ending 10th March, the total number of cases treated in Sick Lines is 241. Of these 170 have been returned to duty, 2 have died and 3 were destroyed as incurable. Sixty-six remain under treatment, of which 42 are surgical cases. No contagious disease exists at the present time.

The Arab pattern shoe has been universally adopted. Men have been and are being trained at the Civil Veterinary Hospital, Baghdad, as shoeing smiths on a three months' course.

Veterinary inspections of Units are made periodically by the Veterinary Adviser.

5.—JUDICIAL.

On the 11th August, 1921, the "Iraq Army Proclamation" (provisional), was passed by the Council of Ministers and signed by His Excellency the High Commissioner.

Under this Proclamation a permanent Court-Martial was instituted at Army Headquarters, Baghdad, to try the more serious offences against Military Law, and in March, 1922, permission was obtained to institute similar permanent Courts-Martial at other stations at the discretion of the Minister of Defence.

The total number of Courts-Martial held during the current year was 8, and the total number of cases of breaches of discipline reported to Ministry of Defence, but not warranting a Court-Martial, was 180. The procedure used at Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry is based on that laid down in the Army Act and King's Regulations.

6.—DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH ON 31ST MARCH, 1922.

Officers and men.

Mosul :

District Staff	2
2nd 'Iraq Cavalry	436
3rd 'Iraq Infantry	626
1st Transport Company	155
Medical Corps	12

N.B.—The 3rd 'Iraq Cavalry will be formed on 1st April, 1922, from drafts of 2nd Cavalry.

Baghdad and Kadhimain :

Headquarters Staff	29
'Iraq Military College	6
1st 'Iraq Cavalry	313
1st Pack Battery	215
2nd Pack Battery	119
2nd 'Iraq Infantry	692
2nd Transport Company (less detach. at Hillah) ...	208
Medical Corps	33

Hillah :

1st 'Iraq Infantry (with one Coy. Hindiyah Barrage)	811
Detach. 2nd Transport Coy.	11
Medical Corps	7

7.—AUTHORISED ESTABLISHMENT FOR 1921-22 AND ORGANISATION OF UNITS.

The strength of the 'Iraq Army during the past year has had to be regulated not by the duties required of it so much as by the funds which could be provided for it from the revenues of the country. A total sum of 55 lakhs was set aside for the Army and plans were made to recruit the forces gradually so as to keep within the limits of this provision. The final strength aimed at was a force of :—

One Cavalry Regiment.

One Battery of Artillery, composed of two Sections of 2.75" Mountain Guns and one Section of 18 pdrs.

Three Battalions of Infantry.

Two Transport Companies.

Ministry and Advisory Staffs.

Recruiting Staff.

Officers' School.

Medical Services.

Accounts Department.

During the year it was found advisable to modify the composition of the above force in certain details, notably in the composition of the Battery, the 18 pdrs. Section of which was abandoned.

The necessity of taking over the duty of garrisoning Mosul by 1st April, 1922, entailed a further re-organisation and the raising of additional troops. The money for this was found out of savings effected in the previous Budget due to Units not being recruited up to programme and from an additional vote of 8 lakhs. The additional forces to be raised with this sum consisted of two Regiments of Cavalry and one Mountain Battery.

The total force, therefore, authorised at the end of the financial year was as shown in the following table :—

	Officers.	Other Ranks.
Headquarters Staff	29	—
Recruiting Staff	32	30
Military College Staff	6	—
Medical Services	12	38
2 Cavalry Regiments	66	885
2 Pack Batteries	12	524
3 Battalions Infantry	84	2,271
2 Transport Companies	6	306
Total	254	4,054

(The above figures represent enlisted personnel and are exclusive of menials and artisans.)

8.—SUPPLY OF CLOTHING, ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND ANIMALS.

The greater bulk of the Army's general and surgical equipment, ammunition and warlike stores, personnel equipment and clothing has been purchased through the Disposals at prices averaging 60 per cent. of Ordnance Vocabulary prices. Sufficient clothing and stores, etc. has been provided for the Army sanctioned during the current financial year. Some stores and clothing were purchased locally such as head-gear, blankets, brow bands, saddlery and some from overseas.

Animal requirements have been provided by surplus animals from the Army of Occupation. The following have been taken over :—

Horses	622
L.D. Mules	202
Ordnance Mules	374
A.T. & Pack Mules	1,796

The prices charged by the British Government are :—

Horses	Rs. 400
L.D. Mules	„ 400
Other Mules	„ 350

9.—MINISTRY, ADVISORY AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

The Ministry Staff is as follows :—

Minister.
Military Secretary.
A.D.C.


The Advisory Staff is as follows :—

Adviser.
G.S.O. II. " G "
„ II. " Q "
„ II. " A "
Accounts Officer.
Ordnance Officer.

All these are in a purely advisory capacity. Each Unit of Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry has a Liaison Officer, and there is also a Liaison

Officer for Transport. These Officers also are in an advisory, not executive capacity.

The Headquarter Staff is as follows :—



10.—FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

The future development of the 'Iraq Army is governed rather by the limitations imposed by financial stringency than by the requirements of the country.

The area of country for which it is desired that the 'Iraq Army should accept responsibility has been laid down for 1922 as being the right bank of the Tigris from the northern frontier as far as Baghdad, and the Euphrates as far as its junction with the Tigris on both banks.

The minimum force requisite to discharge these responsibilities is as follows :—

Mosul :

- 2 Regiments Cavalry (8 Squadrons).
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Pack Battery.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Battery, Horse Artillery.
- 1 Battalion Infantry.
- 1 Transport Company.

L. of C. Mosul-Sharqat :

- $\frac{1}{2}$ Squadron Cavalry.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Company Infantry.

Baghdad :

- King's Guard (1 Squadron, $\frac{1}{2}$ Company).
- 1 Pack Battery.
- 1 Battalion Infantry.
- 1 Transport Company.

Hillah and Barrage :

- 1 Battalion Infantry.

Diwaniyah :

- 1 Regiment Cavalry (4 Squadrons).

Nasiriyah :

- $\frac{1}{2}$ Pack Battery.
- 1 Battalion Infantry.

The force outlined above is estimated to cost, with the necessary services, a sum of 115 lakhs.

Amongst other proposals for the development of the Army in the year 1922-23 it is desired to send five English-speaking officers of the 'Iraq Army to England during the year to undergo courses of instruction in staff duties, musketry, artillery and engineering. The size of the Army and the resources of the country do not warrant the cost of maintaining establishments for higher military training in 'Iraq, but by sending to England every year a small number of officers to study various branches it is hoped to have in a few years a staff of officers of the 'Iraq Army competent to instruct and train the other officers of the Army.

Regarding the 'Iraq Military College, it is proposed after Ramadhan to start special Musketry and Signalling classes for officers and N.C.Os., in addition to the training of Officer Cadets in general Military subjects. Courses in Machine-Gun training, Cavalry courses, etc., will be held as the need arises.

It is hoped during the coming financial year to effect the translation of the remaining portions of the principal text-books of the three Arms of the Service.

V.—'IRAQ LEVIES.

1.—THE LEVY IN 1920.

Genesis of the Levy.

The birth of the Levy dates back to the period when the British Forces were making the final advances upon Baghdad. In those days and for some considerable period afterwards the Levy consisted of Shabanahs, who acted as irregular military police, taking their orders from Political Officers. Gradually these Shabanahs were clothed in uniform, equipped and formed into small bodies under command of British Officers; at this stage their rôle differed little from that originally allotted to them.

By October, 1920, Shabanahs had undergone a considerable change. Company and Squadron organization was being introduced. The numbers had reached a total of 2,000. The good work done by the Shabanahs in the early and difficult days must not be overlooked when reviewing the more brilliant achievements of the Levy in recent times. In October, 1921, the Levy was definitely made responsible for the maintenance of internal order in certain areas in 'Iraq. This responsibility stretched from Mosul to Qurnah on the Tigris, and from Ba'quba to Nasiriyah on the Euphrates.

Work during 1920.

Official despatches and the honours gained testify to the excellent work performed by Levies during the disturbances in 1920. During this anxious period Levies were also employed as guides, scouts for columns, and in active operations with British Troops. The casualty roll during the year ending September, 1921, of 107, which contained the large proportion of 73 killed, indicates the reality of the fighting in which they were engaged. The award of 15 medals of the British Empire for gallantry in the field is significant of the high opinion of

their fighting value held by the British Column Commanders under whom they served.

2.—THE LEVY AFTER THE CAIRO CONFERENCE.

Decisions of the Cairo Conference.

The Levy in 1920 consisted for the greater part of men of Arab nationality. The summer of 1921 saw further responsibilities being vested in the Levies. The decision of the Cairo Conference necessitated a considerable increase, originally estimated to make a total of 7,500. Responsibilities extended to Kurdistan in addition to Iraq. The strength of the force at this period numbered 4,000 rank and file. Though a certain small proportion of Kurds had been introduced into the Levy, and the Kurdish Levy in Sulaimani had been incorporated, it was not till the end of August that the raising of Assyrian Units was begun and a Christian element introduced.

Relief of Imperial troops.

During the autumn of 1921 the decision arrived at during the Cairo Conference in March took effect, with the flow of Imperial Troops out of the country. Levies were now called upon to shoulder still heavier responsibilities in finding reliefs on the Kurdish frontiers for the Imperial Troops. In actual fact Levies of a strength approximately a weak Brigade, without artillery or automatic fire, were called upon to relieve what approached very nearly to two weak Divisions. The manner in which they fulfilled their obligations is shown by the fact that the frontier is still intact, and that no serious tribal rising has occurred. The casualty roll is eloquent of the readiness with which they responded when called upon to assert Government authority by force of arms. The very successful operation against Batas, in September, 1921, had political effects of a far-reaching nature and did much to curb the activities of the truculent Kurds of the Rawanduz area.

Surchi Operations.

Towards the end of December, 1921, a patrol of Levies was treacherously ambushed by Shaikh Ubaidullah of the Surchi to the East of Arbil and suffered severe casualties. The prestige of the Government was at stake and punitive action was imperative. As no Imperial troops were available it became necessary to use the Levies in their new rôle as a military force. Accordingly, on Christmas Day, a force of Levies, 1,000 strong, under the command of the Inspector-General, moved out against the tribes, who were holding a strong position on the south side of the Rawanduz Gorge. The strength of the tribes was estimated at approximately 600 rifles, and they were supported by 200 Turkish troops, 8 machine guns and 1 gun. In spite of the fact that all of the Levies employed were by no means fully trained and that there was a decided shortage of British officers, the operations, which unfortunately involved the loss of two British officers, were brought to a successful conclusion in two days. The Turkish troops took no part in the operations after the first day's fighting, and retired

to Rawanduz. The tribesmen, after putting up a stout resistance, were driven from their hills and several of their villages burned. Their casualties were reported as 20 killed and 70 wounded, and a number of flocks and herds were captured. A march through the country of a tribe whose loyalty to the Government was very much in question concluded the operations, which undoubtedly had a very great effect in shattering the prestige of the small Turkish garrison in the Rawanduz area. The successful result of this first attempt of the Levies to act as an organized military body in conjunction with the Royal Air Force, an attempt which was necessarily undertaken at a time when the training and equipment of the Levies was still incomplete, holds out excellent promise for their success in the future.

Organization and Training.

In September, 1921, two senior and experienced officers arrived and assumed the rôles of Inspector-General and Deputy Inspector-General of the Levy Force. Steps were gradually taken to transfer the weight of the Levies from the Valley of the Euphrates to Kurdistan, and at a Conference held at the Residency early in December it was decided definitely to eliminate Levies from the Euphrates and to assign to them as their sector in the defence scheme of the whole country the Mosul outposts and Kurdistan. Owing to the inability of the 'Iraq Army to take over the whole of the Euphrates it has unfortunately been impossible up to the moment of writing this report to remove the Levies from Diwaniyah, Samawah and Nasiriyah. It has, however, been possible to dispense with many outlying detachments and the consequent concentration of units has resulted in improvements in interior economy and in the possibility of introducing improved systems of training. Desertions, which had reached an average of 77 per month, have fallen to 3 per month, and a marked improvement in the general behaviour of the Levies has been noticed from time to time by Political Officers who have come in contact with them. At the same time, after the operations mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Inspector-General reported to the High Commissioner that existing arrangements, in his opinion, did not work for efficiency and suggested that the Levies should be placed under General Headquarters for the purposes of administration. After full discussion with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, it was decided that the change was immediately necessary in the interests of efficiency and Levies were accordingly transferred from the direct charge of the High Commissioner to that of the General Officer Commanding, acting on his behalf, with effect from February 22nd, 1922.

Recruiting among Assyrians.

Late in November it was decided to raise the strength of the Levies from 4,500 to 5,500. Recruiting of Arabs having ceased and the supply from Kurdish sources being inadequate and not always of very good quality, a vigorous recruiting campaign was started among the fighting tribes of the Assyrians who had been settled North of the Mosul Division. The recruiting was entrusted to Captain MacNearnie,

whose efforts have met with such striking success that by the end of the period under report the total of 5,000 had not only been reached but actually exceeded by some 400. The surplus will be disposed of by weeding out non-efficients.

Details of organization will be found in Appendix II.

VI.—THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

1.—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

Paradoxical Nature of 'Iraq Position.

In the period covered by this report the Government of 'Iraq has passed from a Civil Administration, regularly established in accordance with international law by an Army occupying enemy territory, to the paradoxical position of a Constitutional Monarchy, of which the constitution has not yet been formulated, depending for its sanction and recognition on a Treaty that has never been confirmed and a Mandate that has never been ratified. The practical administrator need care for none of these things, but they press hard on his legal advisers who are responsible for the administration of justice, the jurisdiction of the Courts, the Government's legal relations, internal and external, and the exercise of its legislative powers.

This branch of the Administration has, however, gone boldly ahead, first as the Judicial Department and later as the Ministry of Justice, and in spite of the insecurity of the Government's legal status, has adapted its own organisation and functions, as well as those of the Courts of Justice, to the political or constitutional changes.

It is necessary briefly to summarise the changes which have affected this Ministry.

Historical Summary.

In October, 1920, a Provisional Native Government under the High Commissioner was substituted for the Civil Administration established by the occupying army. The departments of the old Administration became either Ministries under a native Minister or Departments under one of such Ministries. The Judicial Department became the Ministry of Justice and on the 11th November, 1920, the venerable Shaikh Mustafa al Alusi, a Shar'ah official of great experience who at one time held the post of Qadhi of Mecca, accepted the appointment of Minister. Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., who as Judicial Secretary had administered the Judicial Department, became the Adviser and so ceased to be the titular head of the system which he had established. In this connection it is right to point out that he had himself soon after the Armistice proposed the appointment of an 'Iraq Minister of Justice. The insurrection of 1920 brought down upon many departments of the Administration severe criticism, but Sir Edgar justly claimed that little if any criticism in connection with the cause of the rebellion was directed against his judicial system. This immunity he attributed to the policy which he had pursued, first, of making no unnecessary alterations in institutions or laws with which the people were familiar, and secondly, of making the fullest use of

Iraqis as judges and officials of the Department. The institution of the new Ministry, therefore, involved no change and no necessity for change in the policy which had been so successfully pursued.

The next change which reacted upon the judicature followed closely upon the formation of the Council of State in November, 1920. Sir Edgar has described it as follows :—

“ During the war the local administration was entrusted to British Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers, who exercised at once both executive and magisterial functions. At the end of 1920 the Council of State was constituted and it was decided to revert to the local administrative system which was in force under the Turks, and to replace the British Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers by ‘Iraqi Mutasarrifs and Qaim-maqams assisted by British Advisers who are to have no executive functions.

“ One of the essential features of the Turkish Administrative System was the complete separation of the executive and the judicial, and it became, therefore, necessary to increase and extend the Courts so as to make provision for the trial of criminal cases throughout the country.

“ At the same time the opportunity was taken to strengthen the Court of Appeal by the addition of two judges and to vest in it the powers of confirmation and revision which had previously been vested in the High Commissioner. Similarly the powers of revision formerly exercised by the Political Officer within his Division will be transferred to the Court of First Instance for the Division.

“ In certain Divisions where the judicial work is light a Single Judge will be appointed with the powers of a Court of First Instance in Civil matters. He will be assisted by an Assistant Judge. This is in accordance with a scheme which had been brought into force by the Turks shortly before the outbreak of war.”

The detailed scheme as approved by the Council of State is set out on page 6 of the “ Report of the Administration of Justice for the year 1920.”

Hitherto the Court of Appeal has exercised the functions of a Court of Revision for all Courts subordinate to it. The Council of State, however, supported by public opinion, both legal and commercial, has attached great importance to the institution of a Court of Cassation or Revision distinct from the Court of Appeal, on the ground that it is in accordance with Ottoman Law and will provide a second appeal in civil cases of importance. The policy of providing and supporting institutions to which native ideas are wedded outweighed considerations of economy and the obvious objections to a multiplication of appeals, and shortly before his departure, Sir Edgar, as Acting High Commissioner, himself confirmed a resolution of the Council of State establishing a Court of Cassation. In the year which has since elapsed shortage of funds, other political changes and the difficulty of finding suitable personnel have delayed the execution of this decision, and up to the end of March, 1922, the Court of Appeal, provisionally known

as the Court of Appeal and Cassation, continued to function as the only Court of Revision as well as of final appeal.

Another development of the policy of introducing the old system was the appointment of legal procurators in the early summer of 1921. Police procurators were already provided for by the Criminal Procedure Regulations, but judicial procurators, distinct from the police, had no real place in the existing system and were appointed in anticipation of the revision of the Criminal Procedure and Penal Code. The result has been unfortunate. The procurators have left undone the work they might have done and have interfered where there was no need. The result has been friction with the police authorities, and the Procurators General appointed at Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul have been transferred to judicial work until their duties have been properly defined by a new Code of Criminal Procedure.

The modifications in the judicial system which have been outlined above were given legal sanction by the Courts (Revision) Proclamation, 1921, on the 14th May, 1921. The keynote of this enactment is sounded in section 24, which substitutes for the expression "Occupied Territories" the term "Iraq." The Ministry and the Judicature were adapted to the needs and wishes of the Provisional Native Government.

On the 26th of the same month Sir Edgar Bonham Carter left Iraq.

During the further political changes which ensued on the Cairo Conference and the accession of His Majesty King Faisal, the office of Adviser was temporarily held by Mr. E. M. Drower until the arrival at the end of September of Mr. N. Davidson. The organisation of the Ministry and Judicature remained the same, and it was not until the first Ministry of King Faisal was appointed, in succession to the Provisional Government, that any material alteration was effected. On the 11th September, 1921, Naji Beg al Suwaidi was appointed Minister of Justice. The change that soon became apparent was not one of organisation but of personality. The late Minister had been content to leave the administration almost entirely in the hands of his Adviser. Naji Beg, the scion of a family deeply steeped in politics, has not only considerable legal and administrative experience but a forceful character, skill in debate and tireless energy. The new Minister, as was right and proper, immediately assumed the full responsibility of his position. This involved a corresponding change in the position of the Adviser whose duty it became no longer to administer the department but to keep the administration on the right lines. On the other hand Naji Beg has always been ready to recognise the special responsibilities of the Adviser. No important step was taken and no judicial appointment made without mutual consultation, and it was early agreed that all correspondence or other documents issuing from the Ministry should be seen by both the Minister and the Adviser, except the Adviser's correspondence with other Advisers or with the High Commissioner's Secretariat. The Minister's character necessarily led him to force the pace at a time when the Adviser would have preferred to let well alone, and the Adviser was not infrequently obliged to check action by the Minister which might have appeared to derogate from the independence of the Courts. But during the seven

months of Naji Beg's Ministry the Adviser on no occasion felt himself obliged to bring an issue between himself and Naji Beg before the Council of State or the High Commissioner.

Like most well-educated orientals of the younger school the Minister attached what we consider an exaggerated importance to committees, reports, examinations and diplomas. With the concurrence of the Council of State and the approval of the press, committees of judges and other legal officers were instituted to deal with the appointment of civil judges, the appointment of Shar'ah judges and the drafting of legislation. None of these committees have been entirely satisfactory. As all appointments ultimately depended on the Minister and the Adviser the appointments committees lacked real responsibility in their decisions, while the valuable advice which their members were able to give could have been obtained more conveniently by private interrogatory. Drafting is a one-man job and this soon became apparent from the inordinate time taken by the committee in its endeavours to draft a new Penal Code. The real work has been done by Mr. Drower, the Government Counsellor, and his Assistant, Taufiq Beg Suwaidi, the Minister's brother.

A very useful development in the organisation of the Ministry was introduced in October, 1921, when most of the non-judicial and non-political work of the Ministry, namely, legal advice to other Ministers and legislative or other drafting, was entrusted to a special section under the charge of Mr. Drower, who was appointed Governor Counsellor, and whose special qualifications have been satisfactorily utilised. A judicial inspectorate, one of the reforms recommended by Sir Edgar Bonham Carter in his last report, was also established and placed under Mr. Drower's section.

Wider and more radical schemes of reorganisation were also initiated by the Minister, but his resignation for political reasons, which coincided with the date limiting this report, has prevented their completion for the moment. These included a proposal to substitute single judges for a bench of three in all courts of First Instance; the amalgamation of the Shi'ah with the Sunni religious courts; a set of regulations for the appointment, grading and qualifications of judges, and a reorganisation of the Law School. Regulations for the latter have been agreed to, but will not come into force within the period of this report. The others require further consideration, and should await the final settlement of the government and status of Iraq. Nevertheless, the work and the ideas of the late Minister will be of the greatest value and assistance to those who may succeed to his responsibilities.

2.—PERSONNEL.

A list of the principal officials holding appointments in the Ministry of Justice on the 31st March, 1922, is contained in Appendix 12.

All other changes in personnel have been overshadowed by the retirement of Sir Edgar Bonham Carter in May, 1921. The success which attended his re-establishment of the Courts of Iraq has been already noted. The difficulties with which he had to contend and the reasons for his success have been described in previous reports. But

his personal influence was even more remarkable than these practical achievements, and the affection and respect with which he was regarded by all classes were invaluable assets in the head of a judicial system. The irremovability of judges is a principle impossible to apply in the present conditions of Iraq, but the next best thing in order to secure judicial impartiality and independence is complete confidence in the justice and fair-mindedness of the controlling authority. This confidence Sir Edgar won and held throughout.

On the appointment of Mr. N. Davidson to succeed Sir Edgar it was arranged that he should take over from him at the end of May, but events in the Sudan prevented him from reaching Baghdad till the end of September. Mr. Drower carried on as Adviser with great efficiency during the interval.

The death of Haji 'Ali Effendi Alusi, Qadhi of Baghdad, in January, 1922, removed one of the pillars of the religious courts. The late Judicial Secretary wrote of him thus:—

“He was appointed Qadhi of Baghdad soon after the occupation and introduced a regime of honesty into the Shar'ah Courts in strong contrast to that formerly existing. He is much respected and trusted and belongs to one of the most esteemed 'alim families in Baghdad.”

He was succeeded by Shaikh 'Abdul Malik Shawwaf of the Shar'ah Court of Revision.

Mr. S. S. Abrahams, the President of the Courts at Basrah, retired from the Iraq Government to return to his own Colonial service on the 31st March, 1922. Both as Advocate General under the old Judicial Department and as President at Basrah under the new Ministry, Mr. Abrahams showed himself an able and highly trained lawyer, and rendered valuable service to the Government.

The rival attractions of employment by commercial firms, or employment elsewhere, have in the last two months cost the Ministry the loss of three valued officials in Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad, President of the Court at Hillah, Mr. M. P. Mehta, Criminal Judge at Basrah, and Mr. H. F. Martins, Superintendent, Civil Court, Basrah. Each of these officials was invaluable in his particular sphere and cannot be satisfactorily replaced. Mr. Davidson was reluctantly compelled to accept, and even to encourage, their resignation, owing to the strong feeling against the employment of non-Iraqis in the Government service. It is impossible not to sympathise in principle with this feeling on the other hand efficiency has to be sacrificed to what is, in some cases, an unreasonable excess of national sentiment or mere jealousy, and it must be remembered that, under the Turks, the Arabs employed in this department (excluding menials) numbered only 35 out of 104, whereas in December, 1920, they numbered 247 out of 289.

Mr. Davidson endorses wholeheartedly the opinion of his predecessor in his last report that the British Staff in this Ministry (since reduced by a third) is inadequate in number for the duties it has to perform, and that, if the present standard is to be maintained, permanent conditions of service must be granted. The number, position and conditions of service of British Judges in the future is under considera-

tion in connection with wider questions, and I have every hope that a solution satisfactory to them and beneficial to the Iraq judicature will be found. At the moment, however, it is impossible to fill vacancies, and it may be difficult to retain even the present attenuated staff. The fact that the British staff was pronounced inadequate in number more than a year ago, and nevertheless has borne the difficulty and strain of carrying on successfully with diminishing numbers and increasing work, reflects the greatest credit on Mr. B. H. Bell who, as President of the Court of Appeal and Cassation, is head of the judicature, and on the four Presidents of the Courts at Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Kirkuk. I have already referred to the valuable services of Mr. Drower as Government Counsellor and temporary Adviser.

No less credit, however, is due to the native judges, and I can again endorse Sir Edgar's tribute: "With hardly a single exception they have performed their duties in a most loyal fashion and with the whole-hearted desire of raising the administration of justice to the highest possible standard. The relations between these and the British staff have invariably been of the most cordial and friendly character."

Mr. N. Davidson, during the six months in which he served as Adviser to the Ministry, fully maintained the happy relations between Arab and British officials which had been instituted by Sir Edgar Bonham Carter. As the report closes, though he has been transferred to my personal staff, he is, with my concurrence, acting temporarily as Deputy Minister of Justice.

3.—STATISTICS.

I regret that it has not been possible to collect or tabulate satisfactory statistics of the cases dealt with by the civil and criminal courts. This is due to a variety of causes which, it is hoped, will not recur.

In the first place, the period of 18 months is a difficult one to deal with. Secondly, the reorganisation of the courts after the insurrection has rendered it impossible to get statistics covering the earlier part of the period. Thirdly, the transfer of judicial powers from Political Officers to the Courts creates another difficulty in tracing records and classifying cases. Lastly, the records of cases under the old administration were, in most cases, kept in English and therefore cannot be examined and classified by the present staff of the courts.

Appendix 8 gives a statement of the crimes reported to the Iraq Police during the period in question.

4.—LEGISLATION.

The following is a list of the legislation enacted between the 1st October, 1920, and the 31st March, 1922. This does not include Customs Notifications and other orders and resolutions of the Government having the force of law. It will be noticed that, up to July, 1921, legislation was promulgated by proclamation; after the accession of H.M. the King, all legislative acts have been promulgated by Royal

Iradah and published as laws. An exception to this is the Unregistered Sales Confirmation Proclamation, Sulaimani Division, 1922. which was promulgated by myself, the Sulaimani Division not being subject to the Government of King Faisal.

List of Legislation passed between the 1st October, 1920, and the 31st March, 1922.

Date.	Title.
1.11.20.	The Baghdad Penal Code Amendment (No. 3) Proclamation, 1920.
1.11.20.	The Mosul Division Unregistered Sales Proclamation, 1920.
3.12.20.	The Transference of Powers Proclamation, 1920.
28. 2.21.	The Disposition of Immovable Property Proclamation, 1921.
1. 3.21.	The Unregistered Sales Proclamation, 1921.
4. 4.21.	The Companies (Amendment) Proclamation, 1921.
14. 5.21.	The Courts (Revision) Proclamation, 1921.
6. 7.21.	The National Government (Transference of Powers) Proclamation, 1921.
6. 7.21.	The Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations Amendment Proclamation, 1921.
5.10.21.	The Unregistered Sales (Kirkuk Division) Law, 1921.
8.10.21.	The Customs Law (Silkworm Eggs), 1921.
19.10.21.	The Unregistered State (Tapu Hold Land) Confirmation Law, 1921.
3.11.21.	The General Budget Law, 1921-22.
26.11.21.	The Law of Transfer (Budget), 1921-22.
25.1.22.	The Budget Re-Appropriation Law, 1921-22.
(1922)	The Law of Auqaf Budget, 1921-22.
29.1.22.	The Vaccination Law, 1922.
21. 2.22.	Regulations Prohibiting Government Officials from dealing in Land.
22. 2.22.	Unregistered Sales Confirmation Proclamation (Sulaimani Division), 1922.
2. 3.22.	The Legal Holidays Regulations, 1922.

5.—LAW SCHOOL.

The re-establishment of the Law School and the result of its first session has been dealt with by Sir Edgar Bonham Carter in his reports for 1919 and 1920.

In November, 1921, Taufiq Beg al Suwaidi was appointed Director, in addition to his duties as Assistant Government Counsellor, and he has carried out the task with great energy and enthusiasm. On his advice a Special Committee known as the "Committee of the Law School" was formed, consisting of the President of the Court of Appeal; Daud Effendi Samra, of the same Court; Nashat Effendi al Sannawi, Procurator General and former Director of the School; Antoine Effendi Shammas, a leading advocate; and the Director.

The Director and lecturers have prepared a set of regulations providing for a curriculum, examinations and the discipline of the School, which are now under the consideration of the Council of State.

There are now 45 pupils in the first class and 40 pupils in the second class. It is hoped to form a third class of 40 pupils in the coming year, but it is feared that funds will not be forthcoming to provide for this extension.

The Director has reported to me that the income for the past year exceeded Rs. 20,000, while the expenditure was only Rs. 27,000. He estimates that the cost of the extension mentioned above would bring the total expenditure to Rs. 50,000, while the income would exceed Rs. 30,000.

The examinations for the current year have not yet been held.

VII.—EDUCATION.

1.—ADMINISTRATION.

Owing to political events in the summer of 1920, the administrative and inspecting staff of the Department of Education on the formation of the Arab Government was much below strength. Mr. H. E. Bowman, C.B.E., Director of Education, had been withdrawn from the 'Iraq service by the Egyptian Government, his place being taken by Mr. A. L. F. Smith, M.V.O. The contracts of several other officials were cancelled and all vacancies were left unfilled.

In the new Ministry of Education and Public Health, 'Izzat Pasha accepted office as Minister, with Mr. E. L. Norton, I.C.S., as Adviser. On the departure of the latter his post was not filled, but the Director of Education assumed also the duties of Adviser in educational matters to the Minister. On the reorganization of the Council of Ministers which followed the election of H.M. King Faisal, Education was constituted a separate Ministry under Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali Hibat-al-Din Shahristani, who continued in office throughout the period under review. The Director of Education for the time being continued to act also as Adviser. The combination of these functions threw a heavy burden on the official concerned, and was also the cause of considerable confusion, as the separate powers and duties of the Director, as distinct from the Minister, were not yet clearly defined.

The budget of 1920 contemplated the creation of five educational areas, *viz.*, Central (Baghdad), Northern (Mosul), Eastern (Kirkuk), Western (Hillah), and Southern (Basrah), with a British Education Officer in each area. The scheme, however, had not been put completely into operation before the disturbances. British officials were stationed at Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, an officer was already under orders for Kirkuk and it was hoped to post another to Hillah in the autumn of 1920. Under the new conditions only two Arab Education Officers have as yet been appointed, in Baghdad and Mosul; but Inspectors have been sent to all the areas and the nucleus of an organization has been formed at each Headquarters. The schools in Sulaimani Division have remained directly under the Political Officer who has occasionally invited the advice and assistance of the Adviser.

2.—HIGHER EDUCATION.

Except for the Law School, which requires from entrants only a low standard of general education, no institution professing to offer higher educational facilities exists in 'Iraq. Previous to the financial year 1921-22 the Law School was carried on the Education Budget though no effective control was exercised by this Ministry. As from 1st April, 1921, the School was transferred completely to the Ministry of Justice.

A scheme has been set on foot by the King for the organization of a University at Mu'adhham, a few miles north of Baghdad, but a sufficient number of qualified students is not yet available. The erection of buildings will, however, take a considerable time, during which the supply of students will increase.

Meanwhile a few persons have been sent to the American University at Beirut and to Great Britain at the expense of the Government. No one of these has yet reached a standard of general education, through the medium of English, enabling him to enter a place of higher education without at least six months' preliminary study. The students should, however, be able to matriculate in September, 1922.

3.—SECONDARY EDUCATION.

The results of the work of past years is perhaps best seen in the expansion of Secondary Education. No uniform syllabus has yet been drawn up and locally recruited staff are in most cases much below standard. The schools have therefore chiefly depended on teachers recruited from abroad: six Syrian graduates of the American University of Beirut and one Egyptian master have been engaged, while four British officials give part of their time to the teaching of English. The language of instruction is Arabic, except at Kirkuk, where Turkish is the medium.

In Baghdad the Secondary School has been housed separately in a fine building since April, 1921, and its numbers have risen to 74. A fully equipped laboratory has been provided. A four year course is aimed at, and the highest class is now in its third year. In Mosul the number of pupils in the Secondary School is 95, and the standard is approximately the same as in Baghdad. In Kirkuk the secular side of the 'Ilmiyah School was taken over as a Secondary School from 1st April, 1921, and in September a boarding section was opened for pupils from outside the town. It has in consequence been possible to suppress the final year in the local primary school and to substitute for it equivalent preparatory class at the 'Ilmiyah. The attendance is now 83, and the school is making progress in spite of the language difficulties in this Turkish and Kurdish speaking area and the lack of properly trained masters. The Basrah Secondary School remains small with only 15 pupils. It is, however, now a separate institution and a few of the students are boarders. A secondary class was opened at Sulaimani in September, 1921, but only three pupils were enrolled. As they have some knowledge of Turkish it is proposed to transfer them to the boarding school at Kirkuk.

4.—TECHNICAL EDUCATION.

Want of instructional personnel and the lack of suitable accommodation and plant have been serious drawbacks in the development of technical education. Difficulties have also been experienced in the mistaken view of its objects generally held by the public. Public opinion in Iraq is apt to regard a technical school as an orphanage or charitable institution designed to give a trade to boys who would otherwise be destitute. It is proposed to continue the training of artisans to assist in raising the standard of trades in which a degree of skill is required and also to organise sections for the training of higher subordinates for technical departments and engineering firms. The latter should in time become the chief function of these schools. In Baghdad progress has been made in the training of literate artisans; the number of students in regular attendance has been about 70, of whom 20 were apprenticed to railways. A large stock of instructional plant has recently been installed, and with the provision of better accommodation, the school should prove a success. The staff includes a British Principal and Vice-Principal. In Kirkuk the old Turkish Technical School has been reopened under an energetic Syrian Principal; some plant has been provided, and the attendance now numbers 60, of whom 20 are boarders. In Basrah a school has recently been opened under a British Acting Principal and a beginning has been made with 30 pupils.

5.—SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF TEACHERS.

The supply of properly trained masters for primary and elementary schools has not kept pace with the demand. In all cases candidates with experience or training under the Turkish regime who have applied for employment have been tested by examination, and if found at all suitable and recommended on the ground of character, have been offered appointments. The chief handicaps under which these masters suffer are their weakness in Arabic and the low standard of the former training centres, particularly at Mosul and Basrah. Attempts have been made to raise the standard of these teachers by holding holiday classes in the summer months. At Baghdad and Mosul attendance has always been voluntary; at Kirkuk, in 1921, masters from the Turkish-speaking areas were detailed to attend. Most of the larger schools have been supplied with one or more masters, trained since the Occupation, who have been able to undertake the teaching of Arabic.

The Iraq Training College was opened soon after the fall of Baghdad; the number of students has been determined rather by the accommodation and money available than by the needs of the schools, and the output is still insufficient. However, in spite of the shortage of teachers it was considered possible in September, 1921, to lengthen the course from two to three years. The attendance now numbers 92. In 1920, 30 graduates passed out into schools and in 1921, 32. The present standard of the College is somewhat higher than the Elementary Training Colleges in Egypt, and, in addition, English forms part of the curriculum. An Egyptian Moslem as Principal, three Syrian graduates, an Egyptian English master, and a part-time British Instructor in English form the nucleus of the staff.

6.—PRIMARY AND ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS.

The schools in the Central and Western Areas suffered most from the disturbances of 1920. Many school buildings were looted and school books and equipment destroyed. The majority of the school staffs of the disaffected areas were in Baghdad for the summer vacation; allowances were paid to those who were left temporarily without employment, and they were again sent out as conditions became more settled. On the whole their behaviour was admirable. The older type of schoolmaster who had been appointed to the district schools held aloof from the insurgents and their influence in Baghdad among the younger men was considerable. All schools were reopened as soon as circumstances permitted, and in 1921 it was found possible to open a number of new schools. Public interest in education continued to grow, and soon after the beginning of the new school year, in September, 1921, practically every school was filled to capacity.

The number of schools in the period dealt with has increased from 90 to 120 and the school attendance from 6,182 to 11,474.

7.—FEMALE EDUCATION.

The town and village Christian Girls' Schools in Mosul, Arbil and Kirkuk Liwas became Government Elementary Schools as from 1st April, 1921. They had formerly received financial assistance from the Department. The Moslem Girls' School in Baghdad, which was opened in 1919, has continued to flourish, as well as elementary Moslem Girls' schools in Mosul, Karbala and Diwaniyah. Additional Elementary Schools have recently been opened in Baghdad and Kirkuk. The total of schools is now 21, and the attendance about 2,500. A small training centre for mistresses is being organised in Baghdad.

8.—AIDED SCHOOLS.

Except in the Northern and Eastern Areas, the Ministry of Education has not directly controlled the schools of non-Mohammedan communities. In the Northern and Eastern Areas the Government, in 1920, took over direct control of the Christian Schools to save them from extinction. The Carmelite Mission and the Alliance Israelite Universelle have given assistance to the Christian and Jewish communities, respectively, in Baghdad by organising schools, while the American Mission under the expert guidance of the Rev. J. Van Ess, has conducted a most successful mixed school of Christians and Mohammedans at Basrah. These institutions give instruction up to about second year secondary standard in Government Schools. Other schools, not so successful, have been conducted by local committees. A number of Mohammedan Boys' Schools of moderate standard are also in existence, particularly in Baghdad.

The Dominican Sisters have an excellent Girls' School in Baghdad with over 1,000 pupils, the daughters of local Christians; a few Mohammedan girls also attend. The Alliance Girls' School is also a large one; it is in charge of the wife of the Director of the Boys' Schools.

The better schools which were considered moderately efficient and capable of improvement were in the past given grants-in-aid by the

Department in accordance with their size, efficiency, and financial position. The number of State-aided Schools (Girls' and Boys') in 1921 was 28, and the registered attendance 9,319.

9.—BOY SCOUTS.

This organization in 1919 was confined to Baghdad City, but the movement has since made great progress in Mosul, Kirkuk, Kut, 'Amarah, Basrah, on the Euphrates, and elsewhere. It is, however, doubtful whether this rapid expansion has not meant a weakening in principles. No trained British Scoutmasters are now available, but the chief native scoutmaster left for England early in 1922, where he will attend various courses of instruction in scout work, games and physical training. The number of Boy Scouts in 'Iraq is now about 2,500.

10.—CONCLUSION.

On the whole, the outlook is bright. There is no doubt that there is a general and genuine demand for education, and the gradual handing over of the control of the administration to Arabs has not been marked by any violent changes or reactions. It seems probable that the future rôle of the British Education officials will be advisory and inspectorial, and the many religious, racial and lingual differences may make their help both acceptable and necessary for a long time to come. The weaknesses of the Turkish system, as put into practice in 'Iraq, have not yet been fully appreciated, but as war conditions finally pass away and the country begins to develop, it is hoped that a sound indigenous educational system may be firmly established which will be broad enough to include every race and every community in 'Iraq.

VIII.—HEALTH SERVICE.

1.—GENERAL.

A list of the institutions under this Service is appended.

The following Institutions were opened (or reopened) during the year :—

- Civil Hospital, Diwaniyah.
- Civil Hospital, Samawah.
- Civil Dispensary, Baghdad West.
- Civil Dispensary, Hindiyah Barrage.
- Civil Dispensary, Fallujah.

The following were closed during the year :—

- Civil Dispensary, Abul Khasib.
- Port Dispensary, Tannumah.
- Civil Dispensary, Shaikh Sa'ad.
- Civil Dispensary, Hindiyah Barrage.
- Civil Dispensary, Karradah.
- Civil Dispensary, Amadiyah.
- Civil Dispensary, Hit.
- Civil Dispensary, Fallujah.

2.—STAFF.

British Officers.

Nine resigned ; one, Dr. A. C. Oldham (Ahwaz), died, and five were recruited during the year.

British Nursing Sisters.

Two resigned ; one, Miss E. Kidd (Basrah), died, and twelve were recruited during the year.

Local Doctors.

Five resigned and eight joined the service during the year. Many of these are part-time officials. Difficulty has always been experienced in getting local doctors to take whole-time appointments. This is due mainly to a shortage of qualified private practitioners in the large towns, and partly to the disinclination of the 'Iraqi doctor (usually city bred) to leave his home and serve in an out-station.

3.—STATISTICAL.

The institutions of the Health Service provide a total of 1,539 beds for In-patients, in addition to which the Railway hospitals provide 99.

During the year 18,926 In-patients were admitted, of whom 15,582 were discharged and 1,223 died.

607,484 Out-patients (old and new cases) were treated during the year.

4.—INFECTIOUS DISEASES.

The following were notified during the year :—

Cerebro Spinal Meningitis	26
Plague	137
Small-pox	475
Typhus	61
Chicken-pox	90
Measles	605
Mumps	92
Tuberculosis (all kinds)	178
Typhoid	87

The above figures represent only a fraction of the cases, and are in the main confined to the large municipalities. It is extremely difficult to obtain satisfactory notification in face of the conservatism of the native, his dislike of the disinfection of his home, and other troubles entailed by the discovery of infectious disease therein. Tuberculosis is notified much more freely than other disease.

Measles assumed epidemic proportions during the first half of the year. The epidemic reached its zenith in the beginning of May, and thereafter gradually subsided.

A small outbreak of Plague occurred in May, June and July.

Small-pox became epidemic in the second half of the year. The majority of the cases were notified in Baghdad and Basrah, but the disease was much more widely spread throughout the country than indicated by the figures. The epidemic reached its summit in the first half of December, after which the figures dropped suddenly.

Cholera has been notable by its absence and there have been very few cases of typhus and relapsing fever.

5.—SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS.

X-Ray Institute.—The X-Ray Institute, Baghdad, is the central radiographic Institution of the country, and is also the depot for supplies and repairs to all Civil and Military X-Ray installations. It is fully equipped with the latest radiographic and electrotherapeutic apparatus.

During the year a branch Institute has been established at the Civil Hospital, Basrah. Arrangements have also been made to open another branch at Mosul at an early date.

Vaccine Lymph Institute 'Amarah.—The work of this Institute proceeded uneventfully during the year, 14,513 grammes of lymph (sufficient for 2,902,600 insertions) were manufactured, and 7,235 grammes issued during the year, as compared with 6,489 and 5,562 grammes respectively in 1920. With this increased production it has become possible to keep in stock lymph of recent manufacture only. Lymph is now discarded as soon as it is twelve months old.

Chemical Examiner's Department.—The work of this Laboratory has continued at the same high standard as in 1920. The equipment is now complete, and up to date. 376 samples were received for analysis as compared with 313 during the previous year. The proportion of Military work has decreased to about a tenth of the total.

The laboratory is proving to be of considerable value to other departments, notably Railways and Excise. The Public Works Department is also beginning to refer to the Chemical Examiner for help and advice in such matters as concretes, cements, etc.

Rabies Institute, Baghdad.—Although this is at present a Military Institution it cannot be passed without notice. Resulting from negotiations between the Director of Health Services and Government of India and the Assistant Director of Pathology, General Headquarters, 'Iraq, the institution commenced work in July. 159 cases have been sent to the Institute for treatment during the six months. Of these 137 underwent the full course. Of the remainder one refused treatment, and in the case of the remainder treatment was not considered necessary. Its presence in 'Iraq has resulted in an average monthly saving in passages alone of about Rs. 3,500 in so far as civilians are concerned, in view of the fact that previously all cases had to be sent to Kasauli, India.

The Rabies Institute will be taken over by the 'Iraq Health Service on 1st April, 1922.

Civil Medical Stores.—Medical stores and equipment are supplied to all Civil Health Institutions in 'Iraq and Sulaimani as well as to other Government Departments which require chemicals and disinfectants, e.g., Levies, Veterinary, etc.

Goods are shipped in bulk from Europe and India and checked, priced, repacked and distributed to the various Institutions from the

Civil Medical Stores, which are housed in three large buildings specially fitted up for the purpose.

During the year considerable improvements have been carried out. Two of the buildings have been re-roofed and shelving has been provided in the third. A new cold storage room for lymph vaccines and sera has been added.

The stock of medical and surgical equipment and of drugs and dressings is fairly complete, and indents from all parts of the country are expeditiously complied with.

6.—'IRAQ STATE RAILWAY MEDICAL SERVICE.

For medical arrangements the Railway system is divided into two sections, one extending from Makinah to Diwaniyah under the Railway Medical Officer whose headquarters are at Makinah and the other from Diwaniyah upwards under the Railway Medical Officer, Baghdad, the whole being under the control of a Chief Railway Medical Officer at Baghdad.

Railway dispensaries or hospitals have been established at Makinah, Shu'aibah, Diwaniyah, Samarra, Baghdad West, Salachiyah, Hinaidi, Kut, Qaraghan and Khanaqin Road.

During the early part of this period the treatment of Railway employees has been partly dependent on Military Hospitals. The dependence on the Military has been gradually eliminated with the development of the Railway Medical Department, and, towards the latter part of the year, with the co-operation of the Civil Hospitals, attendances at or admissions to Military Hospitals have ceased. All sick now among Railway employees who cannot be treated at Railway Dispensaries are received into Civil Hospitals and practically the only patients dealt with by Military Hospitals are those requiring evacuation to India on medical grounds by Ambulance Transport. Owing to the large reduction in the imported Railway personnel the number of patients has considerably diminished, so that the pressure on Civil Hospitals has been much lessened, and this is noticeably so now with the establishment of a new Railway Hospital at Baghdad West.

7.—'IRAQ LEVY MEDICAL SERVICE.

Previous to August, 1912, the 'Iraq Levies depended on the Civil Health Service for medical treatment but on the reorganisation of the Force a new Levy Medical Service was instituted under the control of the Director of Health Services with S. M. O. (who is also Asst. Director of Health Services), two R.A.M.C. Inspecting Officers, two Assistant Surgeons, eight Sub-Assistant Surgeons and two Dressers on loan from Military. In addition to this trained personnel, subordinate medical orderlies were supplied by Levies. Instruction in medical and sanitary duties has been carried out. Now all the posts are provided with facilities for treatment to a finish and for supervision by a British Medical Officer. Stations in Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimani took over the medical equipment left by the Military while small detention hospitals were instituted at Khanaqin, Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Samawah and

Nasiriyah. The Civil Medical Stores supply medical equipment and the Civil Health Service place their hospitals at the disposal of Levies for the treatment of severe cases. The Civil Surgeon, Kirkuk, and Civil Surgeon, Sulaimani, officiate as Levies Medical Officers in addition to their other duties.

8.—CIVIL HEALTH TRANSPORT.

At the beginning of the year the Health Service Transport consisted of 2 launches, 5 touring cars, 12 ambulances and 10 vanettes. Some of these were not in good order, having been running continually for two or three years. Running repairs were high and the services of good drivers were difficult to obtain. Early in the year a reduction of four touring cars was effected while the number of vanettes on actual duty was reduced to 5, the rest being dismantled.

Since then every effort has been made to utilise slow transport where possible; but it would seem that present establishment is necessary for moderate efficiency.

9.—LIST OF CIVIL HEALTH SERVICE INSTITUTIONS, 1921.

BAGHDAD—

- New General Hospital.
- Sarai Wing Hospital.
- Civil Staff Dispensary.
- Civil Hospital for Women and Children.
- Baghdad West Dispensary.
- Civil Gaol Hospital.
- Civil Isolation Hospital.
- Disinfecting Station.
- Venereal Hospital for Women.
- Kadhmain Civil Hospital.
- X-Ray Institute.
- Central Laboratory.
- Civil Medical Stores.
- Municipal Health Department.
- Ophthalmic Centres.
- Disinfectant Store.

BASRAH—

- Civil Hospital.
- Civil Nursing Home.
- Civil Isolation Hospital.
- Female Venereal Hospital.
- 'Ashar Civil Dispensary.
- Jail Civil Dispensary.
- Basrah City Dispensary.
- Jubailah Civil Dispensary (South Ma'qil).
- North Ma'qil Civil Dispensary.
- Municipal Health Department.
- Port Health Department.
- Civil Hospital, Qurnah.
- Fao Civil Dispensary.

Mosul—

Civil Hospital.
 Civil Isolation Hospital.
 Municipal Dispensary.
 Jail Dispensary.
 Female Venereal Hospital.
 Municipal Health Department.
 Zakho Civil Dispensary.
 'Aqrah Civil Dispensary.
 Tall 'Afar Civil Dispensary.
 Dohuk Civil Dispensary.

OUT-STATIONS—

Arbil Civil Hospital.
 Keui Sanjaq Dispensary.
 Samarra Civil Hospital
 Tikrit Civil Dispensary.
 Balad Civil Dispensary.
 Kirkuk Civil Hospital.
 Female Hospital.
 Kifri Civil Dispensary.
 Altun Keupri Dispensary.
 Khanaqin Civil Hospital.
 Mandali Civil Hospital.
 Tiaruq Civil Dispensary.
 Ba'quba Civil Dispensary.
 Kut Civil Hospital.
 Ramadi Civil Hospital.
 Hillah Civil Hospital.
 Musaiyib Civil Dispensary.
 Hindiyah Barrage Dispensary.
 Najaf Civil Hospital.
 Diwaniyah Civil Hospital.
 Samawah Civil Hospital.
 Nasiriyah Civil Hospital.
 'Amarah Civil Hospital.
 Vaccine Lymph Institute.
 'Ali Gharbi Civil Dispensary.
 Qal'at Salih Civil Dispensary.
 Sulaimani Civil Hospital.
 'Iraq State Railways Medical Service.
 'Iraq Levies Medical Services.

IX.—COMMUNICATIONS AND WORKS.

Scope of Ministry.

This Ministry consisting of the Departments of Public Works, Irrigation, Posts and Telegraphs, Surveys and Railways came into being on the 1st January, 1921, and is the civil successor to the combined office of Chief Engineer and Secretary to Government, Public Works. Railways remained under this Ministry till the end of June, 1921,

when they became an independent branch known as the 'Iraq State Railways and are dealt with in a separate section. This represents the only alteration to the general organisation of the Ministry but such slight alterations to the inter-departmental organisations as deemed necessary for their efficient working have been made.

The necessity for increasing the number of 'Iraqis was early recognised and every endeavour has been made to train and employ suitable men. 'Iraqis with technical knowledge, however, are very scarce and the introduction of a school or some form of preliminary technical training is essential.

An Irrigation School has already been opened and will be enlarged during 1922-23.

A brief description of the works carried out by the various departments against the following Budget allotments is given under each Departmental Head :—

			Rs.
Public Works (Budget Allotment)	66,80,000
Irrigation (Budget Allotment)	40,00,000
Posts and Telegraphs (Budget Allotment)	65,86,537
Surveys (Budget Allotment)	2,58,675

Public Works Department.

This Department, which is the civil successor to the combined Directorate of Military and Public Works, was organised and started on 1st January, 1921. It consisted of five Engineering Divisions and Engineering Stores and two Municipal Engineering Divisions. To this organisation was added the P.W.D. Transport Branch on April 1st, 1921, and the E. & M. Expert's Branch on May 25th, 1921. The Transport Branch is the successor, on a very much reduced scale, to the old Civil Transport Department, and is run on self-supporting lines. It has taken over responsibility for all vehicles and stores of the old Department and is disposing of these to the best advantage of the Government. The E. & M. Branch is made essential by the reduction of the Military E. & M. Section and the necessity of the civil Government to administer or arrange the administration of all public utilities such as electricity supply, water supply, etc.

The complete Budget allotment for the P.W.D. during 1921-22 amounted to Rs. 66,80,000, and besides this a considerable amount of work for excluded funds was carried out.

The main new works either completed or undertaken during the year were :—

- The Government Press, Baghdad.
- The Chief Engineer's Offices, Baghdad.
- Extension to the Civil Hospital, Baghdad.
- 'Awainah School, Baghdad.
- Rustam Institute, Baghdad.
- Houses in 'Alwiyah, Baghdad.
- Water Supply, Mosul.
- Water Supply, Arbil.
- Electric Lighting, Kirkuk.
- Electric Lighting and Water Supply, Nasiriyah.

New School, 'Amarah.
 New School, Badrah.
 New School, Ramadi.
 Post Office, Ramadi.
 Government Residence, Ramadi.
 Rebuilding Sarai, Shahraban.
 Rebuilding Sarai, Ba'quba.
 Telephone Exchanges, Basrah.
 New Hospital, Basrah.
 Match Stores, Baghdad, etc., etc.

A large amount of work has been carried out in the repair and maintenance of buildings and roads and bridges. Bridges in particular are at present in a very bad state of repair and much work must be carried out on them in the future.

Plans have also been prepared and the preliminary arrangements made for the erection of a University College in Baghdad. His Majesty King Faisal has shown great interest in this scheme and was responsible for its inspiration.

A water supply scheme has also been prepared for the city of Basrah and it is hoped that this work will be put in hand during next year.

Irrigation Department.

The Irrigation Department on 31st December, 1920, consisted of eight Divisions or Districts for maintenance and construction, water control and river conservancy, and one Special Project District for the investigation and surveys of new canals.

Owing to financial reasons it was decided to curtail the responsibilities and scope of the Department, and accordingly it was reorganised on the 31st March, 1921, and reduced to three executive districts known as:—

- (1) Baghdad District (comprising of the old districts of Baghdad, Diyala and Kut.)
- (2) 'Amarah District.
- (3) Euphrates Division (covering the whole Euphrates, formerly the Falujah, Hindiyah, Hillah and Nasiriyah Districts.)

At the same time the Special Project District, renamed the Survey District, was doubled in size for the more rapid completion of the surveys for new Projects.

With the curtailment of the responsibilities of the Irrigation Department it ceased to exercise any control over the water distribution of canals, the maintenance of canals and the maintenance and construction of bunds on the Euphrates. As far as the above works were concerned, the Department became purely advisory. The only works for which the Department retained responsibility were the construction and maintenance of all masonry heads, the construction and maintenance of river conservancy works and the complete control of the Hindiyah Barrage.

In June, 1921, urgent requests were made by the cultivators in the outside districts for the renewal of Irrigation control, but due to the reduced establishment under the new organisation these requests could not be entertained.

In July, 1921, the Saqlawiyah Construction and the Yusufiyah Sub-Divisions were formed to carry out the unforeseen works in connection with the construction of the Saqlawiyah Canal and the remodelling of the Yusufiyah Canal.

The Basrah Independent Sub-Division was formed in August, 1921, as a purely advisory Sub-Division.

The Budget allotment for 1921-22 was Rs. 36,00,000, plus Rs. 4,00,000. The latter amount for the Saqlawiyah Canal. Due to the lack of trained subordinate staff and the non-arrival of machinery for the Hindiyah Barrage all works contemplated could not be carried out with the result of an ultimate saving of approximately Rs. 6,00,000.

The principal works carried out by the Department during the year were :—

- (1) Extension and remodelling of the old Saqlawiyah Canal to irrigate a further 88,000 acres.
 - (2) Remodelling of the Yusufiyah Canal to increase its command from 60,000 to 125,000 acres.
 - (3) Construction of a new Masonry Head and Head Reach to the Nahr al Shah Canal.
 - (4) Construction of 7,000 square metres of Decauville Revetment for the protection of the Tigris River Bund at Karradah.
 - (5) Very extensive repairs to the down-stream weir and floor of the Hindiyah Barrage necessitated chiefly by the mis-handling of the Barrage during the insurgent occupation. The estimated cost to complete the work and instal new Stoney Patent Gates is Rs. 27,00,000, which will be spread over a period of three years dating from March, 1921. The estimated expenditure for 1920-21 was Rs. 11,00,000. However, due to the non-delivery of the new gates and certain machinery ordered from England it was impossible to complete the work intended and the total value of work done amounted to about Rs. 3,50,000.
 - (6) The part construction of the Butairah Regulator. This is a timber regulator 600 feet long and is necessary for the control of the Tigris. It is a River Conservancy work. It was impossible to complete it as the timber could not be procured in time and the exceptionally early arrival of the floods put a stop to the work.
 - (7) A Hydrographical Survey of the Tigris from 'Amarah to Qurnah for the object of studying the regime of the river. This survey is 86 miles long.
 - (8) The survey of approximately 3,000 square kilometres of land for new projects.
 - (9) The maintenance of many masonry canal heads.
 - (10) In addition a large number of scattered small irrigation schemes were examined and the Liwa authorities addressed as to the action which should be taken.
-

Works by the Irrigation Department.

Name of Work.	Funds for which the expense is Defrayed.	Situation.	Completed Works Cost.	Continuation Works.		Remarks.
				Expenditure during 1921-22.	Total estimated cost.	
Hindiyah Barrage	Government	Hindiyah	£ —	£ 23,333	£ 180,000	* These figures are approximate only; the actual expenditure depends on the acreage to be brought under irrigation.
Saqlawiyah Canal	"	Saqlawiyah construction Sub-Division.	—	6,666	26,666*	
Yusufiyah Canal	"	Baghdad District	—	8,333	28,333*	
Karradah-Decauville revetment ...	"	Karradah	10,000	—	—	Approximately.
Butairah Regulator	"	'Amarah District	—	12,000	20,000	
Maintenance of masonry heads ...	"	—	3,366	—	—	

Posts and Telegraph Department.

This Department embraces the former separate branches of Posts and Telegraphs under Military control. The policy pursued by the Department for the year under review was one of reconstruction and the main objects in view were to increase the number of 'Iraqis employed, to provide efficient Telegraph and Postal communications for the British Military Forces in 'Iraq and to bring the Telegraph and Postal Services into line with other countries.

The 'Iraqis now employed represent 80 per cent. of the Department's establishment.

In connection with telegraphic services a considerable amount of reconstructional work has been carried out, chiefly necessitated by the damage done during the disturbances of 1920.

During the year the Postal Department was called upon to place its external business in conformity with the regulations of the Postal Union and its system in all branches was revised. The internal services were also considerably modified to come into line with the normal system of conducting postal business, as opposed to the system in operation during the period the Military Postal Services existed.

During the year Money Order and Parcel agreements were entered into with the United Kingdom for direct exchange of Money Orders and Parcels with the United Kingdom and through her intermediary for places in Europe and America. Money Order and Parcel agreements were also entered into with India for direct exchange with her and through her intermediary for places in Africa, Australia and Asia.

The postal fees and rates both inland and foreign were revised and the foreign Telegraphic Money Order and V.P. systems were discontinued from 1st August 1921.

The introduction of a fortnightly aerial mail service between Baghdad and Cairo was effected on 15th August, 1921. The general appreciation for this service is shown by a comparison of despatches. The first despatch consisted of 32 letters whereas the average despatch to-day amounts to approximately 3,800 letters.

To give actual figures for expenditure and receipts is impossible within so short a space of time and the details as given in the attached are based on 9 months actual.

						Rs.
Total Revenue	75,60,433
Total Expenditure	65,86,537
Nett Revenue	9,73,896

New works begun during the year are :—

1. The Wireless Telegraphic Station, Basrah.

Work on this station commenced in November, 1921, and the completion is expected in June, 1922. This installation with a wave length of 2,000 metres and a range of 1,000 miles will put 'Iraq in direct communications with India, Cairo and Constantinople.

2. The Automatic Telephone System, Basrah.

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Work on this most up-to-date installation commenced in September, 1921, and its completion is expected in July, 1922. In connection with this installation three exchange buildings have been built at various points in the Basrah District, and the installation of exchange instruments and phones is progressing favourably.

Damage done during the disturbances in 1920 necessitated a considerable amount of repairs to telegraph lines and the work done in many cases, classified as "Reconstructional Work," almost amounted to the rebuilding of lines.

(1) Hillah to Diwaniyah: line covering a distance of 70 miles reconstructed on existing poles at a cost of £554.

(2) Kifl to Kufah, a distance of 13 miles were linked up with a complete new line at a cost of £831. This line was laid in place of the original which was completely demolished.

(3) In the Arbil-Ba'quba District reconstructional work was carried out to a cost of £770.

(4) At a cost of £2,020, telegraph lines from Ur Junction to Diwaniyah and from Samawah to Diwaniyah were reconstructed and maintained. These lines cover 117 miles and 55 miles respectively.

In connection with the Telephone system of Baghdad, new lines totalling 27 miles have been laid at a total cost of £1,094.

The cost of maintenance of Telegraph and Telephone systems are as under :—

Baghdad—							£
Telegraph	4,311
Telephone	1,700
Basrah—							
Telephone	1,100
Telegraph—Included in £2,020 for reconstructional work and maintenance (para. 4 above).							

Telephone subscribers in Baghdad are as under :—

Government	222
R.A.F.	40
Military	135
Private	65

Survey Department.

This Department which is the civil successor to the Military Survey Department was organised on a very much smaller scale in January, 1921. As this Department is merely a reproducing Department little can be said with regard to its history other than a brief description of the work executed.

The Budget allotment for 1921-22 was Rs. 2,58,675 including Rs. 46,675 allotted from Imperial Funds.

A survey of the oil areas at Naft Khanah and Chia Surkh was commenced in December, 1921, the expenditure of which was borne by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited.

During the year large scale surveys have been made of the Baghdad Cemetery, Dairy Farms and Residency, besides surveys for Military in the vicinity of Kut, Rumaithah, Quraitu and Mosul.

The completion and fair drawing of 31 standard maps of 'Iraq and the preparation of 35 large scale and miscellaneous maps and diagrams have been completed.

The following have been executed by the Photo-Zincographic and Printing Section :—

- 290 negatives prepared by wet plate process.
- 500 Aclo-Zincographic plates prepared.
- 76,000 copies of maps printed in five colours.
- 10,000 copies of maps printed in two colours.
- 252 maps dealt with in combined Photo-Zincographic and Vandyke processes.

Requisitions in small quantities for 69,567 maps have been dealt with during the year.

The reproduction of $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. T.C. maps in Arabic commenced in January, 1922. Up to the end of March, 1922, no copies were available for issue. Proofs only had been submitted.

IRAQ RAILWAYS.

Local Conditions.

The beginning of the financial year synchronised with the re-opening of the through route between Basrah and Baghdad. The reconstruction of the line destroyed by the insurgents in 1920 was sufficiently advanced to permit trains to resume running.

During the early months of the year the Army in 'Iraq was being reduced, and the Railway was called upon to carry great numbers of troops and great quantities of materials to the Base.

This work was successfully carried out, but to do so a large staff and equipment had to be maintained and when the evacuation was completed there was much re-arrangement and reduction of staff to be done in order to provide for normal conditions and civil traffic.

Capital Works.

The programme of capital works for the year was based on the cash grant recommended by Cairo Conference, and work was planned and staff arranged to spend this amount; the capital grant was subsequently reduced by His Majesty's Government and a large imported staff had to be dispensed with. Unfortunately the evacuation of the army at that time required all the steamer accommodation available and the surplus staff could not be repatriated for some time, and the cost of their pay and rationing automatically became a charge against the Revenue Budget.

Owing to the reduction of the capital grant many urgent works necessary to bring Railways to a more complete state have had to be postponed.

The capital grant which was sanctioned has been spent on the most urgent works—viz., the replacement of some of the unsafe timber bridges by permanent ones, the erection of staff quarters, and a beginning was made on new Central Workshops to replace the scattered and uneconomical workshops of the formerly separate divisions of the Railway.

A great deal of capital work is still necessary in order to bring these Railways up to a moderate standard of equipment, and to provide access to Karbala and Najaf, without which the Railways are not in a position to take full advantage of the commercial potentialities.

It is estimated on the basis of 15 rupees to the pound that about 4½ millions sterling will be required, spread over a period of, say, six years.

Statistics.

A schedule of statistics for the period 1st April, 1921, to 1st February, 1922, the latest period for which details are available, is attached hereto. The figures for the whole financial year will not be available until the end of April.

Cost of Oil Fuel.

The year's working has resulted in a considerable deficit. This was due almost entirely to abnormal conditions, and to the very high cost of fuel oil.

During the first three months of the year the price charged for fuel oil at Makinah was Rs. 113 per ton, for the following eight months it was Rs. 75-8-0, and for the last month of the year it was Rs. 65 per ton.

During the same periods the same fuel oil was being supplied to the G.I.P. Railway C.I.F. Bombay at Rs. 34 per ton. The price charged for fuel oil has fluctuated from Rs. 23-2-0 per ton in 1919, to Rs. 113 in 1921.

Closure of Hinaidi-Kut Line.

During the first half of the year the Hinaidi-Kut line was in operation and this line and the river provided an alternative route for traffic to Baghdad. The line was built purely as an army measure, and is not a part of the commercial system of Railways. This line has been partially dismantled and has not been in operation since 1st November, 1921.

Extensions Required.

Insistent demands to extend the railway to serve areas offering large traffics have been made, but lack of funds have prevented these demands being met. All the branches considered would improve the transport of the country, and would greatly add to the value of the Railway system as a whole.

The extensions most urgently required from the Public and administrative points of view are:—

- (i) A branch from main line via Musaiyib to Karbala. This would serve a large grain-producing area, and carry an enormous pilgrim traffic.
- (ii) A branch from main line to Khaniqin Town. This branch of seven miles would replace thirty miles of temporary line to the Persian frontier at Tiaruq, which is an abnormally expensive line to work and maintain, owing to the steep grades, weak bridges and worn out permanent way.
- (iii) A branch line from Baghdad to Dibban. This line would serve a very large agricultural district, and tap the river

traffic on the Euphrates, and would meet the very great demand for transport from Hit to Baghdad of the materials for the construction of roads and building, *i.e.*, bitumen, lime, stone, good brick and sand.

There are short sidings which are essential parts of these Railways, but for the construction of which there are no funds at present. The most important of these are: sidings to Ashar and Basrah City, and a siding to Nasiriyah Town.

Staff.

At the beginning of the year (1st April, 1921) the staff on the Railway was—

Imported Staff (including Officers).

European and Anglo-Indian	1,095
Indian	17,539
Local Labour	5,071

Great reductions were made in staff as soon as the evacuation of the army was complete, and the demands for transport of army personnel and material had been met.

The expensive imported labour necessary to meet requirements of Railways during reconstruction and when other labour was not available was eliminated as soon as possible and replaced by local labour as it became available.

The staff on Railways at the end of the year will be:—

Imported Staff (including Officers).

European and Anglo-Indian	560
Indian	5,425
Local	6,000

Uncertainty as to the future control of Railways and as to continuity of service for the staff has been and is exercising the minds of the officers and senior subordinates, and has made it impossible for the Administration to make arrangements to secure the best class of staff, whose interests would be safeguarded, and whose whole energies would be devoted to the betterment of Railway working.

Prospects for 1922-23.

The outlook for the coming year is much brighter for railways than during the one just ended. The Railways have been brought on to a more commercial basis than was formerly possible, and although very considerable capital expenditure is necessary to make the system an even moderately well equipped line, it is hoped that the financial working of 1922-23 will result in meeting the expenditure, and if any of the branch lines mentioned are built a small surplus over expenditure may be expected.

The winter rains have been most favourable, and great extensions of cultivation have been made, and it is confidently expected that there will be a surplus of grain for export.

Arrangements have been made to cater for a large pilgrim traffic. Some new and up-to-date coaching stock is due to arrive in the early months of the year which, when put into service, will add greatly to the comfort of the travelling public.

Terminal Stations of each Line.	Length of Line open to Traffic.	Gauge.	Passenger Receipts.	Goods Receipts.	Total Receipts.	Expendi- ture.
	Miles.		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Basrah-Baghdad ...	356.10	Metre	3,487,583	3,441,204	73,28,787	
Baghdad-Tiaruq ...	163.52	"	1,583,777	2,130,903	37,14,680	
Baghdad-Kut ...	109.75	"	Army Contri- bution	—	19,21,869	
Baghdad-Sharqat ...	185.50	4' 8½"	—	—	44,02,000	
Port Receipts ...	—	—	—	—	4,21,052	
Telegraph Receipts ...	—	—	—	—	50,981	
Postal Receipts ...	—	—	—	—	2,30,908	
Sundry Receipts ...	—	—	—	—	90,863	
Total ...	—	—	—	—	1,81,61,140	
Deficit ...	—	—	—	—	41,72,906	
Total ...	—	—	—	—	2,23,34,046	2,23,34,046
Train miles per month	69,509	Total ...	6,95,090	
Engine miles per month	1,18,351	Total ...	11,83,510	

XI.—THE ADMINISTRATION OF AUQAF.

General Review.

The Administration of Auqaf in the financial year 1921-22 has proceeded generally on the lines laid down in the period 1918-20, when Auqaf were administered entirely by the British Officer-in-charge: the conversion at the end of 1920 of the Administration into a Ministry with a Minister responsible to the Council of Ministers has led to some restraint of the former freedom of action of the administration, and to a considerable increase in the clerical work and in the cost of administration; but the ready co-operation of the Minister, His Excellency Muhammad 'Ali Fadhil Effendi, has made it possible for us to adhere closely to the policy of previous years, particularly in the development of the revenue-producing properties.

As the period on which the report is written is that of transition from the British Administration to that of the newly-created 'Iraq Government, the whole period of British Administration may be reviewed. In June, 1918, when first a whole-time British Officer became available for Auqaf, the condition of the Auqaf properties was such that any ruinous building or barren land was unhesitatingly labelled "Waqf." To-day every new building, whether completed or in course of erection, is assumed to be "Waqf."

The financial progress of Auqaf during the period is shown in the following table:—

Year.	Revenues.	Expenditure.
	Rs.	Rs.
1917-18	3,04,089	2,88,901
1918-19	4,55,726	3,99,735
1919-20	13,70,439	10,58,320
1920-21	16,70,886	13,12,191
1921-22	29,16,601	29,03,596
(Estimates.)		

The serious check sustained in the year of the disturbances, 1920-21, will be noticed. During that time building came to a standstill, the collection of revenues was exceedingly difficult, and the leasing of agricultural properties impossible.

It will be seen from the table also that, in the years 1917-18 and 1918-19, the revenues barely sufficed for the expenditure, despite the fact that very little indeed was expended on property development and mosque repairs: the problem in 1918 was therefore to increase revenues and keep down expenses: expenditure was scrutinized and cut down ruthlessly, and a large amount of bare-faced fraud and speculation discovered. But as a great number of the mosque employees in Baghdad were implicated, and it was recognized that standards of administrative honesty were not high under the former regime, it was decided that action should not be taken against the persons involved, but that Auqaf should content itself with stopping further speculations.

As regards revenues, the leasing of the properties was supervised, the returns jumped up, a little working capital became available, and the development of the properties began. The expenditure on this head during the period was:—

Year.							Rs.
1917-18	Details not available.
1918-19	60,425
1919-20	1,83,311
1920-21	2,70,102
1921-22	11,28,500
(Estimates)							
Total						...	16,42,338

A careful consideration of all building projects on the basis of the probable returns on the capital expended led to very profitable results, the cost in many cases having been covered by the first year's returns.

It is evident that Baghdad, as a field for investment on building schemes, is of exceptional promise. With a view to fostering a corporate spirit amongst the wealthier of the townsmen, the results achieved by the Auqaf have been shown to them, and they have been urged to form a company for the prosecution of building schemes, but as yet they have taken no action.

Unfortunately the former regime also left a legacy of ruined and dilapidated religious establishments, the repair and reconstruction of which had to go on together with the development of the properties: this expenditure is entirely unproductive, but inevitable. The following table shows the expenditure during the years under review:—

Year.							Rs.
1917-18	Details not available.
1918-19	18,062
1919-20	2,39,529
1920-21	1,69,732
1921-22	4,91,000
(Estimates)							
Total						...	9,18,323

Personnel.

The results attained at Baghdad and elsewhere are due to the carefully selected staff which has been collected and the efficiency and co-operative spirit which have been displayed. The composition and numbers of the staff during the period were :—

Year.	British.	Iraqis.	Total.
1917-18	—	Details not available	
1918-19	1	103	104
	(9 months)		
1919-20	2	115	117
1920-21	2	121	123
1921-22	1	145	146

The numbers include personnel engaged in the supervision of the constructional work, the whole of which has been carried out by the Auqaf Administration itself which employs its own masons, carpenters, tile-makers, and the like on daily rates of pay; these daily-paid employees are not included in the above table.

As regards the year 1921-22, the heads of revenue and expenditure are as set forth in the attached table: the revenues show increases which are due to the development and the better leasing of the properties. The following items on the expenditure side require explanation:

As has been mentioned earlier in this report, administrative expenses are high: they amount to 12 per cent. of the total expenditure, whilst the percentage in the 1920-21 budget was ten. It is of interest to note in this connection that the percentage in the Egyptian Ministry of Waqf for 1920-21 was sixteen and a half. In the case of the 'Iraq Auqaf, the Minister's salary alone accounts for $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the total expenditure, and the building constructional staff, the expenses of which might be charged reasonably to Property Development, account for nearly a further $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

The steady improvement in the payment of the Mosque officials is shown by the following table :—

Year.	Rs.
1917-18	Details not available
1918-19	1,57,184
1919-20	2,35,304
1920-21	2,49,880
1921-22	3,62,180
(Estimates)	

Colleges and Schools.

A good deal of educational work is done by Auqaf: for example, in Baghdad alone, the teaching of religion which comprises theology, Arabic language and literature, mathematics and history, is carried on by thirty-two teachers in mosques, where such appointments exist. This type of teaching is very casual, and control is difficult to establish. The students are usually adults who desire to become mosque officials.

More hopeful are the children's schools which have been established in the year 1921.

					Teaching Staff.	Pupils.
Baghdad in the						
Jama'al Haidar Khanah	2	48
Takiyah Baba Qurqur	2	46
Madrasat al 'Umariyah	2	63
A'dhamiyah in the						
Jama'al Imam al A'dham	3	96
Salman Pak in the						
Jama' Salman Pak al Farsi	1	45

These schools have been inspected and reported upon favourably by the officials of the Ministry of Education, and co-operation with this Ministry has been secured. The policy is to supplant gradually the Mulla's schools by children's schools, accommodated and maintained by Auqaf and inspected by the Ministry of Education on the lines of five schools already mentioned. Only reading, writing, and reckoning are taught in these schools, the object being to make the pupils literate, and so supply them with the minimum mental equipment necessary to enable them to occupy intelligently their places as citizens of 'Iraq, and, should their lot in life allow, to fit them for the primary education course in the Government schools.

There are also two higher schools, termed "Kulliyat" (colleges), one in the Jama'al Imam al A'dham at A'dhamiyah, and the other at Samarra, with a comprehensive scheme of studies, comprising theology, Arabic language and literature, mathematics (geometry, algebra and trigonometry), history, geography, physics, chemistry, natural history, cosmography and logic. The course of study has been fixed at six years, the limits of age of the students at 13 to 30, and entrance is only allowed to holders of the primary education certificate or its equivalent. Favourable reports from all inspections and visits have been received.

Towards the end of the year 1921, His Majesty King Faisal called for a report from the Ministry of Auqaf on the administration of Auqaf since the occupation. On His Majesty's perusal of this report, a project, which had been set on foot in the winter of 1918, for the reconstruction of the Mustansariyah, or a school to be called by that name, was enlarged by His Majesty's desire into a project for a University for 'Iraq to be called "Al Kulliyat Al al Bait" and to comprise all the faculties of a modern university; a site was selected, the Talumbah garden, near A'dhamiyah, and plans and drawings were prepared by Major J. M. Wilson, the Director of Public Works, for a scheme comprising (1) six large colleges, each capable of accommodating 400 to 600 students, (2) four smaller colleges, (3) a central block containing the University library, general Assembly Hall, Museum, and the Principal's Offices, (4) two residential blocks providing living and study accommodation for professors and students, (5) residences for the principals of the colleges, (6) a mosque, and (7) the usual appurtenances of a University, such as a restaurant for non-residents, servants' quarters and the like. The plans were approved by His Majesty, and it was decided to begin with the construction of the college for the faculty of theology, the central block, one residential block, and the mosque. Proposals for the appropriation of Auqaf funds for this part of the general

scheme were submitted to the Council of Ministers, who passed the project, and a start was made. On the 7th of April, 1922, His Majesty King Faisal laid the foundation stone of the theological college, the walls of which are rising steadily. The appropriations for this project will appear in the 1922-23 budget.

Buildings and Repairs (Mosque Establishments).

The amounts set aside under this head show that progress in the upkeep and reconstruction of the mosques and other religious establishments is maintained.

Property Development.

The appropriations under this head are the most justifiable in the budget: the programme for building has been prosecuted steadily throughout the year; in particular, a special effort to develop the Basrah properties is being made, the Chief Inspector of Properties having been delegated to Basrah for a year for this purpose.

The development of agricultural land was taken up in 1921; pump-plant was installed on the Furaijat Tha'albah and Saiyafiyah lands, and the whole area put under cultivation by Auqaf in partnership with the cultivators; this departure promises well for the annual cereal crop, but the principal object in view is the future for which the planting of 20,000 date-palms and many other fruit trees is proceeding.

The sum of Rs. 1,87,000 under Purchase of Properties was appropriated in order to buy out the partners of Auqaf, where a property the Khan Daftardar, at the river end of Bank Street, was held in shares. The site is very valuable, but the present buildings are practically ruins, and the partners would not contribute their share of the cost of the new buildings projected. The only solution was to buy them out, and this has been done.

Tapu Fees.

The registration in Tapu of the title to all Auqaf properties having been decided upon in 1920, the appropriation for the registration fees was necessary.

Ramadhan Bonus.

A bonus of an extra month's salary was given to the Mosque officials in the years 1919-21 at the close of the month of Ramadhan; but the Council of Ministers have decided that shall not be given in future.

Auqaf Budget for 1921-22.

Estimated Revenues for 1921-22.					Projected Expenditure for 1921-22.				
Sources of Revenue.	Auqaf Madh- butah.	Shrines.	Nabawi.	Total.	Heads of Expenses.	Auqaf. Madh- butah.	Shrines.	Nabawi.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	<i>Administrative.</i>	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
House properties ...	9,22,843	7,745	55,585	9,86,173	Salaries and allowances ...	2,93,940	8,040	3,050	3,05,030
Garden properties...	3,70,291	1,900	1,77,011	5,49,202	Expenses	32,160	120	6,500	38,780
Ground rents ...	84,890	300	1,200	86,390	Furniture	3,710	200	—	3,910
Agricultural lands	1,27,620	36	17,600	1,45,256	Rents	300	—	—	300
'Uqrs	95,169	—	400	95,569					
Forest lands ...	10,720	—	44,000	54,720	<i>Mosque Establishments.</i>				
Date-palm taxes ...	6,000	—	—	6,000	Salaries	3,18,180	30,350	13,650	3,62,180
Tapu dues	300	40	80	420	Allowances and pensions	19,400	—	150	19,550
					Expenses	86,340	14,430	2,600	10,370
<i>Fees.</i>					Colleges and schools	68,629	—	—	68,629
On Mulhaqlah Auqaf ...	23,500	—	—	23,500	Food and entertainment				
On shrines „ ...	27,412	—	—	27,412	allowances	46,200	—	500	46,700
On Nabawi „ ...	51,388	—	—	51,388	Buildings and repairs ..	4,35,500	55,500	—	4,91,000
Khairat Mudawwarah ...	63,414	—	—	63,414					
Compensation	53,000	—	1,000	54,000	<i>Property Development.</i>				
Burial fees	—	1,72,330	—	1,72,330	Buildings and repairs ...	6,36,100	43,600	1,74,800	8,54,500
Miscellaneous revenues ...	13,962	400	3,000	17,362	Agricultural development	87,000	—	—	87,000
Withdrawn from accumu- lated surplus for Build- ing and Development Schemes	5,30,745	—	42,720	5,73,465	Purchase of properties ...	1,87,000	—	—	1,87,000
					Tapu fees	47,220	2,700	—	49,920
					Bonus Ramadhan	33,000	—	—	33,000
					Khairat Mudawwarah ...	73,414	—	—	73,414
					Reserve for contingencies	21,611	—	—	21,611
					Charge for administration	—	16,356	26,888	43,244
					Surplus	—	—	1,14,458	1,14,458
Total	23,81,254	1,82,751	3,42,596	29,06,601	Total	23,89,704	1,71,296	3,42,596	29,03,596

XII.—THE CHRISTIAN REFUGEES.

I.—ASSYRIANS.

The conclusion of the year 1919 saw some 50,000 Assyrian and Armenian refugees still in camp at Ba'quba, where they had been since November, 1918, their destiny being a problem for the Administration, and their maintenance for the Exchequer. It was obvious that they had to be settled somehow, but in the general uncertainty as to relations with Turkey and Persia, of which countries the refugees were in theory the subjects, the question of settlement was not easy of solution.

The Assyrians, who numbered about 35,000, were the more important element, for they had been recognised as allies by Great Britain in the war, and had been used by her in the campaign of 1919 in Kurdistan. A definite promise of settlement under a benevolent, if not a British government, had been made to them, and their land, if not within our administered area, was at least on the immediate frontier. The Armenian problem was greater in itself, but the numbers in the camp (some 15,000) were smaller. They were simply refugees, and whatever the fate of their country, it was not under British direction. Government had no further duty to them than that of transporting them to their home when a home could be found, and maintaining them meanwhile.

Amadiyah Enclave Scheme.

Various schemes for settling the Assyrians had been mooted; and the most promising had been their suggested settlement in an enclave in the district of Amadiyah. This had been approved by Col. A. T. Wilson (then acting Civil Commissioner) and by Col. Leachman, Political Officer of Mosul. It was welcome to at least a great part of the people, and the Assyrian Battalion raised among them to serve in Kurdistan (which did good service in the 1919 campaign) had indeed taken some rather drastic steps towards clearing the country. The home Government, however, was unable to come to a decision on the point until the British troops had been withdrawn from the country and the project rendered impracticable.

The scheme had therefore to be dropped.

Conditions of Problem.

The Assyrian refugees were divided into two main bodies, the Persian subjects, who were the plainsmen of Urumiyah, and the Turkish subjects, the mountaineers of Hakkiari. Both were clear as to what they wanted, and both wanted the same thing, viz., return to their own homes, and settlement there under British protection. Unfortunately, the homes were in different districts, and though the people formed one congregation in theory, in practice most of them cared only for their own clan or village and very little for the fate of others. Further, the strain of war, and the conditions of life in a refugee camp,

had broken up the old organization of the people under their headmen (maliks) and Patriarch, and nothing had taken its place. Free maintenance, with liberal payment for all services, rendered even to themselves, had pauperized a type already inclined to live by beggary in some form.

The Urumiyah folk, though fair soldiers when trained were not capable of self-defence if replaced in their old home. Further, the feeling against such replacement was far more bitter in Persia than was the case in Kurdistan. In Kurdistan clans had always fought and the quarrels had not always followed religious lines: the great war appeared as no more than the largest known instance of an old custom. In Persia, the rising of the Christians appeared as almost a slave insurrection, in which the slaves had shown themselves better men than their masters—an unforgivable offence! Moreover, had the Persian Government been far readier to see the Christians back than was actually the case, they were in no position to guarantee their safety. The only practical authority in the Urumiyah district was that of Simko, the Shikak Agha, who had murdered the Assyrian Patriarch in 1918.

The problem of the mountaineers was simpler. They are excellent fighting material in themselves, and formed, as hinted, part of the established disorder of things in Kurdistan. Many Kurds were not unwilling to see their old neighbour foes back on the old lands, if once they could be sure that the return did not mean Christian domination. Naturally, Turkish intriguers assured them that nothing less was intended, and the Christians were quite ready to complicate matters by their conviction that the British Government really wanted to annex all Kurdistan, and, further, that British protection implied the right to revenge all old quarrels.

Agha Petros and his plan.

It was at this time, the spring of 1920, that Agha Petros, an Assyrian mountaineer, of the Baz tribe, came forward with his plan for the disposal of his nation. In the later stages of the war (particularly after the murder of the Patriarch, Mar Shim'un), he had come to the front and taken the lead; he had shown himself a good fighter, though real generalship was beyond him. He was certainly the most active leader of his nation, but his disposition to intrigue had brought him into bad odour with the British authorities at Ba'quba. He seemed to be, however, the best man available, and was so accepted by the British. His scheme was for the occupation of an area in the lower hill district on the Turko-Persian border, east of a line drawn from Gawar to Ushnu, and extending thence towards Urumiyah. With 8,000 armed men of his nation he could, he considered, occupy this area and allow the Urumiyah folk to return to their homes, while such mountaineers as did not accept settlement in the area itself might in time filter back to their mountain homes in Hakkari. The Assyrians would then constitute a buffer state, of which Petros would probably be the ruler, between Turkey, Persia and Iraq. Petros would command the force to be raised, and would be accompanied by a few British officers in a purely advisory capacity.

The scheme was not impossible on certain conditions. Those conditions were: (1) that the local Kurds should raise no objection, and turn a deaf ear to the Turkish intriguers among them; (2) that the difficulties of the transport of a huge caravan of women and children, as well as fighting men, by the very hard route chosen, did not prove insuperable; (3) that Petros should prove able to control his own people, so as to keep order among them during the operation, and induce the warlike mountaineers to convoy the plainsmen (for whom they cared not at all) to safety in the fat plain west of Urumiyah before returning to their own mountains. Petros, after the habit of his people, overlooked all obstacles on a road that was to lead to prosperity for his people and greatness for himself, and the scheme was accepted, perhaps too readily.

By April, 1920, some three-fourths of the nation had accepted the plan; the remainder of the nation hung back, under the leadership of the Patriarchal house. This family is theoretically the head of the nation, and had actually been so during much of the war, under the then Patriarch Benjamin Mar Shim'un. On his murder in 1918, a younger and weaker brother had been selected for the semi-hereditary office and the family had dropped into the background, and were kept there by the fact that the man selected, Paulus Mar Shim'un, was dying of tuberculosis, and actually died in the course of 1920. The subsequent election and consecration (partly by family influence) of a child of thirteen years to the Patriarchate, at once accentuated the differences in the nation, and the difficulties of the Patriarchal house and party. The opposition of this party was therefore negligible. A small proportion of the people, some 4,500 mountaineers, as well as a number of Urumiyans who had remained loyal to the Patriarch, were settled in villages in the Dohuk-'Aqrah districts, but the available corn lands were insufficient for more. In May, 1920, the transport of the nation from Ba'quba to Mindan, the starting point selected, was begun. The route proposed led from 'Aqrah through the difficult Barzan country to Gawar, whence the road to Urumiyah is easy.

Big dumps of food and munitions were collected at Jujar, near 'Aqrah, for the purpose. These arrangements were carried out with signal success by the Director of Repatriation, Colonel Cunliffe Owen.

Delays.

Before any start could be made, the Arab rising of 1920 had caused a general suspension of action. Ba'quba camp was attacked, and the dumps at Jujar, were threatened by the Surchi Kurds. It is true that the Assyrian contingents—to their own great satisfaction and our great advantage—defeated both attacks, but the condition of the country prevented any further movements until the end of October. The pending departure of Sir A. T. Wilson was a second reason for delay. Short of unusual good luck in the form of a late winter, the season was undoubtedly late to give great chance of a successful issue, but great expense had already been incurred in preparations, and it seemed to be a case of now or never. Accordingly on October 27th, 1920, Agha Petros' army was sent over the 'Aqrah Pass. It comprised about

4,000 men, armed with good rifles, mostly of the Turkish type, and several mountain guns; this was to occupy the territory, and the women were to follow later. There were also three British lieutenants. Food in abundance had been collected at Jujar, but the army proposed to live on the country, and much of the stores provided was left behind.

Some sort of arrangement had, it was understood, been made between Petros and the local Khurdish Aghas, but whatever the nature of the treaty, it did not prevent opposition being offered at the crossing of the Zab, by Faris Agha of Zibar, and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan, both of whom were actively hostile to the British authorities in 'Iraq. This was overcome, and Faris was driven off to the west, towards Nerva and Raikan, Kurdish districts that had always been loyal to us. Petros ordered a pursuit, and the clans of Tiari and Tkhoma,—which had been imprudently posted on the left wing of the advancing force,—thus found themselves moving in the direction of their own mountains, with arms enough to wreak full vengeance on ancient enemies. The temptation was too much for them, and—abandoning the scheme and the comrades for which they had never had any enthusiasm—they marched off on a great raid on the two districts named, plundering both of them, and incidentally the Chal area also, regardless of the fact that they had invited the Agha of that place to assist them against his old foe, Faris of Zibar. Meantime, the balance of the force, namely the Urumiyah men, deprived of its best fighting material, came to a halt in the unfamiliar hills, lost all order, and presently drifted back to 'Aqrah and Mindan, having lost about 100 men from cold (for the winter had set in early with heavy rain, and the rivers were in flood), several hundred rifles, and the bulk of their transport animals. The Tiari and Tkhoma men continued their wild career through Nerva and Chal, but were ultimately checked by Haji Rashid Beg, the Rais appointed by the British over the Barwar district, and by the British Assistant Political Officer of Dohuk, who had hurried to the scene of action with a few police. They also returned to the Mindan camp. Thus, as had been feared by many who knew too well the lack of discipline and union amongst the people, the scheme ended in fiasco, and the attempt had only increased the Kurdish distrust, both of the people and of the English, which British officials had been attempting to allay. The choice of route, the late date of the start, the absence of proper supply, and bad leadership, all contributed to this result, but in fact the absence of any common feeling or real organization among the people would have been enough to render success impossible. Even had there been proper training and discipline and direct British control, Agha Petros' scheme was a difficult one. There now remained nothing but to compensate the Kurds for the damage done and to think out a more practicable plan.

Repatriation by Infiltration.

At the beginning of the year 1921, some ten thousand Assyrians and as many Urumiyans, some twenty thousand refugees in all, had been recollected in Mindan camp and the prospects of successful repatriation were apparently further off than ever. It was realised that at

all costs the Mindan camp would have to be broken up during 1921, and accordingly a scheme for repatriation by infiltration was at once got out and despatched to Baghdad for approval in the middle of February. Briefly speaking, the idea was not to let loose the whole body of Assyrians upon Kurdistan in a horde but, relying on our control of the Kurdish leaders, to settle the mountaineers, tribe by tribe, with a reasonable interval between each move, the nearest to Amadiyah first, and the further sections passing successively through them, either to their homes or as near to their homes as suitable locations could be found for them.

We were emboldened to attempt this plan because it was known that some of the Assyrians had been in communication with Haji Rashid Beg with a view to returning to Barwar and that he had given them a favourable reply. If he maintained this attitude, the scheme was half insured and, as it turned out, he went even further to meet our wishes than we had dared to hope.

Sanction to proceed with the scheme was not received until the very end of May. This meant not only that none of the refugees would be able to reach their destinations in time to raise any crops that year, but also that the rate of settlement would have to be far more rapid than had been intended. Actually the whole of the twenty thousand odd refugees, with the exception of clearing up parties, were out of the camp by the beginning of August.

The sum allotted to us for the purpose was thirty lakhs for the Assyrians and a similar sum for the Urumiyans. After making a large allotment for contingencies a budget was drawn up in which an allotment of Rs. 122 was allowed for every person in the camp, man, woman and child. A severe drain was subsequently made upon the fund for contingencies by the intimation that the cost of the upkeep of the camp from April 1st to the beginning of the dispersal would have to be borne by the Dispersal Fund. Even in spite of this it was found possible, owing chiefly to the speed with which the scheme was worked, to keep within the limits set, and towards the end of the year, after setting aside a sum of two lakhs for necessary poor relief during the winter and another sufficient sum to cover all visible contingencies, it was found possible to relinquish a sum of two lakhs for the settlement of the Armenians at Nahr Umar.

Refusal of the Urumiyans to participate.

Of the settlement of the Urumiyans there is little to be said. In spite of grave warnings as to the difficulties they would encounter, practically all of them decided to endeavour to reach Persia *via* Baghdad. They were released from the camp in daily batches of 100 (subsequently increased to 150), took their money in Mosul and departed down the line.

As had been predicted to them their subsequent fate was not fortunate. On reaching the Persian frontier they encountered the opposition both of the Persian Government and of the local tribes. Robbed of what little they possessed, many turned back to find such occupation as they could in the 'Iraq. A few hundred of these are still

concentrated in a small camp in Baghdad, for which the Repatriation Department gave a grant to cover the original outlay. Some have reached Tabriz where they are said to be living in a state of misery.

Settlement of the Mountaineers.

As regards the mountaineers, they were sent out of camp in sections of roughly one thousand persons at intervals of about a week. Great credit is due to the Repatriation Department officers, especially Messrs. Charge, Holmes and Burn, for the clock-work like method in which these departures were effected and the very precise nominal rolls—very necessary if the payment of the allotments was to be kept correct—issued with every party. The intention was that each section should go first to Dohuk to be paid its allotments, but as things turned out a good many of them were paid in Mosul. Mr. Shim'un was lent by the Director of Repatriation to carry out payments there.

When the actual dispersal from Mindan began the uncertainty of our northern frontier gave rise to the greatest difficulty. All the Assyrians were unanimous in their determination to remain within the British sphere. The frontier of the Mosul Wilayat, up to which we had been administering since the Armistice, included the whole of Barwari Bala, up to, but just exclusive of Ashuta and Lizan. The Assyrians had not unnaturally hoped and expected that the frontier as laid down in the Peace Treaty would include their country, which is conterminous with the Mosul Wilayat. Actually, however, the frontier as described in the Treaty of Sévres not only left the Nestorian country to the Turks, but actually gave them Amadiyah, which is not only economically dependent on Mosul, but is strategically the door to this part of Kurdistan, since it has easy access to Zakho, Dohuk and 'Aqrah. Its exclusion from the boundaries of 'Iraq would, moreover, hand over to the Turks, not only the Nestorians of Barwari and the Chaldeans of the Sapna, but also men like Haji 'Abdul Latif who had held Amadiyah for us against Turkish agents and Turkish intrigues. The Assyrians were clamouring for an assurance, and any final assurance on the point, even if forthcoming, was bound to take weeks, if not months, to obtain. Rightly or wrongly, the assumption was made that the frontier would be revised, and that at any rate the actual Mosul Wilayat would eventually pass to 'Iraq. On this assumption the process of dispersal was carried out, in the hope that in due course it would be supported and the Nestorian Christians not handed over once again to the tender mercies of the Turks.

The Assyrians themselves proved extremely difficult to deal with. The good intentions of Surma Khanum, sister of the late Patriarch, and of Mar Timotheus, the Nestorian Patriarch of Malabar, were not enough to restore the lost authority of the youthful Mar Shim'un, while the intrigues of Agha Petros, who exhorted his followers not to fall in with any British scheme as he was about to conclude with the French an arrangement for an autonomous Assyria under French protection, made the people unwilling to listen to our counsels. The natural fanaticism of the Assyrians themselves made the problem all the more difficult. It must not be forgotten that in normal times they are just as

truculent as the other local Kurdish tribes, and no less savage. The right of a Nestorian Malik taking his place as a matter of course at the head of a conference of Kurdish chiefs does much to dispel the entirely erroneous idea that the Nestorians were a class of down-trodden slaves.

The bulk of the work of settlement fell on Mr. Jardine, who has met the many problems which faced him with unfailing knowledge, patience, and discretion. The presence of Dr. Wigram, who before the war was in charge of the Archbishop's Mission to the Assyrians, has been of great service in keeping touch with the people, in gaining their confidence and in persuading them to produce recruits for the Assyrian Levies, whose good behaviour and growing efficiency have been a matter of general surprise and admiration. Mr. Lampard, of the American Mission, has done most valuable service in treating the malaria-stricken villages of the Dohuk colony.

As has been mentioned some colonies of mountaineers and Urumiyans had been settled in 1920 in the 'Aqrah-Dohuk plains. The Urumiyans showed tendencies to settle down and make the best of their lot and their colonies should have been most successful. Unfortunately, as was the case with the mountaineers also, they were heavily stricken by malignant malaria in the late summer and autumn. It should be noted in this respect that the Assyrians who settled in the mountains have also suffered in this way and that generally the incidence of fever among all classes of the population is reported to have been very heavy this year.

Most of the Assyrians regard their residence in these colonies as purely temporary, until they can move towards their own homes. It is much to be hoped that a suggestion that a number of these should be settled in Barwari Zair, where there is ample and good land for them, may be carried into effect this spring.

In addition to these colonies, a small party of 300 Barwari Bala left Mindan for their homes before the actual dispersal scheme started. These, by arrangement with Haji Rashid Beg, were well received, entered at once into their houses which had been occupied and kept in good repair by the Kurds, and received their Tapu share (in these parts one-half) of the products from their lands which the Kurds had cultivated.

The actual dispersal scheme began on 31st May, and by 1st July 7,500 persons, including 1,000 who had joined the Levy camps, had left Mindan and had been settled in Government villages south of Zakho, in villages in Dohuk and Amadiyah districts, in Barwari Bala and Upper and Lower Tiari. The remaining mountaineers, 6,480 in number, consisted of six sections which had agreed to fight under Agha Petros for the Assyro-Chaldean independent State. They were all dispersed during July, and after the last of the Urumiyans had also left, Mindan camp was finally closed down.

The six sections continued to give trouble. Their first intention was to concentrate near Mosul, and await the appearance of Agha Petros, but recollection of their capabilities for highway robbery caused the political authorities to stand out against this scheme. Under pressure

the six sections moved up to Dohuk; the three Tiwari sections, who came first, were allowed to proceed straight into the mountains and reached their homes in August. As long as they remained on good terms with Barwari Bala they could come to little harm. Perhaps at the instigation of Agha Petros, the six sections now decided to concentrate in the N.E. corner of Barwari Bala and await him and the arms he promised, living during the winter on the food and grass which the Moslems had collected for themselves. Nothing but confusion could have resulted if this plan had been allowed to materialize. The remaining three sections were, therefore, ordered to disperse and with some difficulty were settled in Dohuk and Amadiyah, a few remaining in the Mosul plains. The presence of Agha Petros in Baghdad had proved throughout an impediment to any practicable scheme, but matters were facilitated by his departure in August, at my request, for Europe.

In September, the greater part of the colony settled in 'Aqrah in 1920 became restless, and moved into Dohuk, whence it is anticipated that they and most of the mountaineers will filter back into the hills during the spring of the present year. The Patriarchal family, which had been living in Mosul, have been given the use of the house of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission at Baibad, near Amadiyah. They have lost all influence, both religious and secular over the people.

Rifles have been distributed in numbers sufficient for self-defence against other than military attacks, but not so great as to encourage acts of aggression, to those settled in districts where Government protection was difficult, with special partiality to such sections as have weakened their man-power by generous enlistment in the Levies. As far north as Amadiyah the country is protected by Gendarmes, and south of a line drawn from Zakho to 'Aqrah, by the Levy garrisons.

Appendix No. 14 gives a financial estimate of the cost of the disposal of the refugees at Mindan camp, while the map, Appendix No. 13, gives the present distribution of the refugees.

In sum, I must record that in the dealings of the British Government with the Christian refugees it must be put to the credit of the former that 50,000 souls were maintained in comfort, not to say in idleness, by the British Exchequer for close on three years. That it was the intention of Government to re-establish the ancient Nestorian community as a united whole in a locality where they would have the best possible chance of maintaining themselves, and that if this scheme partially broke down, the failure was due firstly to the reckless imprudence of the mountaineers, and secondly to the refusal of the Urumiyans to accept our advice and the help which we were in a position to offer. As a result the Urumiyans have practically ceased to exist as a community. On the other hand, those of the mountaineers who returned to their homes are in a fair way to the recovery of prosperity, and the others are settled in adjacent upland regions where we may still be able to watch over and protect them in the future. If guardianship from foreign attack can be secured to them, the British nation will have no reason to feel that they have failed in consideration or generosity towards the Assyrian people as a whole.

In justice to the Assyrians it must be added that during the first three months of this year, when a Turkish attack was always a possibility, they have proved their strategic value on the 'Iraq frontier. In March, over 2,000 enlisted in the Levies within three weeks. It is far from improbable that this instant response on the part of a people whose qualities as fighting men are renowned was the main reason which induced the Kamalists to abandon their projected attack. Led by British officers, they are a native force second to none. Their quickness in picking up discipline and their mettle in battle has surprised and delighted all who have been concerned with them.

2.—ARMENIANS.

Nahr 'Umar Camp.

When the camp at Ba'quba was broken up, the position with regard to the Armenians was that they were unwilling to co-operate in any scheme for their settlement in 'Iraq because they still hoped for repatriation by sea to a Black Sea port, while the shipping position at that time was such as to preclude any immediate possibility of the realisation of this hope.

It was therefore decided to postpone the consideration of the final disposal of the Armenians until the outcome of the Assyrian scheme was known. In July, 1920, however, a telegram was received from the India Office saying that the return of the Armenians to Erivan might be possible before long, and, in the following month the Armenian refugees, who at that time numbered some 14,000, were transferred from Ba'quba to Nahr 'Umar, where they would be conveniently placed for embarkation at Basrah in the event of their repatriation by sea becoming possible. Subsequent events in Armenia made it evident that the time was inopportune for any scheme of repatriation, while on the other hand, it was felt that it would be unwise to incur the expenditure which would be involved in any scheme of local settlement until it was certain that repatriation to Armenia was definitely outside the sphere of practical politics. The matter was the subject of considerable inter-departmental correspondence and discussion in London, but up to the spring of 1921 the problem remained unsolved, and in the meanwhile the 14,000 Armenian refugees continued to be maintained at the expense of the British Government.

Up to this point, the cost of the camp had been borne by the War Office, but no provision for its upkeep had been made after 31st March, 1921. When the matter was discussed at the Cairo Conference, it appeared that the only alternatives were either to arrange for the immediate repatriation of the Armenians by sea, or else to turn them adrift in 'Iraq. Of these the first alternative was preferable.

Attempt at Absorption.

Unfortunately, in May, 1921, the Foreign Office intimated that the political situation in Turkey and the Caucasus was still unpropitious for any such movement and as it was obviously impossible for the

British Government to bear the heavy recurring expenditure on the maintenance of the refugees for an indefinite period while waiting for the political horizon to clear, the sum of £140,000 was allotted in a supplementary estimate as a final charge in respect of the Armenian and Russian refugees. A sum of £110,000 was allocated to the Armenians and a scheme was immediately drawn up which was intended to achieve the absorption of the refugees in 'Iraq with the least possible hardship to themselves and at the same time without exceeding the above financial limit. In accordance with this scheme the population of the camp was to be gradually reduced until 15th August, 1921, on which date the last party was to leave. Such balance as was not required for the maintenance of the camp up to the 15th August was to be expended in supplying 15 days' rations and a cash grant to each family to enable them to support themselves after leaving the camp and until they should be able to find suitable employment. At the same time every possible effort was made to find employment for them in advance. The inhabitants of the camp were classified according to profession and capacity for work and copies of this classification were sent to General Headquarters, to all the Ministries of the Arab Government and the Chambers of Commerce at Baghdad and Basrah, who were asked to co-operate by guaranteeing employment to as many of the refugees as possible on their leaving the camp. As a result of this measure work could undoubtedly have been found for a very large proportion of the able-bodied men, but unfortunately every offer of employment was absolutely refused by the refugees themselves and the Deputy Director of Repatriation at Nahr 'Umar found it impossible to induce the people to leave the camp in accordance with the schedule. The single able-bodied men had, however, been dispersed and a certain number of Persian Armenians had also been returned to Persia, though not until some difficulties with the Persian authorities had been overcome, and at the end of July the numbers in the camp had been reduced to about 11,700.

At this juncture I felt it essential to have some senior and responsible officer in the vicinity of the camp to advise, and when necessary, represent me in matters relating to the refugees. Although the dispersal of the Assyrian refugees was by this time complete, Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, C.M.G., the Director of Repatriation, was prevented by private considerations from himself proceeding to Nahr 'Umar, and in these circumstances General Headquarters kindly placed the service of Colonel H. Lakin at my disposal to assist me in the matter.

After visiting the camp and discussing the problem with the Acting Director of Repatriation, Colonel Lakin gave it as his considered opinion that the absorption in the labour market of 'Iraq of such large body of unskilled labour possessing such a low market value was impracticable. Contributory causes of this were the general slackness of the labour market at that time, and the fact that practically none of the Armenians could speak Arabic, but the main cause was unquestionably the attitude of the Armenians themselves, who believed that by a policy of passive resistance they would be able to coerce the British Government into providing them with free passages.

Repatriation.

After the situation had been fully examined it seemed probable that the most economical course would be to arrange for the transport of the whole camp to Batum. This course had the great advantage that it would dispose not only of the able-bodied men and their dependents but also of the infirm and orphans, etc., who would still have presented a difficult problem after any practicable scheme for the dispersal of the remainder in 'Iraq had been carried out. The local authorities at Basrah were also much in favour of this course since they feared that a large influx of unemployed and perhaps unemployable refugees would prove a danger and probably a source of expense to the local community. Moreover, assuming that their reception at Batum could be arranged, the time seemed particularly opportune for repatriation, since the pilgrim season was just ending and shipping especially fitted for pilgrim traffic might be obtained on favourable terms before being refitted for ordinary commercial use. A telegram was accordingly sent to the Secretary of State strongly recommending this course.

The political situation in trans-Caucasia had by this time improved and, after the possibility of settling the whole of the refugees on the land in 'Iraq had again been considered and rejected, the proposal to ship the whole population of the camp to Batum was approved and a further grant of £100,000 was voted for the purpose.

The Armenian Government, when consulted, were prepared to accept the refugees at Batum but wished to stipulate that they should arrive in groups of not more than 1,000 at a time, at intervals of at least a fortnight. This could not be arranged without greatly increasing the cost, and the Armenian authorities were therefore asked to agree to accept groups of 3,000 at somewhat longer intervals. The interval between the sailing of the first and second boat was three weeks, and that between the sailing of the second and third boats over six weeks.

At the time the decision to charter shipping was finally reached there remained some 9,600 refugees in the camp so that if three boat loads of 3,000 each could be despatched it seemed that the camp would be practically cleared. The reduction to 9,600 had been effected in various ways. Further parties had left for Persia. Some 600 refugees had petitioned and been allowed to proceed to Mosul to be settled on the land on the same terms as the Assyrians, and some few (very few) had accepted offers of local employment. As soon, however, as it became known that the scheme for repatriation had materialised, refugees from various parts of 'Iraq left their work and returned to the camp in the hope of obtaining a free passage. Moreover, owing to representations made by the Armenian authorities, who professed themselves unable to arrange for the reception of the full number at Batum, the last boat, the "Shuja," carried only 2,000 refugees. It thus came about that after the "Shuja" sailed on 27th January, 1922, there still remained some 2,600 refugees in camp at Nahr 'Umar to be dispersed locally.

During the whole period that the refugees had been under the protection of the British, an orphanage had been maintained as a separate branch. It contained in July, 1921, 830 boys and girls of all ages up

to 18. Guarantees were obtained from Armenian individuals and societies for the maintenance of these orphans in Palestine and it had been intended to despatch them by the first boat. Owing to an epidemic of chicken pox it was impossible to carry out this intention and the orphans were eventually included among the 2,000 who left by the last boat. These orphans were disembarked at Kantara, and the "Shuja," therefore, reached Batum with 1,200 refugees only. The total numbers sent to Batum on the three boats were thus 7,200. In addition to the orphanage from Nahr 'Umar a number of orphans had been collected by the Armenian authorities and maintained in Mosul without the assistance of the British Government. Funds being no longer forthcoming for their maintenance, the Armenian authorities reduced the numbers of this orphanage to 75, and it was requested that these also might be sent to Palestine. Owing to fact that the sailing of the "Shuja" was in doubt up to the last moment on account of the attitude of the authorities at Batum, these orphans were eventually despatched with very little notice being given to the High Commissioner for Palestine. The latter, however, very kindly obtained the necessary additional guarantees and was also good enough to arrange for the reception of the whole party of orphans at Kantara.

Owing to the urgent representations of the Armenian Government, who stated that unless some help was afforded them they would be unable to save the Armenians from starvation after their arrival at Erivan, authority was given for the purchase of food supplies from Disposals Board for distribution in Armenia. Food supplies to the value of one lakh of rupees were accordingly shipped on the "Shuja," in addition to rations for the voyage. The principal items consisted of 25 tons of preserved meat, 30 tons of biscuits and 10 tons of condensed milk.

With regard to the dispersal of the 2,600 still remaining at Nahr 'Umar the same difficulties have arisen as arose in July when it was intended to disperse the whole camp locally, but the problem is of course now greatly simplified not only by the smaller numbers involved, but by the fact that care has been taken that only able-bodied man and their families have been left behind. The absorption of the bread winners of these families in the labour market of Baghdad would not at present have proved impossible and the Acting Director was accordingly authorised to send those who so wished to Baghdad at Government expense. None of the refugees have accepted this offer and they are at present persisting in their attitude of passive resistance and are even refusing to accept the 15 days' rations and subsistence allowance offered them. They are, however, steadily being struck off the ration strength which will have been reduced to nil by 31st March, 1922, and orders have been given to strike the tents over their heads, by force if necessary, if they persist in their refusal to leave the camp. It is feared that this procedure will result in some suffering among the refugees, but it is no longer possible to protect these people from the natural consequences of their refusal to help themselves.

XIII.—FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Until the signature of the treaty between Great Britain and the 'Iraq, together with the confirmation by the League of Nations of the relations between the two Governments, the international position of the 'Iraq is necessarily ambiguous. Pending a definition of 'Iraq nationality, laissez passers have been issued by the 'Iraq passport authorities and Divisional Advisers, while in the case of 'Iraqis abroad arrangements are being made for their issue by British Consular representatives.

RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

Throughout the period under report the 'Iraq Government has been in the anomalous position of having, in Turkey, a neighbour theoretically in a state of armistice but, in fact, clearly hostile. Apart from the political effervescence which the efforts of the Kamalists have maintained on the Kurdish frontier, the economic effects have been serious.

The Sanusi.

Turkish propaganda has been associated in the main with the name of Shaikh Ahmad al Sanusi. In January, 1921, he was first heard of as having arrived in Diyarbakr from North Africa; in April he was reported to be in Mardin, and in May he was spoken of as being either the Turkish candidate for the throne of the 'Iraq or else the deputy of Burhan al Din Effendi, a son of the Sultan 'Abdul Hamid. The candidature of Amir Faisal was the signal for an intensive effort to advocate his cause. A large number of his manifestoes found their way to Mosul and other parts of the country. They were violently anti-foreign and pan-Islamic in tone and no less singularly ineffective. Arab Nationalist hopes and Islamic ideals were alike satisfied by the qualifications of the Amir Faisal and his arrival in Baghdad was immediately followed by the submission to himself of those chiefs of the Shammar Jarba' who had remained in close touch with the Turks and had been in March, the recipients of lavish decorations. It was a decisive rebuff to the pretensions of the Sanusi, or rather to the anticipations of his principals, for he is himself a typical darwish, devoid of initiation and used merely as mouthpiece. In December, 1921, rumours were current that he was to be set up as the ruler of a semi-independent Trans-'Iraq State, embracing Jazirah, Rawanduz and Sulaimani, but a scheme of this nature would seem to combine every element of failure and the Sanusi himself is generally believed to be highly dissatisfied with his position and anxious to return to his own country.

The complete lack of success which has attended Turkish propaganda among the Arab tribes on the frontier was further exemplified by the return to the fold in June of Daham al Hadi, who had been one of the recipients of Turkish honours. He is the favourite grandson of the old chief Al 'Asi, who is probably still the greatest name among the Shammar. Daham has been given rights of cultivation at 'Awainat, within the 'Iraq frontier, while Al 'Asi is cultivating extensively at Rumailan, the nearest point on the frontier to Nisibin. The Tai,

who are nominally in the French zone, have been forced by their proximity to the Turks to enter into relations with the latter, and Bulaibil, the chief of the small Albu Hamad tribe, has maintained a robber band near Jazirah, but the successful bombing of his encampments in June, 1921, in retribution for his attacks on barges on the Tigris belonging to the inhabitants of Zakho, led to a pronounced diminution in his activities. Aeroplane action was also taken over the frontier in August, when Naif Beg of the Miran Kurds crossed the Tigris to raid the Hassanan in the neighbourhood of Faishkhabur. (At the end of March, 1922, Naif Beg was seeking permission to settle in 'Iraq territory.)

Turkish Propaganda among Indian Troops.

Turkish propaganda has also been directed against the loyalty of our Indian troops, in the form of circulars in Urdu emanating either from Angora or from Pan-Islamic associations in Anatolia. Muhammadan troops were urged to murder their officers and desert to Mustafa Kamal who was preparing a great army for the extirpation of the infidel and the liberation of the holy places of 'Iraq. The effects produced by these appeals were inperceptible and since July the dissemination of pamphlets of this nature has ceased.

Kamalist difficulties with the Kurds.

On the Kurdish side, the Kamalists have had troubles of their own. In January they were forced to take measures, attended with no great success, for the subjection of the Hawerki, and in October they attacked Shernakh with a considerable force, partly composed of tribes at feud with 'Abdul Rahman Agha, Shaikh of Shernakh, who has been practically independent since the armistice. He has been at pains to cultivate friendly relations with the British authorities and on the arrival of the Amir Faisal, he, with other Kurdish leaders, expressed to the latter their willingness to accept him as King and to form part of the 'Iraq State under conditions of local autonomy. When the Turkish attack developed, he was obliged, owing to lack of ammunition, to come to terms. During the winter he refused all invitations to present himself in Jazirat ibn 'Umar, but in February, when as a result of the Angora Agreement, the Kamalists had been able to increase their force on the 'Iraq frontier and to place outposts as far as the vicinity of Zakho, along the foot of the Shernakh hills, he found himself obliged to give way to Kamalist threats and visited Jazirah. Even then he did not agree to Turkish schemes for an offensive against the 'Iraq.

Kamalist efforts at Rawanduz.

Within the 'Iraq borders such success as the Turks have met with has been obtained in the Rawanduz area and is due to the insurgence of the Surchi chiefs of 'Aqrah and malcontents of Rawanduz. In May, 1921, measures were taken against the Surchi, as a result of which Batas was re-occupied and the Surchi chiefs made submission, with the exception of 'Ubaidullah and his half-brother Raqib. The political atmosphere showed every sign of clearing and overtures had been put forward by the Rawanduz leaders, when in June a new factor was

introduced by the appearance of a Kamalist official with a small Turkish reconnaissance. Active propaganda was instituted among the tribes and by the end of July the Turkish force had been increased to about 60 rifles, with a gun and two machine guns. The police post at Batas was attacked on July 31 and forced to surrender; ten days later the Pizhtgelli section of the Khushao under Ahmad Beg delivered an unsuccessful attack on Rania. The local tribes rallied to the British authorities, Babakr Agha of the Pizhder was as unwavering as ever in his adherence and operations conducted in the Shaur district by a combined force of Levies and tribesmen, with aeroplane support, brought the villages to submission and obliged the small Turkish military element to beat a hasty retreat.

Nevertheless, the presence of the Turks was a continuous menace to local peace and in September a force of Levies and Police, supported by aeroplanes, entered Dasht-i-Harir and inflicted punishment on the tribes. Again the combination of native forces and aeroplanes gave highly satisfactory results. As a result of this action 'Ubaidullah made submission, paid up a fine of rifles and ammunition and accepted responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Dasht-i-Harir. But for the second time the Kamalists upset the equilibrium, and the arrival, in December, 1921, of Turkish reinforcements amounting to 80 men with ammunition and three machine guns, shook the favourable resolutions of 'Ubaidullah, who on December 14th, treacherously attacked a Levy reconnaissance at Babachichik between Arbil and Harir. This ambush led to operations by Levies, Police and aeroplanes on a larger scale, with salutary results, though they involved the loss of two British officers. The tribesmen were demoralized and disheartened, the Turkish force was reduced to about 70 men and the leading insurgent chiefs, with the exception of 'Ubaidullah, made overtures to H.M. King Faisal and were given permission to come in under safe conduct, a permission of which they have not yet availed themselves.

Sulaimani Frontier.

On the Sulaimani side intensive anti-British propaganda, carried out through the medium of the Persian Kurdish chiefs of Aoraman and of Mahmud Khan Dizli, was the feature of the end of the year 1921. Mahmud Khan, chief of the village of Dizli in Persia, had been concerned in the rising of Shaikh Mahmud in 1919. He was captured by the Persian Government in 1920 and handed over to the British authorities. After a term of imprisonment in India he was released in September, 1921, and allowed to proceed to Sulaimani, under a guarantee that he would not cross the Persian frontier. This condition he promptly broke; he returned to Dizli and wrote to Mustafa Kamal asking for arms to enable him to drive the British out of Sulaimani. Late in December several petty Aoraman chiefs, who were undoubtedly in touch with him, entered the Halabja plain and proceeded to collect taxes. In the middle of January a Levy force was ambushed near Halabja, in an attempt to recapture a local suspect, and suffered casualties which included the British officer in command, Captain Fitzgibbon. An attack on Halabja was averted by highly successful

aeroplane operations and Mahmud Khan Dizli returned across the Persian frontier. His followers continued to commit depredations in Halabja plain until, in March, threats conveyed by aerial reconnaissance persuaded him to put himself into communication with the British authorities.

With regard to persons connected with Shaikh Mahmud's rising of 1919, his brother 'Abdul Qadir and distant relative, Gharib ibn 'Arif, together with his follower, Shaikh Ahmad, were released from Henjam under the amnesty in May. The two first named are living at liberty in Baghdad while Saiyid Ahmad was allowed to return immediately to Sulaimani. Shaikh Mahmud and his brother-in-law, Shaikh Gharib ibn Ma'ruf, were released from prison in India in January and are at present in Kuwait, where they are retained as political detenus pending their ultimate return to Sulaimani.

Rumours of Kamalist attack.

Throughout the past year, rumours of an impending Kamalist attack on 'Iraq were persistent and after the conclusion of the Angora Agreement caused serious anxiety. The fact that the headquarters of the 3rd Division were transferred to Sa'airt had, without doubt, grave significance; the garrison at Jazirat ibn 'Umar was strengthened and small posts placed along the frontier. It was at this moment that the rallying of the Assyrian refugees and their enlistment in great numbers in the Levies, as has been recounted, proved of signal value and as this report closes, it is increasingly unlikely that the Kamalists can venture on an attack in force in the immediate future. But until the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey finally stabilizes the situation, the threat from the north cannot be disregarded, while Turko-Bolshevist intrigue will continue to be a menace to the 'Iraq State.

NAJD.

Extension of Ibn Sa'ud's Authority.

The predominant facts in the politics of Arabia during the past 18 months have been the capture of Hail by Ibn Sa'ud and his subsequent efforts to push his tribal influence in the northern part of the peninsula up to the borders of 'Iraq and the necessity thereby involved of a definite delimitation of frontiers both in the case of the 'Iraq and also in that of Kuwait.

Troubles between Ibn Sa'ud and Kuwait.

As regards Kuwait, a treaty concluded between Ibn Sa'ud and His Majesty's Government in December, 1915, and ratified in the following July, contained the following clauses:—

1. His Majesty's Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, Al Hasa, Qatif and Jubail and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter, are the countries of Ibn Sa'ud.
2. Ibn Sa'ud undertakes to refrain from aggression on or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, etc., and the limits of their territories shall be afterwards determined.

The delimitation of boundaries was thus expressly left in abeyance, but in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 the area under the direct control of the Shaikh of Kuwait had been defined on the map by a red circle with a radius of some 70 miles from Kuwait on all sides, while a farther area, from Umm Qasr to Al Ratk, thence down the Batin to Hafar and eastward to the Persian Gulf which it reached at Jabal Manifah, some 200 miles south of Kuwait, was recognized as being within his sphere of influence.

In 1919, the respective claims of the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn Sa'ud over this outer zone gave rise to a dispute which resulted, in September, in an unsuccessful attack on Jahrah, a village which lies about 30 miles west of Kuwait, on the part of the Akhwan leader, Faisal al Duwish. I met Ibn Sa'ud at Ojair at the end of September, on my way to Basrah, and resumed the cordial relations which I have ever enjoyed with him, but a suggested conference at Kuwait did not materialize. At the end of December, Ibn Duwish raided a section of the Shammar camped in the desert borders of the 'Iraq, in retaliation for the undoubtedly provocative attitude of which they had been guilty. Some of the Dhafir, a tribe subject to the 'Iraq administration were camped with the Shammar and shared in their losses, while during January not only the Dhafir but also the Samawah confederation of the Huchaim suffered from Akhwan raids.

Early in February, 1920, Ibn Sa'ud sent his relative, 'Abdullah ibn Thunaiyan, on deputation to Baghdad. He was accompanied by a native of Mosul, Dr. 'Abdullah, who had been for some years a resident at Rivadh. Ibn Thunaiyan stayed in Baghdad till May, while Dr. 'Abdullah returned to Riyadh in the following November. Both were helpful in dealing with current questions with Najd. As regards the dispute touching the boundary of Kuwait, the Shaikh of Muhammerah, as a friend of both parties, arranged that his son, together with Shaikh Salim's nephew, Ahmad al Jabir, should visit Ibn Sa'ud at his capital, with a view to adjusting differences. On February 27th, while the party were at Riyadh, the death of Shaikh Salim removed the chief obstacle to agreement. When Shaikh Ahmad returned to Kuwait on March 24th, he was nominated by the notables of the town successor to Shaikh Salim, since when, although the final settlement of the Kuwait frontier has not yet been effected, no further hostilities have occurred.

Subjugation of Jabal Shammar by Ibn Sa'ud.

For the next eight months Ibn Sa'ud was occupied in pursuing his long-cherished ambition to subdue Hail and the Shammar of Ibn Rashid. By April he had defeated 'Abdullah ibn Mit'ab, the ruling Amir of Jabal Shammar, in a series of engagements, and had begun the blockade of Hail. The immediate results in the 'Iraq of this campaign were twofold. It produced a state of continuous lawlessness on the southern frontiers; the Dhafir and some of the local tribes, profiting by the general unrest, engaged in raids and forays, sometimes on the Akhwan, sometimes on each other, on the tribes of Kuwait, while the Akhwan retaliated on their side. Secondly, it started a migration to

the 'Iraq of Shammar tribes fleeing from the forces of Ibn Sa'ud. They passed up through the 'Amarat 'Anizah, the tribesmen of Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, and a portion of them crossed the Euphrates at Ramadi into the Jazirah, after paying kodah, a tax on domestic animals, to the 'Iraq administration. The rest remained in the pasturages of the 'Amarat.

The refugee Shammar.

Fahad Beg had obtained an assurance from Ibn Sa'ud that he and tribes camping with him should be immune from attack on the part of the Akhwan, but the fact that the Shammar of Najd, whom Ibn Sa'ud regarded as rebellious subjects, had taken refuge with the 'Anizah, was naturally galling to the Imam, and in the end of April he wrote a sharp letter to Ibn Hadhdhal, reminding him of the ties of kinship—Ibn Sa'ud is himself of 'Anizah descent—claiming authority over all 'Anizah, and, while recognizing their close relations with his friend the British Government in 'Iraq, declaring that he would not agree to their being ruled by any Arab except himself. At the same time he wrote to inform me that an assembly of the leading men of Najd had invited him to assume the title of Sultan, which he had accordingly done, and asked for recognition by His Majesty's Government. This was officially accorded to him on August 22nd.

Ibn Sa'ud's letter crossed one from myself acquainting him with the fact that His Majesty's Government were disposed to admit and support the candidature of the Amir Faisal to the throne of 'Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud had recently given another proof of his loyal friendship with the British Government by persuading his subjects, at the risk of grave dissatisfaction on their part, to refrain for the third year from performing the pilgrimage so as to avoid possible friction with the Hijaz, and his reply to my letter, far from intimating opposition to the presence of the Amir Faisal in the 'Iraq, breathed his willingness to accept the decision of His Majesty's Government, coupled with the prayer that his own interests might be equally respected. The Amir Faisal, while on his way up the Gulf, had himself written to Ibn Sa'ud, and he received from him a reply couched in amicable terms.

The refugee Shammar were, however, a difficult problem, and, as Fahad Beg rightly pointed out, their presence among his own tribe was likely to prove a danger to the latter. The Shammar used the asylum thus afforded them as a safe vantage ground from which to raid the Akhwan, and it was clear that the 'Anizah might well be involved in the counter-raids of the Akhwan. All Shammar were accordingly ordered to cross the Euphrates into the Hillah Division, where their movements could more easily be controlled.

Fall of Hail.

Meantime the Amir 'Abdullah ibn Rashid had made submission to Ibn Sa'ud, but his cousin, Muhammad ibn Tallal, held out in Hail, and sent messages to me begging me to intervene between himself and Ibn Sa'ud. The latter, however, refused all offers of mediation, and early in November the prolonged struggle terminated in the submission of Hail to the Sultan of Najd. The victor exhibited a clemency as

generous as it was statesmanlike. He took immediate steps to relieve the population of the town, which had been reduced to great straits during the siege, and appointed Ibrahim al Subhan, the head of a house which had served as Wazirs of the Al Rashid and was closely related to them by marriage, as Governor of Hail, placing a small garrison of his own followers in the citadel. He and his son contracted matrimonial alliances with the Rashid and Subhan, and the Rashid family were removed to Riyadh, where they were treated with all honour.

Correspondence with regard to treaty between the 'Iraq and Najd.

I instructed the Political Agent at Kuwait to convey my congratulations to the Sultan, together with my appreciation of his conduct, and at the same time I pressed upon him the importance of an early meeting between himself and King Faisal, under my auspices, to establish a clear understanding as to the frontiers of the two Arab States and the treatment of tribal affairs. Ibn Sa'ud replied with the suggestion that a preliminary agreement on the principles of the proposed treaty was desirable, before the actual meeting of himself and King Faisal took place. To this, in accord with His Majesty, I agreed, but in intimating concurrence it seemed necessary, in view of the extravagant claims which Ibn Sa'ud was known to be contemplating, to lay down the *prima facie* basis on which, in my opinion, negotiations should be conducted, namely, that the tribes of Muntafiq, 'Anizah and Dhafir must be accepted as appertaining to the 'Iraq, and that the line of the frontier would be determined in accordance with predominant and prescriptive rights to watering-places.

As regards the 'Anizah, the attitude of the 'Amarat, under Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, is one of unqualified determination to remain, as 'Iraq tribesmen, under the direct protection of the British Government. On the Syrian side of the desert, it would appear that the Ruwallah section of the 'Anizah are prepared to accept Ibn Sa'ud's suzerainty.

Akhwan propaganda and attack.

There had been for some time past friction between the 'Iraq Government and the Shaikh of the Dhafir, Humud ibn Suwait. Owing to his failure to control his tribe from raiding, his subsidy had been intermitted, while there was a large claim against him on the part of a group of Mosul merchants who had been robbed by his tribesmen in the previous spring. It was unfortunate at this juncture that King Faisal sanctioned in January the appointment of Yusuf Beg al Sa'dun as head of a Camel Corps which was intended to guard the southern frontiers of 'Iraq. Between Yusuf Beg and Ibn Suwait there was long-standing enmity, and the latter was likely to regard the appointment of his rival to control the southern marches as a direct blow aimed at himself. He did, in fact, repair at once to Riyadh, and though I requested Ibn Sa'ud not to receive him, on the ground that he was in trouble with the 'Iraq administration, my letter did not reach Riyadh until after his visit. He returned with presents from the Sultan of Najd and was accompanied by an Akhwan representative, Ibn Ma'amar, despatched for the purpose of collecting tribute from the Dhafir as well as from 'Iraq shepherds pasturing their flocks in the desert.

Meantime the arrival of a large body of Akhwan at Hafar early in February had alarmed the 'Iraq tribes, who withdrew to the neighbourhood of the railway, fearing reprisals for raids on the Akhwan, for which the Dhafir had been responsible during the winter. A few days later a section of the refugee Shammar, who were on their way to make submission to Ibn Sa'ud, were attacked near Shabikah, south of Najaf, by a Shammar Shaikh who had accepted the Akhwan creed. This episode, together with constant rumours that the Akhwan intended to move against the 'Amarat, increased the apprehension of the 'Iraq tribes. In the middle of February, Yusuf Beg and the Camel Corps moved out towards Abul Ghar, south of Suq al Shuyukh, where the Mutasarrif paid him a visit and exhorted the tribes not to pay tribute to Ibn Sa'ud. His action probably precipitated the issue. On March 11 the Akhwan leader, Faisal al Duwish, no doubt in collusion with Ibn Suwait, looted Abul Ghar, and, not finding the Camel Corps there, followed them to Shaqrah, some 30 miles south of the Basrah Nasiriyah Railway, and delivered an unprovoked attack on Yusuf Beg's men and the Muntafiq shepherds, who were camped in the vicinity.

The losses sustained both by the Camel Corps and the tribesmen were heavy, but in view of the very serious portent implied by the opening of hostilities with Ibn Sa'ud, I judged it necessary to obtain the instructions of His Majesty's Government, while keeping the Akhwan camp under aerial observation. On March 14th, however, aeroplanes were heavily fired upon and orders were, therefore, given for immediate measures in retaliation.

I lost no time in warning Ibn Sa'ud that the situation which had arisen was one of extreme gravity, and received from him an assurance that the Akhwan had acted without his authority, together with expressions of his deep regret for what had occurred and of his determination to inflict punishment on those who should be proved guilty. I acquainted His Majesty the King and His Highness the Naqib with the contents of this communication, which, together with my letter to Ibn Sa'ud, was published in the local papers. Meantime I had received instructions from His Majesty's Government to proceed with negotiations in the matter of the treaty between 'Iraq and Najd and to inform Ibn Sa'ud that temporarily the frontier between the two States should be considered to run along the lines I had previously indicated to him, *i.e.*, including the wells and pasturages of the Dhafir, Muntafiq and 'Amarat 'Anizah.

Provisional frontier.

I have laid down the provisional frontier as follows:—

From Kharjah on the Batn, about 40 miles N.E. of Hafar, thence due west, leaving Hafar to Najd and Dulaimiyah and Wuqubah to 'Iraq. Thence it will proceed north-west towards the Jal al Batn, leaving Umm al Radhumah and Zablah to Najd and Jumaimah to 'Iraq. The frontier will then touch the Jal al Bain at a point immediately south of Jabal 'Athman. Thence it will proceed due west between Lifiyah and Loqah and through Al Khir south of Lifiyah by Fijan, Al Buwaithah, Khashm al Ra'an, Quraiyit al Dhumran to Mughaiyir, and thence in a direct line towards Sakakah.

As for the Shammar who had taken refuge in 'Iraq territory, encouraged by the obvious desire of Ibn Sa'ud to consolidate his conquest by propitiating the conquered, the majority have returned to their Arabian pasturages and adopted the tenets of the Akhwan. But many thousand tents, more especially of the 'Abdah section, have been withheld by personal disinclination from the creed of Najd or by private blood feud; these have remained, and are likely to remain, between the two rivers. We have, indeed, witnessed during the past year one of those episodes which from time immemorial have populated 'Iraq—the hungry desert has once more overflowed into the settled lands, to raid, to pilfer, and, finally, through a long and somewhat painful, if ultimately beneficial process of absorption, to settle down to husbandry.

3.—PERSIA.

In January, His Majesty the Shah, travelling strictly incognito, passed through the 'Iraq on his way to Europe. On his arrival at Baghdad, he was met by myself and representatives of the King, but the private character of his journey precluded any official reception.

Pusht-i-Kuh.

Relations with the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh have been mainly concerned with the vexed question of the Wali's right to levy grazing fees on those sections of the Bani Lam who are accustomed at certain seasons to graze their flocks in Pusht-i-Kuh territory. In former days before the fixation of the Turco-Persian frontier, the Bani Lam were accustomed to graze free in what the Wali considered his limits; in return for which a small present of a horse or a few rifles was given to the Wali. On the conclusion of peace, however, the Wali claimed the right to collect the full tax in respect of the flocks grazing in his territory and based his claim on the contention that the custom whereby the Bani Lam had formerly escaped such tax had arisen solely out of the indeterminate nature of the boundary and that, since the fixation of the boundary by the Boundary Commission in 1914, there remained no justification for the custom. Attempts to induce the Wali to forego his claim and to continue the old friendly custom of reciprocal free grazing rights between himself and the Bani Lam proved unavailing, and, as the Wali's claim was legally justifiable, there remained no option but to recognise it. This decision is by no means pleasing to the Bani Lam Shaikhs who resent as a reflection on their dignity the necessity of paying the Wali for what they have received for generations by custom. The tension thus produced between the Wali and the Bani Lam has been increased by the truculent behaviour of the former who has twice in the last few months raided the flocks of the Bani Lam with the object either on making up arrears which he considers due to him, or of punishing those whom he suspects of attempting to evade payment of the tax. It is only with difficulty that the Bani Lam have been prevented from retaliating against these acts of aggression. The possibility of avoiding such disputes for the future and of

saving the *amour propre* of the Bani Lam by making a fixed annual payment to the Wali through the 'Iraq Government in return for free grazing rights in the Pusht-i-Kuh is now under consideration and negotiations with this object in view have been opened with the Wali.

There can be little doubt that the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh is anxious to take advantage of any weakness on the part of the 'Iraq Government to improve his own position at its expense. One of his methods, for example, has been to purchase, generally through an agent, estates contiguous to his own territory, but on the 'Iraq side of the frontier. The local Qaimmaqam has, however, refused his application for title deeds confirming these transactions, and the Wali has requested me to intervene on his behalf. I have referred the whole question to the Council of Ministers, pointing out the complications likely to arise if neighbouring potentates are permitted to own large estates in 'Iraq contiguous to territory which they control in an official capacity. The Council is enquiring fully into the Wali's claims and I do not anticipate that its decision will be in his favour.

APPENDIX 1.

PROCLAMATION TO THE TRIBES AND COMMUNITIES OF THE 'IRAQ.

The High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, wishes it to be understood by the tribesmen and communities of the 'Iraq that he has been deputed by His Majesty's Government to return to Mesopotamia in order to give shape to their fixed intention of assisting the leaders of the people to create a National Government. It is clearly difficult to carry out the wishes of His Majesty's Government as long as certain sections of the tribes and communities of Mesopotamia are in active opposition to the Government. It is thought that this state of affairs has to some extent resulted from misplaced doubts on the part of certain sections of the people as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government, but the High Commissioner believes that he has been able completely to remove all doubts among those with whom he has actually come into touch. He is at a loss to know for what object tribesmen are at present fighting and would be glad if they would put themselves in communication with the nearest Political Officer in case any misunderstandings exist which can be removed.

Dated 17th October, 1920.

APPENDIX 2.

INSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE.

Whereas by Notification dated the 17th June, 1920, it was announced that His Majesty's Government had authorised the calling of a General Elective Assembly for the purpose of preparing an organic law for 'Iraq:

And whereas it is considered expedient that, pending the convocation of such General Assembly and the framing thereby of an organic law, the Government of the Country should be conducted, subject to my supervision and direction, by a provisional national Government:

Now Therefore, I, Major-General Sir P. Z. Cox, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., by virtue of the authority vested in me as High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, do hereby proclaim as follows:

1. There shall be constituted a Council of State consisting of a President, Ministers for the following departments, Interior, Finance, Justice, Awqaf, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce and such other members without portfolios as may be nominated.

2. Until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect, the Council of State and Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations and in general military affairs, except such military affairs as concern solely the locally recruited forces.

Made at Baghdad this 11th day of November, 1920.

P. Z. Cox,
High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

APPENDIX 4.

COMMUNIQUE RELATING TO THE CAIRO CONFERENCE.

The primary reason for the Conference which has taken place in Cairo was the desire of the new Secretary of State to meet the British representatives of the spheres which come within the scope of his responsibilities, such as the High Commissioners of the Iraq and Palestine and the Governors of Aden and Somaliland, so as to acquaint himself at first hand with the current problems of the regions in question.

As regards Mesopotamia, the principal question to be considered was the necessity of a large reduction in military expenditure to enable the British Government to bear the burden of maintaining a stable position in the Iraq until the National Government can itself assume responsibility for the Arab State which it is the aim of His Majesty's Government to establish and foster.

His Excellency the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief were able to present to the Conference proposals both for immediate and for gradual economies which, the Secretary of State hoped, would satisfy the views of His Majesty's Government and of the British public. At the same time the agreement which was arrived at pays due regard to the maintenance of internal security, the protection of the frontiers and the necessary financial arrangements for the progress of the Arab army.

A general amnesty will be declared at an early date and will include all who were concerned in the recent disturbances, with the exception of a few individuals who have committed heinous crimes, such as the murder of Colonel Leachman and offences of a similar nature.

When the Conference terminated, the Secretary of State proceeded to Palestine and thence to England in order personally to place before the Cabinet the results which had been reached. It is hoped that in the course of the next few days the approval of the Cabinet will be received by telegram, when H.E. the High Commissioner will make a further communication.

Dated Baghdad, the 12th April, 1921.

APPENDIX 5.

PROCLAMATION OF A GENERAL AMNESTY.

With the authority of His Majesty's Government, His Excellency the High Commissioner is pleased to announce, with effect from May 30th, a General Amnesty to Political Offenders on the following basis:—

1. Pardon is extended to all those who were concerned in the rising of 1920, in respect of offences committed as against the State in the furtherance thereof. Those who are detained or imprisoned will be set free, those who are fugitive are permitted to return without fear of prosecution with the following exceptions:—

- (1) Individuals who at the time when they took part in the rising were paid servants of the Administration of the Occupied Territories, whose cases will be dealt with individually on their merits.
- (2) The individuals listed below who are believed to be responsible for the commitment or abetment of certain heinous crimes and are at the present time fugitive from justice—

- (a) Shaikh Dhari, his sons Khamis and Sulaiman; Sarb and Salubi, sons of Mijbas; Daham, son of Farhan, all of the Zoba 'tribe, and all charged with the murder or abetment of the murder of the late Colonel Leachman.
- (b) Jamil Bey and Hamid Effendi Dibuni, charged with being the immediate instigators of the murder of the late Captain Barlow, Lieut. Stuart and other British officials at Tall 'Afar.
- (c) Jasim al Mu'ailu, of the Mahdiah tribe, charged with the murder of the late Captain Wrigley.
- (d) Muhammad al Mulla Mahmud, of Bahahsah, charged with the murder of the late Lieut. Bradfield, Hasan al 'Abd and Jasim al 'Awad, of the Bani Tamim tribe, charged with the murder of Mr. Buchanan.
- (e) Nasir ibn Araidhir, 'Alaiwi al Jasim, Ibn Duraimidi, all charged with the murder of British prisoners.
- (f) Basbus ibn Mahawwis, Na'mah ibn Dhu'ainah, all of the Jawabir tribe, charged with the murder of R.A.F. officers.
- (g) Falih ibn Haji Sifr al 'Ajairib, of the Jawabir tribe, charged with instigating the murder of Lieut. Hedgar and five British gunners on the "Greenfly."

¶2. As regards individuals not concerned in the rising of 1920, but interned, exiled or fugitive in connection with political offences committed prior to the said rising, His Excellency the High Commissioner is authorised in principle to extend the amnesty to them subject to consideration of each case on its merits, on receipt of formal application addressed by the individual to the nearest British representative, or to the High Commissioner direct.

P. Z. Cox,

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

Dated 30th May, 1921.

APPENDIX 6

Monday the 18th April, 1921.

WITHDRAWAL OF SAIYID TALIB PASHA FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND BAGHDAD.

The High Commissioner thinks fit to acquaint the public with the grounds on which he has considered it necessary to withdraw Saiyid Talib Pasha from the Government and from Baghdad.

Before his departure for Cairo the High Commissioner had repeatedly made it known, both publicly and in personal intercourse with officials and notables, that it was his intention and the wish of His Majesty's Government to ensure that the people of Iraq should be left entirely free to express their wishes as to the form of Government they desired and the person of the ruler.

On his return from Cairo the High Commissioner repeated these assurances to H.H. the President of the Council and to Saiyid Talib Pasha, in answer to their inquiries.

On the morning of the 16th inst. the High Commissioner was notified of a speech delivered by Saiyid Talib Pasha to a distinguished company at a dinner party given by himself on the 14th instant to an English gentleman on a short visit to Baghdad.

In this speech Saiyid Talib, after repeatedly inquiring from his guest whether he could confirm the High Commissioner's assurances regarding the attitude of the British Government in this connection, and after asking how best he could ensure the removal of certain British officials from the High Commissioner's staff, of whose attitude he did not approve, went on to say that he and his countrymen were determined to see that the policy of His Majesty's Government was faithfully carried out in accordance with the above assurance. Then, turning to Amir Rabi'ah and Shaikh Salim Khaiyun, who were among his guests, he suggested that should there be any signs to the contrary, the Amir Rabi'ah, with 20,000 armed tribesmen and Shaikh Salim al Khaiyun,

with his tribal following, would have to be reckoned with. He also had the temerity to associate the name of H.H. the Naqib with the same menace.

The High Commissioner has not the least doubt of the friendly attitude of the two chiefs referred to, or of the absolute integrity of purpose of H.H. the Naqib, but he considers that if he for a moment tolerated the utterance of such an unseemly threat of recourse to armed force against His Majesty's Government by a person in the responsible position of Saiyid Talib Pasha, he would be failing in his duty both to the people of this country and to the British Government. Accordingly, in the interests of law and order and good government, he felt called upon to ask the G.O.C.-in-Chief to arrange for the immediate removal of Saiyid Talib from the scene.

Saiyid Talib left Baghdad on the night of the 16th.

APPENDIX 7.

KURDISTAN.

The following communiqué from the High Commissioner was published by the Advisers in the Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimani Divisions, on May 6th, 1921—

"The High Commissioner has under active consideration the administrative arrangements to be made for the future of the Kurdish districts in Iraq. It has been represented to him that apprehension exists less the interests of the Kurds should suffer by subordination to the national Government established in Baghdad, and that for this reason there is some demand for an autonomous regime.

At the same time the leaders of Kurdish opinion are understood to be fully alive to the economic and industrial ties connecting their areas with Iraq proper and to the inconveniences which separation might involve. In these circumstances His Excellency desires if possible to obtain an indication of the real wishes of the Kurdish communities. Should they prefer to remain under the Iraq Government, he is prepared to recommend to the Council of State a solution on the following lines :—

"*One.*—As regards the Kurdish districts of the Mosul Division which fall within the sphere of the British Mandate, a Sub-Liwa should be formed comprising the districts of Zakho, 'Aqrah, Dohuk and Amadiyah, with headquarters at Dohuk, the Sub-Liwa to be under a British Assistant Mutasarrif. Qaimmaqams for the time being should be British, but will be replaced by Kurds or Kurdish speaking Arabs acceptable to the Kurds as soon as competent men are forthcoming. This Sub-Liwa would be generally subject, for all financial and judicial purposes, to the National Government in Baghdad and would then naturally send representatives to the Constituent Assembly; but for the purposes of general administration the Qaimmaqams would address the Sub-Mutasarrif while administrative appointments would be made by H.E. the High Commissioner in consultation with the local authorities.

"*Two.*—The High Commissioner will endeavour to arrange to associate British officers with the administration of Arbil, together with Keui Sanjaq and Rawanduz, and will secure that in the appointment of Government officials regard will be had to the wishes of the people. Details should be elaborated as soon as the situation admits.

"*Three.*—Sulaimani will be treated as a Mutasarrifliq governed by a Mutasarrif in Council; the Mutasarrif to be appointed by the High Commissioner and to have a British Adviser attached to him. Pending the appointment of a Mutasarrif the British Political Officer will act in this capacity.

"To the Mutasarrif in Council will be delegated such powers, including right of appeal to the High Commissioner, as may be approved by the High Commissioner, after consultation with the Mutasarrif in Council on the one hand and the Council of State on the other.

"Qaimmaqams for the time being should be British to be replaced by Kurds as soon as competent men are forthcoming."

NOTE.—Appendices Nos. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 have not been reproduced.

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